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THE INVESTMENT-RELATED ASPECTS OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 
PETER K. YU* 
This Article critically examines the investment-related aspects of intellectual 
property rights with a focus on the use of investor-state dispute settlement 
(ISDS) to address international disputes involving intellectual property 
investments.  It begins by exploring the growing trend of using investment law 
and fora to set international intellectual property norms.  It also closely 
evaluates the strengths and weaknesses of the ISDS mechanism.  This Article 
then examines the various upgrades that the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) 
Agreement has provided to the ISDS mechanism.  It further outlines the 
conceptual and institutional improvements that could make ISDS even better 
than the mechanism provided in the TPP Agreement.  This Article concludes 
by exploring whether the TPP ISDS mechanism has provided any silver linings 
if it is adopted without modification. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Three decades ago, the United States and other contracting parties 
to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) launched the 
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (“Uruguay 
Round”) to develop new international norms concerning the trade-
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related aspects of intellectual property rights.1  These norms eventually 
became the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights2 (“TRIPS Agreement”).  This oft-criticized agreement 
not only transformed the international intellectual property landscape 
but also necessitated a revision—and for many countries, a complete 
overhaul—of the domestic intellectual property system.  It is therefore 
no surprise that some leading commentators have described the TRIPS 
Agreement as a “sea change” or “tectonic shift” in international 
intellectual property law and policy.3 
Today, we are at a similar crossroads.  Through bilateral, regional, 
and plurilateral trade and investment agreements, new norms are 
being developed to address the investment-related aspects of 
intellectual property rights.4  Even more importantly, these norms 
will strengthen the ability of private investors, such as intellectual 
property rights holders, to sue foreign governments without the 
support of their home governments.5  One therefore cannot help but 
wonder whether we are now approaching yet another “sea change” or 
“tectonic shift” in international intellectual property law and policy. 
In the past few years, the developments concerning the investment-
related aspects of intellectual property rights have garnered 
considerable policy, scholarly, and media attention.  Frequently 
                                                     
 1. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Ministerial Declaration on the 
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations of 20 Sept. 1986, 25 I.L.M. 1623, 
1626 (1986). 
 2. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 
1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. 
 3. FREDERICK M. ABBOTT ET AL., INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN AN 
INTEGRATED WORLD ECONOMY 3 (2007) (stating that “the TRIPS Agreement 
represented a sea change in the international regulation of IPRs [intellectual 
property rights]”); Charles R. McManis, Teaching Current Trends and Future 
Developments in Intellectual Property, 52 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 855, 856 (2008) (noting that 
“the field of international intellectual property law underwent a tectonic shift with 
the promulgation of the [TRIPS Agreement]”); see also JAYASHREE WATAL, 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE WTO AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 2 (2001) 
(“TRIPS is, by far, the most wide-ranging and far reaching international treaty on the 
subject of intellectual property to date and marks the most important milestone in 
the development of international law in this area.”). 
 4. See, e.g., Peter K. Yu, The Non-Multilateral Approach to International Intellectual 
Property Normsetting, in INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:  A HANDBOOK OF 
CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 83, 110–12 (Daniel J. Gervais ed., 2015) [hereinafter Yu, 
Non-Multilateral Approach] (discussing the investment-related aspects of intellectual 
property rights). 
 5. See discussion infra Section II.A. 
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criticized is the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP),6 whose agreement 
the United States and its eleven trading partners in the Asia-Pacific 
region signed on February 4, 2016.7  The TPP investment chapter 
and its attendant investor-state dispute settlement (“ISDS”) 
mechanism have generated quite a controversy, as this mechanism 
will allow private investors to resolve international disputes with host 
states concerning all forms of investments, including those in the 
intellectual property field.8 
Senator Elizabeth Warren (D–Mass.) is among the most vociferous 
critics of ISDS, which she condemned for giving large multinational 
corporations “the right to challenge laws they don’t like—not in 
court, but in front of industry-friendly arbitration panels that sit 
outside any court system.”9  In the run-up to last year’s presidential 
election, the candidates from both the Democratic and Republican 
Parties also offered similarly harsh criticisms.  While Hillary Clinton 
described ISDS as “flawed” and called for “a new paradigm for trade 
agreements that doesn’t give special rights to corporations, but not to 
workers and NGOs,”10 Donald Trump made his opposition loud and 
clear by lambasting the TPP as “another disaster, done and pushed by 
special interests who want to rape our country.”11  Upon taking office, 
President Trump quickly followed through by signing a presidential 
memorandum that directed the United States Trade Representative 
                                                     
 6. Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, Feb. 4, 2016 [hereinafter TPP 
Agreement], https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/trans-pacific 
-partnership/tpp-full-text. 
 7. Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Rep., Trans-Pacific Partnership 
Ministers’ Statement (Feb. 4, 2016) [hereinafter Trans-Pacific Partnership Ministers’ 
Statement], https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/20 
16/February/TPP-Ministers-Statement.  The twelve TPP partners are Australia, 
Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, 
Singapore, the United States, and Vietnam.  Peter K. Yu, TPP and Trans-Pacific 
Perplexities, 37 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1129, 1129 (2014). 
 8. TPP Agreement, supra note 6, art. 9.1 (defining “investment” to include 
“intellectual property rights”). 
 9. Deirdre Fulton, As Countries Line up to Sign Toxic Deal, Warren Leads Call to 
Reject TPP, COMMONDREAMS (Feb. 3, 2016), http://www.commondreams.org/news/2 
016/02/03/countries-line-sign-toxic-deal-warren-leads-call-reject-tpp. 
 10. Press Release, Oregon Fair Trade Campaign, Clinton and Sanders Oppose 
“Lame Duck” Vote on the Trans-Pacific Partnership (May 6, 2016), 
http://www.citizenstrade.org/ctc/oregon/2016/05/05/clinton-and-sanders-oppose-
lame-duck-tpp-vote. 
 11. Jessica Hopper & Ines de la Cuetara, Donald Trump Slams Trans-Pacific 
Partnership as “A Continuing Rape of Our Country,” ABC NEWS (June 29, 2016, 7:17 
AM), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/donald-trump-slams-trans-pacific-partnership-
continuing-rape/story?id=40213090. 
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“to provide written notification to the Parties and to the Depository of 
the TPP . . . that the United States withdraws as a signatory of the TPP 
and withdraws from the TPP negotiating process.”12 
Apart from the TPP Agreement and its ISDS mechanism, 
intellectual property-related investor-state disputes involving Philip 
Morris have also received significant attention.  Since February 2010, this 
multinational corporate giant began challenging the plain-packaging 
regulations for tobacco products in Uruguay13 and Australia.14  Both 
efforts have since failed.15  From March 2012 to September 2013, 
Ukraine, Honduras, the Dominican Republic, Cuba, and Indonesia also 
filed complaints challenging the tobacco control measures in Australia 
before the Dispute Settlement Body of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO).16  These ongoing cases have since been consolidated,17 and the 
WTO panel plans to issue its decision later this year.18 
                                                     
 12. White House, Presidential Memorandum Regarding Withdrawal of the 
United States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations and Agreement (Jan. 
23, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/01/23/presidential-
memorandum-regarding-withdrawal-united-states-trans-pacific. 
 13. Philip Morris Brands Sàrl v. Oriental Republic of Uru., ICSID Case No. 
ARB/10/7, Request for Arbitration (Feb. 19, 2010), http://www.italaw.com/sites/de 
fault/files/case-documents/ita0343.pdf. 
 14. Philip Morris Asia Ltd. v. Commonwealth of Austl., UNCITRAL, PCA Case 
No. 2012-12, Notice of Claim (June 22, 2011), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/ 
files/case-documents/ita0664.pdf [hereinafter Philip Morris Asia’s Notice of Claim]. 
 15. Philip Morris Brands Sàrl v. Oriental Republic of Uru., ICSID Case No. 
ARB/10/7, Award, ¶ 235 (July 8, 2016), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/ 
case-documents/italaw7417.pdf; Philip Morris Asia Ltd. v. Commonwealth of Austl., 
PCA Case No. 2012-12, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, ¶ 588 (Dec. 17, 
2015), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw7303_0.pdf. 
 16. Request for Consultations by Indonesia, Australia—Certain Measures 
Concerning Trademarks, Geographical Indications and Other Plain Packaging Requirements 
Applicable to Tobacco Products and Packaging, WTO Doc. WT/DS467/1 (Sept. 20, 
2013); Request for Consultations by Cuba, Australia—Certain Measures Concerning 
Trademarks, Geographical Indications and Other Plain Packaging Requirements Applicable to 
Tobacco Products and Packaging, WTO Doc. WT/DS458/1 (May 7, 2013); Request for 
Consultations by the Dominican Republic, Australia—Certain Measures Concerning 
Trademarks, Geographical Indications and Other Plain Packaging Requirements Applicable to 
Tobacco Products and Packaging, WTO Doc. WT/DS441/1 (July 23, 2012); Request for 
Consultations by Honduras, Australia—Certain Measures Concerning Trademarks, 
Geographical Indications and Other Plain Packaging Requirements Applicable to Tobacco 
Products and Packaging, WTO Doc. WT/DS435/1 (Apr. 10, 2012); Request for 
Consultations by Ukraine, Australia—Certain Measures Concerning Trademarks and Other 
Plain Packaging Requirements Applicable to Tobacco Products and Packaging, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS434/1 (Mar. 15, 2012).  Ukraine requested the WTO panel to suspend its panel 
proceedings on May 28, 2015.  See Communication from the Chairperson of the Panel, 
Australia—Certain Measures Concerning Trademarks and Other Plain Packaging Requirements 
Applicable to Tobacco Products and Packaging, WTO Doc. WT/DS434/1 (June 3, 2015). 
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Another widely reported ISDS dispute that has yet to be decided is 
Eli Lilly’s high-profile CDN$500 million complaint19 against Canada 
under chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA).20  This case concerned the Canadian courts’ invalidation of 
Eli Lilly’s patents on the hyperactivity drug Strattera and the anti-
psychotic drug Zyprexa.21  The multinational pharmaceutical giant 
claims that the “promise doctrine,”22 which the courts used to 
invalidate its patents is inconsistent with Canada’s obligations under 
NAFTA, the TRIPS Agreement, and the Patent Cooperation Treaty.23  
                                                     
 17. See Communication from the Panel, Australia—Certain Measures Concerning 
Trademarks, Geographical Indications and Other Plain Packaging Requirements Applicable to 
Tobacco Products and Packaging, WTO Docs. WT/DS434/12, WT/DS435/17 
WT/DS441/16, WT/DS458/15, WT/DS467/16 (Apr. 28, 2014) (“The Director-
General will compose the panels in DS434, DS435, DS441, DS458 and DS467 on 5 
May 2014, and the same panelists will be appointed in all these disputes, pursuant to 
Article 9.3 of the DSU [Dispute Settlement Understanding].”). 
 18. See Communication from the Panel, Australia—Certain Measures Concerning 
Trademarks, Geographical Indications and Other Plain Packaging Requirements Applicable to 
Tobacco Products and Packaging, WTO Doc. WT/DS467/21 (Dec. 6, 2016) (“The Panel 
wishes to advise that it now expects to issue its final report to the parties not before 
May 2017, in light of the complexity of the legal and factual issues that arise in this 
dispute.”).  For an early analysis of this dispute, see generally LUKAS VANHONNAEKER, 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AS FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENTS:  FROM COLLISION TO 
COLLABORATION 200–20 (2015); Susy Frankel & Daniel Gervais, Plain Packaging and 
the Interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement, 46 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1149 (2013). 
 19. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Government of Can., ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2, Notice 
of Arbitration, ¶¶ 3, 85 (Sept. 12, 2013), http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/icsidb 
lobs/onlineawards/c3544/dc4612_En.pdf. 
 20. North American Free Trade Agreement, Can.-Mex.-U.S., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 
I.L.M. 289 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA]. 
 21. Eli Lilly & Co., ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2, ¶ 4. 
 22. As Cynthia Ho explained, 
Since 2005, Canadian courts have invalidated roughly a dozen patents for 
failing to satisfy this doctrine.  Pursuant to this doctrine, a patent that 
promises something is only useful if it does what it “promises.”  If the patent 
does not make a promise, a scintilla of utility can establish usefulness.  For 
patents and patent applications that make a promise, whether the promise is 
fulfilled can either be demonstrated in the patent or “soundly predicted.”  In 
the many cases where the promise relies on a sound prediction, there are 
three components to satisfy.  First, there must a be [sic] factual basis for the 
prediction.  Tested compounds can supply this.  Second, the inventor must 
have a sound basis from which the desired result can be inferred from the 
factual basis as of the date of the application.  Third, there must be proper 
disclosure in the patent application to justify the quid pro quo of a patent 
monopoly. 
Cynthia M. Ho, Sovereignty Under Siege:  Corporate Challenges to Domestic Intellectual 
Property Decisions, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 213, 236–37 (2015). 
 23. Patent Cooperation Treaty, June 19, 1970, 28 U.S.T. 7645, 1160 U.N.T.S. 231. 
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The breach of these obligations has, in turn, prevented Eli Lilly from 
meeting its reasonable investment-backed expectations.24 
Taken together, these developments have created a general 
impression that investment law has now rudely entered the 
intellectual property domain.  Such an intrusion is important because 
ISDS arbitrations involving intellectual property disputes represent 
“not only a new frontier in investment arbitration, but more 
importantly, uncharted territory in the increasingly complex and 
contested landscape of international intellectual property 
obligations.”25  There has also been a growing concern about an 
ongoing shift of intellectual property norm-setting activities from the 
trade regime to the investment regime.26  Such a shift could take away 
the traditional limitations, safeguards, and flexibilities that have been 
built into the international intellectual property regime.27 
To a large extent, the current debate on the investment-related 
aspects of intellectual property rights has raised similarly far-reaching 
questions as the intellectual property debate at the launch of the 
Uruguay Round three decades ago.  These questions are particularly 
troubling considering the higher level of intellectual property 
protection and enforcement now demanded by bilateral, regional, 
and plurilateral trade and investment agreements.  The TPP 
Agreement, for instance, has called for intellectual property term 
extension, special provisions for internet service providers, expansion 
of eligibility for trademark rights, and greater protection of trade 
secrets and clinical trial data.28 
Against this backdrop, this Article critically examines the 
investment-related aspects of intellectual property rights with a focus 
on the use of ISDS to address international disputes involving 
intellectual property investments.  Part I explores the growing trend 
                                                     
 24. Eli Lilly & Co., ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2, ¶¶ 3–4. 
 25. Ruth L. Okediji, Is Intellectual Property “Investment”?  Eli Lilly v. Canada and the 
International Intellectual Property System, 35 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1121, 1122 (2014) 
[hereinafter Okediji, Is Intellectual Property “Investment”?]. 
 26. See, e.g., Rochelle Dreyfuss & Susy Frankel, From Incentive to Commodity to Asset:  
How International Law Is Reconceptualizing Intellectual Property, 36 MICH. J. INT’L L. 557, 
566 (2015) (“While TRIPS laid the platform for commodification, much of the 
current regime shifting is reconceptualizing IP [intellectual property] as an asset and 
progressively detaching it from its grounding in incentive-based principles.”); James 
Gathii & Cynthia Ho, Regime Shifting of IP Law Making and Enforcement from the WTO to 
the International Investment Regime, 18 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. (forthcoming 2017) 
(discussing the shift from the intellectual property regime to the investment regime). 
 27. See infra text accompanying notes 125–26. 
 28. See TPP Agreement, supra note 6, ch. 18. 
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of using investment law and fora to set international intellectual 
property norms.  Although this Part recognizes the existence of many 
new developments concerning the intellectual property rights 
holders’ use of ISDS, it notes that intellectual property has been 
linked to foreign investment as early as the 1960s.  This Part therefore 
cautions against treating the linkage between intellectual property 
and investment as a mostly recent development. 
Part II closely evaluates the ISDS mechanism.  This Part begins by 
discussing its strengths in relation to investments in developing 
countries, including those in the intellectual property field.  It then 
catalogues the mechanism’s myriad weaknesses.  To help facilitate a 
systematic analysis, this Part divides these weaknesses into three 
distinct categories:  process-related, interpretation-related, and 
outcome-related.  It then discusses each weakness in turn. 
Part III examines the various upgrades that the TPP Agreement has 
provided to the ISDS mechanism.  Although ISDS is available in 
other agreements, such as NAFTA,29 this Part focuses on the specific 
arrangements in the TPP for three reasons.  First, such a focus will 
reveal what concrete measures can be instituted to improve ISDS.  
Although this Part finds that the TPP Agreement has not alleviated 
many of the weaknesses documented in Section II.B, it welcomes the 
various substantive and procedural safeguards that have been built into 
the Agreement.  Second, the discussion aims to illuminate the debate 
on whether countries such as the United States should ratify the TPP 
Agreement.  After all, ISDS remains one of the Agreement’s most 
controversial features.  Even though the Trump administration has 
already announced the United States’ withdrawal from the TPP, ISDS 
is likely to remain a highly sensitive issue for future international trade 
or investment agreements.  Third, the compromise reached in the TPP 
Agreement reflects the complex considerations precipitated by the 
groundbreaking ISDS complaints Philip Morris and Eli Lilly filed in 
the middle of the negotiations.  The added safeguards not only 
highlight the concerns of many TPP partners but also provide useful 
suggestions on how to further improve ISDS. 
Taking account of the various safeguards the TPP Agreement now 
contains, Part IV outlines two different sets of improvements that 
could make ISDS even better than the mechanism provided in the 
TPP Agreement.  The first set of improvements focuses on ways to 
better conceptualize intellectual property investments.  The second 
set of improvements covers institutional arrangements that could 
                                                     
 29. See NAFTA, supra note 20, arts. 1115–1120 (providing an ISDS mechanism). 
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strengthen the overall ISDS mechanism.  While many of these 
improvements can be introduced without modifying the TPP 
Agreement, others may require at least some modification. 
Part V concludes by exploring whether the TPP ISDS mechanism 
has provided any silver linings if it is adopted without modification.  
Such an exploration will provide important guidance to developing 
countries, considering that many of these countries lack the ability to 
resist the introduction of ISDS through international trade or 
investment agreements.  Even if the TPP Agreement failed in the wake 
of the United States’ withdrawal, TPP-like ISDS mechanisms would still 
be introduced to these countries through other bilateral, regional, or 
plurilateral trade or investment agreements.  Thus, developing 
countries should consider the benefits and drawbacks of TPP-like ISDS 
mechanisms as well as the various safeguards that can be proactively 
introduced to reduce the mechanisms’ deleterious impacts. 
I. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INVESTMENT 
With the arrival of lengthy investment chapters in the TPP 
Agreement and other international trade or investment agreements as 
well as the unprecedented ISDS proceedings initiated by Philip Morris 
and Eli Lilly, there is an inevitable assumption that investment law has 
only recently entered the intellectual property domain.  This view, 
however, is not historically accurate.  The linkage between intellectual 
property and investment can be traced back many decades.  Indeed, 
the 1960s was the first time when these two sets of issues received 
considerable international policy and scholarly attention. 
On the investment front, it is worth recalling that Pakistan and 
West Germany signed the first bilateral investment treaty in 1959.30  
Many commentators have traced the origin of recent bilateral, 
regional, and plurilateral investment agreements back to this 
particular treaty.31  In addition, the Convention on the Settlement of 
                                                     
 30. Treaty for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Ger.-Pak., Nov. 25, 
1959, 457 U.N.T.S. 6575; see also Chester Brown, The Evolution of the Regime of 
International Investment Agreements:  History, Economics and Politics, in INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW:  A HANDBOOK 153, 177–79 (Marc Bungenberg et al. eds., 2015) 
[hereinafter INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW HANDBOOK] (discussing the agreement). 
 31. See, e.g., SCOTT MILLER & GREGORY N. HICKS, INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE 
SETTLEMENT:  A REALITY CHECK 6 (2015), https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-
public/legacy_files/files/publication/150116_Miller_InvestorStateDispute_Web.pdf 
(noting that the era of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) began in 1959); Bryan 
Mercurio, Awakening the Sleeping Giant:  Intellectual Property Rights in International 
Investment Agreements, 15 J. INT’L ECON. L. 871, 874 n.8 (2012) [hereinafter Mercurio, 
Awakening the Sleeping Giant] (referring to the agreement as the “the first BIT”); 
YU.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/13/2017  6:42 PM 
838 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:829 
Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States 
(“ICSID Convention”) was adopted in March 1965.32  As Tagi Sagafi-
nejad and John Dunning reminded us, 
The period from 1945 to the 1960s can be called the golden era of 
foreign direct investment [FDI].  During this phase, FDI grew 
dramatically both in volume and in spread.  The number of foreign 
affiliates of U.S.-based [transnational corporations] grew from 
around 7,400 in 1950 to 23,000 in 1966, with an annual growth rate 
averaging near 10 percent.  Meanwhile, outward flow of FDI from 
the United States increased from $1.7 billion in 1960 to $4.4 billion 
in 1970, while inward FDI into the United States from the rest of the 
world went from $140 million in 1960 to $1 billion a decade later.33 
It was in the 1960s when developing countries first sought to 
“regulate foreign investment through an international instrument 
rather than leaving the matter to customary international law.”34  
Since then, the global stock of FDI has greatly increased from $60 
billion in 1960 to $25 trillion in 2013, as estimated by the World 
Bank.35  Today, more than 3000 bilateral, regional, or plurilateral 
investment agreements have been signed.36 
The 1960s was also the era when developing countries became 
increasingly dissatisfied with the international intellectual property 
regime.37  At that time, many newly independent countries seriously 
questioned whether succeeding to obligations that the former 
colonial powers entered into on their behalves was a good idea.38  As I 
                                                     
Okediji, Is Intellectual Property “Investment”?, supra note 25, at 1124 (“European countries 
negotiated the first wave of BITs, starting with a Germany-Pakistan BIT in 1959.”). 
 32. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and 
Nationals of Other States, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 
U.N.T.S. 159.  This Convention is known widely as the ICSID Convention, drawing its 
name from the World Bank’s International Centre for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (ICSID). 
 33. TAGI SAGAFI-NEJAD & JOHN H. DUNNING, THE UN AND TRANSNATIONAL 
CORPORATIONS:  FROM CODE OF CONDUCT TO GLOBAL COMPACT 26 (2008). 
 34. SURYA P. SUBEDI, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW:  RECONCILING POLICY AND 
PRINCIPLE 215 (2d ed. 2012). 
 35. MILLER & HICKS, supra note 31, at 6. 
 36. See Fact Sheet:  Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), OFF. U.S. TRADE 
REPRESENTATIVE (Mar. 11, 2015) [hereinafter ISDS Fact Sheet], https://ustr.gov/about-
us/policy-offices/press-office/fact-sheets/2015/march/investor-state-dispute-settlement-isds 
(“Various forms of ISDS are now a part of over 3,000 agreements worldwide, of which 
the United States is party to 50.”). 
 37. See Peter K. Yu, A Tale of Two Development Agendas, 35 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 465, 
471–75, 505–07 (2009) [hereinafter Yu, Two Development Agendas]. 
 38. Id. at 471. 
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observed in relation to the Berne Convention for the Protection of 
Literary and Artistic Works39 (“Berne Convention”), 
When [this] Convention was revised in Brussels in 1948, only India 
and Pakistan participated as fully independent nations.  While 
other less developed countries were previously subject to the Berne 
provisions, the Convention applied to them only by virtue of their 
status “as dependent territories.”  Once they became independent, 
they therefore began to question the extant international copyright 
relationship—in particular, whether they should continue as 
members of the Berne Convention in their own right or whether 
they should withdraw from the Union.  While India, Pakistan, the 
Philippines, and many former French and Belgian African colonies 
elected to remain bound by the Convention, Indonesia decided to 
withdraw from the Union.40 
It was against this post-colonial background that a large number of 
pro-development documents or instruments were developed.  The 
widely cited examples included Brazil’s draft 1961 resolution on “The 
Role of Patents in the Transfer of Technology to Under-Developed 
Countries,”41 the 1967 Stockholm Protocol to the Berne 
Convention,42 the 1974 Declaration on the Establishment of a New 
International Economic Order,43 the draft International Code of 
Conduct on the Transfer of Technology,44 and the draft U.N. Code of 
Conduct on Transnational Corporations.45 
                                                     
 39. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 
1886, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 (revised at Paris July 24, 1971) [hereinafter Berne Convention]. 
 40. Yu, Two Development Agendas, supra note 37, at 471–72 (footnotes omitted). 
 41. For discussions of this draft declaration, see generally Andréa Koury Menescal, 
Changing WIPO’s Ways?  The 2004 Development Agenda in Historical Perspective, 8 J. WORLD 
INTELL. PROP. 761 (2005); Yu, Two Development Agendas, supra note 37, at 505–06. 
 42. Protocol Regarding Developing Countries to the Berne Convention for the 
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886 (revised at Stockholm July 14, 
1967).  For discussions of the Stockholm Protocol, see generally 1 SAM RICKETSON & 
JANE C. GINSBURG, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBOURING RIGHTS:  THE BERNE 
CONVENTION AND BEYOND 120–24 (2d ed. 2005); Charles F. Johnson, The Origins of the 
Stockholm Protocol, 18 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 91 (1970); Dorothy M. Schrader, 
Analysis of the Protocol Regarding Developing Countries, 17 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 
160 (1970); Yu, Two Development Agendas, supra note 37, at 471–84. 
 43. Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, 
G.A. Res. 3201, at 527, U.N. GAOR, 6th Special Sess., Supp. No. 1, U.N. Doc. A/9559 
(1974), 13 I.L.M. 715 (1974). 
 44. Draft International Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology, United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development, U.N. Doc. TD/CODE TOT/47 
(1985), reprinted in UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV. [UNCTAD], 
COMPENDIUM OF INTERNATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS ON TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY:  
SELECTED INSTRUMENTS 261–77 (2001), http://unctad.org/en/docs/psiteipcm5.en.pdf; 
see also Peter K. Yu, International Technology Contracts, Restrictive Covenants and the 
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Although pro-development activities slowed down significantly in 
the late 1970s and the 1980s, due in large part to the developing 
countries’ weakening economic power46 and the developed countries’ 
active push for the Uruguay Round negotiations,47 renewed attention 
was paid to the linkage between intellectual property and investment 
following the adoption of the TRIPS Agreement.48  Such attention 
grew even further with the expiration of the TRIPS transition periods 
for developing countries on January 1, 2000,49 and the developed 
countries’ active negotiation of TRIPS-plus bilateral, regional, and 
plurilateral trade agreements.50 
In the mid-2000s, around the time when these negotiations 
accelerated, a growing number of academic commentators began 
discussing international intellectual property law in the investment 
context.  For instance, Peter Drahos explored the relationship 
between bilateral investment treaties and bilateral intellectual 
                                                     
UNCTAD Code, in EMPLOYEES, TRADE SECRETS AND RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS 41 
(Christopher Heath & Anselm Kamperman Sanders eds., 2017) (discussing the draft 
International Code of Conduct in relation to international technology contracts and 
employee-related restrictive covenants); Yu, Two Development Agendas, supra note 37, at 
493–505 (providing a historical discussion of the draft International Code of Conduct). 
 45. See Karl P. Sauvant, The Negotiations of the United Nations Code of Conduct on 
Transnational Corporations:  Experience and Lessons Learned, 16 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 
11, 13–20 (2015). 
 46. See SAGAFI-NEJAD & DUNNING, supra note 33, at 29 (noting that the early 1980s 
“reflected a weakening of the position of developing countries as debt rose and the 
Bretton Woods institutions imposed adjustment policies”). 
 47. For discussions of the active push by developed countries and their industries 
for the TRIPS Agreement, see generally DUNCAN MATTHEWS, GLOBALISING 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS:  THE TRIPS AGREEMENT (2002); SUSAN K. SELL, 
PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW:  THE GLOBALIZATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 
96–120 (2003). 
 48. This renewed attention is understandable considering that developing 
countries have been made aware of the benefits of stronger intellectual property 
protection in attracting foreign investment and “were told to overlook the distasteful 
aspects of introducing or increasing intellectual property protection and 
enforcement in exchange for longer-term economic health.”  Daniel J. Gervais, The 
TRIPS Agreement and the Doha Round:  History and Impact on Economic Development, in 4 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH:  ISSUES AND PRACTICES IN THE 
DIGITAL AGE 23, 43 (Peter K. Yu ed., 2007). 
 49. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, art. 65 (providing a five-year transition 
period for developing countries). 
 50. See Peter K. Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents in the International Intellectual Property 
Regime, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 323, 392–400 (2004) [hereinafter Yu, Currents and 
Crosscurrents] (discussing the increased negotiation of bilateral and regional trade 
agreements). 
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property agreements.51  Carlos Correa analyzed the implications of 
international investment agreements for the grant of compulsory 
licenses.52  Ermias Tekeste Biadgleng detailed the public interest 
implications of TRIPS-plus international investment agreements.53  
Frederick Abbott underscored the investment angle that drove the 
global pharmaceutical industry’s push for stronger patent protection 
worldwide.54  As he reminded us, 
A patent is essentially a financial instrument that entitles its bearer 
to achieve greater than competitive market rates of return on 
investment.  The Pharma companies are market-oriented 
enterprises that seek to maximize shareholder returns on 
investment.  Pharma treats potential intrusion on the security of 
the patent and related regulatory support as a threat to return on 
investment.  Pharma justifies its rent seeking as necessary to the 
funding of research and development for new medicines. . . .  The 
Pharma companies demand rules and enforcement that will 
protect their income streams, justifying a high return on 
investment as necessary to drug development.55 
Like these commentators, I registered my concern about an 
emerging “incentive-investment divide” among policymakers who 
were responsible for developing intellectual property regimes.56  
While policymakers in developed countries were obsessed with the 
protection of the investments made by their exporting intellectual 
                                                     
 51. Peter Drahos, BITs and BIPs:  Bilateralism in Intellectual Property, 4 J. WORLD 
INTELL. PROP. 791 (2001). 
 52. Carlos M. Correa, Investment Protection in Bilateral and Free Trade Agreements:  
Implications for the Granting of Compulsory Licenses, 26 MICH. J. INT’L L. 331 (2004) 
[hereinafter Correa, Investment Protection]. 
 53. Ermias Tekeste Biadgleng, IP Rights Under Investment Agreements:  The TRIPS-
Plus Implications for Enforcement and Protection of Public Interest (South Centre, Research 
Paper No. 8, 2006). 
 54. Frederick M. Abbott, The Cycle of Action and Reaction:  Developments and Trends 
in Intellectual Property and Health, in NEGOTIATING HEALTH:  INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES 27, 36 (Pedro Roffe et al. eds., 2006) [hereinafter 
NEGOTIATING HEALTH]. 
 55. Id. 
  56. See Peter K. Yu, The International Enclosure Movement, 82 IND. L.J. 827, 892–901 
(2007) [hereinafter Yu, International Enclosure Movement]; see also Peter K. Yu, The 
Strategic and Discursive Contributions of the Max Planck Principles for Intellectual Property 
Provisions in Bilateral and Regional Agreements, 62 DRAKE L. REV. DISCOURSE 20, 30 
(2014) (stating that “the negotiation of intellectual property provisions in [bilateral 
and regional agreements] should not take on a heavy gloss of trade, investment, or 
security” (emphasis added)). 
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property industries,57 their developing country counterparts were 
equally obsessed with international compliance and the acquisition of 
foreign investments.58  In the end, the policymakers on both sides 
focused so much on investments that they ignored a primary 
justification for intellectual property protection—that is, to provide 
incentives for creativity and innovation.  Such a focus is dangerous 
from a public interest standpoint.  As I noted earlier, 
When policymakers and trade negotiators focus on the protection 
of intellectual property investments by their own nationals, they will 
likely be less interested in evaluating the economic efficiency of the 
intellectual property system and the welfare gains that system 
produces.  Instead, they will push for the development of a system 
that protects foreign investors[,] often at the expense of the public 
interest . . . , the local innovative environment and the country’s 
social-economic conditions.59 
Given the decade-long existence of this body of literature, the 
discussion of intellectual property issues in the investment context is 
clearly not as new as many commentators have suggested.  To a large 
extent, the discussion of the investment-related aspects of intellectual 
property rights is only as “new” as the discussion of the trade-related 
aspects of these rights in the late 1980s and the early 1990s.60  Although 
                                                     
 57. For discussions of the relationship between intellectual property protection 
and foreign direct investment (FDI), see generally Keith E. Maskus, The Role of 
Intellectual Property Rights in Encouraging Foreign Direct Investment and Technology Transfer, 9 
DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 109 (1998) [hereinafter Maskus, Role of Intellectual Property 
Rights]; Carlos A. Primo Braga & Carsten Fink, The Relationship Between Intellectual 
Property Rights and Foreign Direct Investment, 9 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 163 (1998). 
 58. See CAROLYN DEERE, THE IMPLEMENTATION GAME:  THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND 
THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REFORM IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
242 (2009) (“TRIPS implementation in the OAPI [African Intellectual Property 
Organization] countries was shaped by a pro-IP and ‘compliance-plus’-oriented 
political environment.”); Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman, The Globalization of 
Private Knowledge Goods and the Privatization of Global Public Goods, in INTERNATIONAL 
PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY REGIME 3, 18 (Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman eds., 2005) 
(expressing concern that many developing countries are “compliance oriented”). 
 59. Yu, Non-Multilateral Approach, supra note 4, at 112. 
 60. Timothy Armstrong recently provided the following observation: 
Given the Berne Convention and the very lengthy history of international 
negotiations over copyright . . . , [one] might very well conclude that it was 
entirely foreseeable, even inevitable, that copyright would come to be a 
contentious trade issue as global markets for the import and export of 
expressive works matured.  Perhaps it was not inevitable that the United 
States would yoke copyright policy to the WTO trading system via the TRIPS 
Agreement, thereby enabling bigger countries to threaten smaller ones with 
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the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property61 (“Paris 
Convention”) and the Berne Convention were established to address 
the growing needs for international standards governing the cross-
border trade of intellectual property goods,62 trade rules were not 
applied to the intellectual property context until the completion of the 
Uruguay Round and the founding of the WTO.63 
The same can be said about today’s growing use of investment law in 
the intellectual property field.  As noted earlier, policymakers in both 
developed and developing countries have, for many decades, viewed 
technology and intellectual property through the investment lens.  
Indeed, the ISDS mechanism that Eli Lilly has utilized to challenge the 
Canadian “promise doctrine” was instituted by NAFTA more than two 
decades ago.64  The only new development was that private intellectual 
property investors, such as Philip Morris and Eli Lilly, have now begun 
using ISDS to resolve international intellectual property disputes and 
to shape international intellectual property norms.65 
Until the early 2010s, there were in effect only two general types of 
international processes for resolving cross-border intellectual property 
disputes.  The first type involves the International Court of Justice.66  
Both the Paris and Berne Conventions provide this process as an 
optional dispute settlement mechanism.67  Yet no country has ever 
                                                     
trade sanctions if they did not bring their domestic copyright laws up to the 
standards favored by the large copyright-exporting nations . . . . 
Timothy K. Armstrong, Two Comparative Perspectives on Copyright’s Past and Future in the 
Digital Age, 15 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 698, 759 (2016). 
 61. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, 21 
U.S.T. 1538, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 (revised at Stockholm July 14, 1967) [hereinafter Paris 
Convention]. 
 62. See Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents, supra note 50, at 333–34 (noting that 
international intellectual property protection did not become a major issue until 
transportation and communication had substantially improved and until cross-
border markets had greatly expanded). 
 63. See id. at 357–66 (discussing the marriage of intellectual property to trade 
through the TRIPS Agreement). 
 64. See NAFTA, supra note 20, arts. 1115–1120 (providing a mechanism for 
settling disputes between a party and an investor of another party). 
 65. See supra text accompanying notes 13–24. 
 66. See International Court of Justice, HAGUE JUST. PORTAL, 
http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/index.php?id=305 (last visited Feb. 5, 2017) 
(“The International Court of Justice is the principal judicial organ of the United 
Nations. . . .  The Court has a dual role:  to settle in accordance with international 
law the legal disputes submitted to it by States, and to give advisory opinions on legal 
questions referred to it by duly authorised international organs and agencies.”). 
 67. See Berne Convention, supra note 39, art. 33(1) (“Any dispute between two or 
more countries of the Union concerning the interpretation or application of this 
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used it to resolve any international intellectual property dispute.68  The 
second type involves trade agreements, such as NAFTA and the WTO 
Agreement.69  Although successful dispute settlement through these 
agreements will undoubtedly benefit intellectual property industries, 
the WTO’s state-to-state dispute settlement process does not give 
private actors legal standing to sue national governments.70  As a result, 
these industries will have to rely on the assistance of governments in 
either their home states or other supportive states. 
In sum, what is new about the investment-related aspects of 
intellectual property rights is not that intellectual property rights 
have now been viewed or treated as investments—which has 
happened for many decades.  Nor is it that ISDS mechanisms have 
now emerged to enable private investors to sue national 
governments—as NAFTA and other bilateral and regional investment 
agreements have already empowered them to do so.  Rather, it is the 
beginning of the private investors’ effort to take intellectual property 
norm-setting activities into their own hands by initiating ISDS 
proceedings against those foreign governments that do not offer 
their preferred levels of protection and enforcement.  These efforts 
were unprecedented in the intellectual property field. 
II. INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 
Thus far, policymakers, commentators, and civil society 
organizations have widely criticized the use of ISDS to resolve 
international intellectual property disputes.71  While policymakers 
and commentators in developing countries are understandably 
concerned about the heavy burden imposed by this increasingly used 
                                                     
Convention, not settled by negotiation, may, by any one of the countries concerned, 
be brought before the International Court of Justice by application in conformity 
with the Statute of the Court, unless the countries concerned agree on some other 
method of settlement.”); Paris Convention, supra note 61, art. 28(1) (containing the 
same language as in the Berne Convention). 
 68. See Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents, supra note 50, at 355 (“So far, no member 
state of the Berne or Paris Unions has ever pursued intellectual property litigation 
before the [International Court of Justice].”). 
 69. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, art. 64 (mandating that disputes arising 
under the TRIPS Agreement be settled by the WTO dispute settlement process). 
 70. See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of 
Disputes arts. 2–3, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401, 401–02 [hereinafter DSU] (outlining the 
dispute settlement process and limiting access to WTO member states). 
  71. See sources cited infra note 332. 
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mechanism,72 their counterparts in the developed world are equally 
concerned about the mechanism’s potential impact on their ability to 
regulate harmful conducts, including those committed by 
transnational corporations.73  To provide an understanding of the full 
impact of ISDS, this Part explores in turn the mechanism’s myriad 
strengths and weaknesses. 
A. Strengths 
1. General strengths 
ISDS is particularly attractive to businesses entering countries that 
have either a limited respect for the rule of law or an 
underdeveloped, or even undeveloped, judicial system.74  While 
                                                     
 72. See MILLER & HICKS, supra note 31, at 6 (“According to [UNCTAD], about 100 
claims were initiated during the 15-year period 1987–2002, but from 2003 until 2013, 
the number of filed claims more than quadrupled, reaching a total of 568.”); Ho, 
supra note 22, at 219 (“[I]nvestors filed only one dispute in 1982, over fifty new cases 
in 2012, and today there are currently five hundred claims pending in over fifty 
countries.”); see also ANNA JOUBIN-BRET, ESTABLISHING AN INTERNATIONAL ADVISORY 
CENTRE ON INVESTMENT DISPUTES? 2 (2015) (“It should be noted that the number of 
cases compiled by UNCTAD does not reflect all disputes between foreign investors 
and states.  With the increase of transparency in several arbitration institutions and 
treaties, the number of treaty-based cases is easier to access.  However, a host of cases 
brought under investment contracts or before the International Chamber of 
Commerce (ICC) or regional arbitration institutions are not publicly known, and it is 
fair to say that the total number can easily be doubled.”); Gary B. Born & Ethan G. 
Shenkman, Confidentiality and Transparency in Commercial and Investor-State 
International Arbitration, in THE FUTURE OF INVESTMENT ARBITRATION 5, 28 (Catherine 
A. Rogers & Roger P. Alford eds., 2009) (“The UNCITRAL Rules . . . provide for ad 
hoc arbitration with no central registry or requirement that the existence of 
UNCITRAL cases be publicly registered.  For this reason, investors seeking to keep 
their disputes with states out of the public eye may decide, treaty permitting, to opt 
for an ad hoc arbitral mechanism rather than ICSID.  Some non-trivial percentage of 
investor-state arbitrations are thus never made public.”). 
 73. See supra text accompanying notes 9–12; see also Ho, supra note 22, at 220 & 
n.21 (noting the concerns among Australian and German policymakers about the 
problems posed by ISDS). 
 74. As Charles Brower and Stephan Schill observed, 
In many developing and transitioning countries, independent courts that 
decide cases in accordance with pre-established rules of law in a timely 
fashion are missing altogether.  Corruption in the judiciary is a sad but daily 
business in the courts of many countries.  Additionally, lengthy and 
inefficient court proceedings dragging on over years, if not decades, remain 
too commonplace.  Under such circumstances, it is difficult to argue 
convincingly that dispute resolution in many host states’ courts constitutes a 
way for investors to make a recalcitrant host state comply with its investment-
treaty commitments. 
YU.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/13/2017  6:42 PM 
846 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:829 
business or contractual disputes are inevitable, they are highly 
problematic if injured investors cannot seek compensation through a 
fair and independent judicial system.  The lack of such a system 
would make it difficult for businesses to recoup or benefit from their 
investments, such as those made when “buying or leasing land, 
building new facilities, establishing relationships, and recruiting and 
training employees.”75  Having mechanisms that prevent foreign 
investors from being subjected to unreasonable political risks would 
also send important signals to attract investments from abroad.76 
In addition, providing an internationalized process for businesses to 
seek redress directly from governments is important considering that 
courts, especially those in developing countries, tend to be protective 
of their own governments.77  For example, these courts may provide 
                                                     
Charles N. Brower & Stephan W. Schill, Is Arbitration a Threat or a Boon to the 
Legitimacy of International Investment Law?, 9 CHI. J. INT’L L. 471, 479 (2009) (footnotes 
omitted); see also MILLER & HICKS, supra note 31, at v (“Disputes are also most 
frequent in states with weak legal institutions.  Argentina (53 claims) and Venezuela 
(36 claims) are the leading respondent states.”). 
 75. MILLER & HICKS, supra note 31, at 13; see also Christoph Schreuer, Do We Need 
Investment Arbitration?, in RESHAPING THE INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM:  
JOURNEYS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 879, 879 (Jean E. Kalicki & Anna Joubin-Bret eds., 
2015) [hereinafter RESHAPING THE ISDS SYSTEM] (“An investor typically must commit 
considerable resources before it can hope to reap the expected profits.  In doing so, 
it makes itself dependent on the benevolence of the host State.  This situation of 
dependence calls for strong legal protection.”). 
 76. See LONE WANDAHL MOUYAL, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND THE RIGHT 
TO REGULATE:  A HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVE 8 (2016) (noting the political risks 
concerning “the likelihood of changes to the operation and profitability of the 
investment as a result of the policy or administration, which impacts on the existence 
and/or an investor’s ownership of the investment, on the continuous operation of 
the investment as well as on the possibility of transfer of returns”); SUBEDI, supra note 
34, at 87 (discussing the role of BITs as “insurance against political risks”); August 
Reinisch, The Future of Investment Arbitration, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW FOR 
THE 21ST CENTURY:  ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF CHRISTOPH SCHREUER 894, 899 (Christina 
Binder et al. eds., 2009) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW] (stating that a 
legal framework that includes the potential for highly enforceable investment awards 
“creates a positive investment climate that attracts foreign investment that is 
beneficial to the economy of recipient states”); Schreuer, supra note 75, at 879 
(“From the host State’s perspective, the most obvious advantage of investment 
protection is improvement of its investment climate.”); Ho, supra note 22, at 231–32 
(“All of these rights help to ensure that host governments will not subject foreign 
investors to inappropriate risks, and consequently induce them to invest.”). 
 77. See Peter Muchlinski, Policy Issues, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 3, 40 (Peter Muchlinski et al. eds., 2008) 
[hereinafter OXFORD HANDBOOK] (“[I]nvestors may perceive host country laws and 
procedures not to be sufficient as a means for the resolution of disputes with the host 
country.  They may prefer an internationalized approach to dispute settlement.  This 
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sovereign immunity, thereby taking away the businesses’ opportunities 
to file lawsuits against local governments in the first place.78  The courts 
may also be biased,79 especially if corruption is involved.80  For 
businesses in locations with armed conflicts or civil strife, resolving 
disputes through local means can be quite dangerous.81 
                                                     
allows the investor the freedom to choose between national and international 
dispute settlement mechanisms.”). 
 78. As Andrea Bjorklund observed, 
Municipal courts in the home state of the investor will often be unavailable 
either for lack of jurisdiction over the host state, or because foreign sovereign 
immunity protects the host government.  All the western European nations, 
and many beyond, have adopted the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, 
holding that foreign governments do not enjoy immunity when they are acting 
jure gestionis (in a private capacity), but that they retain immunity when acting 
jure imperii (in a public capacity).  The United States followed the lead of the 
European countries and codified the restrictive theory of immunity in the 
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976.  In the investor-state dispute 
settlement context, foreign states sometimes act in a private capacity, but very 
often act in a public capacity as they enact a government measure with 
deleterious effects on a foreign investor or his investment. 
Andrea K. Bjorklund, Private Rights and Public International Law:  Why Competition 
Among International Economic Law Tribunals Is Not Working, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 241, 254 
(2007) (footnotes omitted); see also Brower & Schill, supra note 74, at 479 (“Various 
legal obstacles—including state immunity and doctrines of judicial restraint such as 
the act-of-state doctrine—constitute significant limits to the subjection of host states 
to third-country jurisdiction.”); Ho, supra note 22, at 232 (“Although foreign 
investors previously might have attempted to sue the state in its own courts, those 
courts could be biased; alternatively, the state might be able to claim sovereign 
immunity.  Sometimes the investor could not even directly pursue an action.”). 
 79. As Christoph Schreuer elaborated, 
From an investor’s perspective, the alternative of resorting to a host State’s 
domestic courts is of limited attractiveness.  Domestic courts are organs of 
the State and judges are State employees.  In arbitration, the appointment of 
employees of one of the parties as arbitrators is taboo.  There is no 
persuasive argument why different standards should apply to domestic courts 
in cases against forum States.  Lack of independence and impartiality of 
these courts and a sense of loyalty towards local interests are recurring 
problems that arise for foreign investors that try to vindicate their rights 
before domestic courts against the forum State. 
Schreuer, supra note 75, at 883; see also ISDS Fact Sheet, supra note 36 (“While 
countries with weak legal institutions are frequent respondents in ISDS cases, 
American investors have also faced cases of bias or insufficient legal remedies in 
countries with well-developed legal institutions.”). 
 80. See Hilmar Raeschke-Kessler & Dorothee Gottwald, Corruption, in OXFORD 
HANDBOOK, supra note 77, at 584 (examining the “legal effects of corruption on 
international investment”). 
 81. See MILLER & HICKS, supra note 31, at 17–19 (discussing the change of 
investment policy from gunboat diplomacy to BITs); Ho, supra note 22, at 232 (“In the 
worst-case scenario, home states used, or at least threatened to use, military force.”). 
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At the macro level, ISDS can promote global harmony by 
“insulat[ing these] disputes from the realm of politics and 
diplomacy.”82  As Christoph Schreuer, a leading commentator on the 
ICSID Convention, pointed out, 
A major benefit that is often overlooked is the impact on the relations 
between the States concerned.  Diplomatic protection by the investor’s 
State of nationality has been a frequent source of irritation and 
discord.  In the presence of an effective system of investor-State 
arbitration, the host State and the investor’s home State are less likely 
to get drawn into investment disputes.  Where investment arbitration 
is available, these disputes are transferred from the political arena to a 
judicial forum especially charged with the settlement of mixed 
investor-State disputes.  The dispute settlement process is depoliticized 
and subjected to objective legal criteria.83 
Diplomatic benefits aside, greater protection of investment—
through ISDS or otherwise—could help to ensure “the introduction 
and promotion of principles of good governance in domestic legal 
systems.”84  Indeed, according to Professor Schreuer, “Investment 
protection treaties provide for the rule of law and its effective 
implementation with respect to foreign investors.  The relevant 
standards have begun to show spill-over effects on the internal 
systems of the countries concerned.”85 
Finally, it will be worthwhile to compare ISDS with state-to-state 
dispute settlement.  Compared with the process in the WTO, which 
limits complaints to those brought by state governments,86 ISDS will 
give investors independence and more control over the dispute 
resolution strategies.  The latter process will enable investors to 
determine for themselves when to file complaints and whether to 
focus on the short term or the long term.87  The ability to make these 
                                                     
 82. Schreuer, supra note 75, at 882 (quoting Aron Broches, the chair of the 
preparatory meetings for the ICSID Convention). 
 83. Id. at 881; see also VANHONNAEKER, supra note 18, at 161 (stating that ISDS 
arbitrators will be “able to issue a directly enforceable award holding the Host 
Government accountable for [an international investment agreement] violation 
without risking the political interferences that may occur in conflicts between 
States”); Reinisch, supra note 76, at 900 (noting that ISDS “is supposed to lead to a 
de-politicization of investment disputes”). 
 84. Schreuer, supra note 75, at 882. 
 85. Id. 
 86. See supra text accompanying note 70. 
 87. See Christopher Gibson, A Look at the Compulsory License in Investment 
Arbitration:  The Case of Indirect Expropriation, 25 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 357, 407–08 
(2010) (“[T]he investor in an investor-state arbitration will have the greatest degree 
of control over its case without any involvement from its own government. . . .  [It] 
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decisions is particularly important because governments do not 
always meet industry demands for initiating WTO complaints.88  As 
Charles Gibson observed, 
[I]nvestors choosing the WTO forum will be forced to rely upon 
their government’s willingness to bring a claim, which is not a 
foregone conclusion and may be subject to the vagaries of other 
considerations in the relations between the two countries concerned.  
The private investor will thus need considerable political sway to 
induce its government to initiate the state-to-state dispute.89 
2. Strengths specific to intellectual property 
In the intellectual property arena more specifically, ISDS can 
provide some additional benefits.  For instance, in cases in which the 
government is complicit in acts of piracy or counterfeiting, investors 
may be able to obtain compensation for their losses even if they 
cannot stop the government from participating in these illegal 
activities.90  Complicity in this area can range from the government’s 
direct participation in pirate and counterfeiting activities to its failure 
to take the requisite actions for addressing these problems.91  As 
Lukas Vanhonnaeker observed, 
The involvement of the State can take different forms and does not 
necessarily need to amount to positive actions on the part of the 
state:  the Host State can prove to be involved if it supported acts of 
piracy but also if it failed despite its awareness of the situation at 
stake to take the necessary measures to effectively restrict IPRs 
[intellectual property rights] infringement.92 
                                                     
can prepare and implement its own strategy for litigating potential investment claims 
in connection with the compulsory license based only on the investor’s assessment of 
the circumstances and merits of the case.”). 
 88. See Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners (Episode II):  Protecting Intellectual Property 
in Post-WTO China, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 901, 923–26 (2006) [hereinafter Yu, From Pirates 
to Partners II] (noting that the U.S. Trade Representative initially took a “‘wait-and-
see’ approach” and refused to file a WTO complaint against China despite repeated 
complaints and demands from the business community). 
 89. Gibson, supra note 87, at 407 (footnotes omitted). 
  90. See VANHONNAEKER, supra note 18, at 172–73 (describing the various claims 
that an investor could make when a government chooses to “look[] the other way”). 
 91. See id. at 173 (“[T]he investor will have to prove a failure of the state to act 
with due diligence for the full protection and security claim and he will have to bring 
evidence that the Host State’s enforcement authorities deliberately did not take 
appropriate action or were corrupt as far as the fair and equitable treatment claim is 
concerned.”). 
 92. Id. at 162. 
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A difficult question, however, concerns whether inadequate 
intellectual property enforcement could meet the burden of 
government complicity.  Such a question is particularly important 
considering that developed country governments continue to have 
great difficulty in using the WTO dispute settlement process to 
strengthen intellectual property protection and enforcement in 
developing countries.93 
While there are apparent benefits to using ISDS as an alternative 
dispute resolution mechanism, it remains to be seen whether this 
mechanism can be transformed into an “effective tool[] in pressuring 
governments to strengthen their efforts to enforce intellectual 
property rights.”94  At first glance, the claimants would likely face 
considerable challenges in linking inadequate intellectual property 
enforcement to the host government’s failure95 in providing “fair and 
equitable treatment” or “full protection and security”—commitments 
commonly made under international investment agreements.96  
Indeed, as Vanhonnaeker reminded us, “given the often weak IP 
[(intellectual property] legal regime in many developing countries, in 
which most acts of systemic IPRs piracy take place, investors will likely 
                                                     
 93. The leading example of such difficulty is China—Measures Affecting the 
Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, in which the United States 
succeeded in some claims but failed in the others.  See Panel Report, China—Measures 
Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS362/R (Jan. 26, 2009) (finding for China on the claim regarding the high 
thresholds for criminal procedures and penalties related to intellectual property 
protection and for the United States on the claim regarding the denial of copyright 
protection to works that have not been authorized for publication or dissemination, 
with the remaining claim regarding the customs authorities’ failure to properly 
dispose of infringing goods seized at the border somewhat divided between the two 
parties).  For the Author’s discussions of this dispute, see generally Peter K. Yu, 
TRIPS Enforcement and Developing Countries, 26 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 727 (2011); Peter 
K. Yu, The TRIPS Enforcement Dispute, 89 NEB. L. REV. 1046 (2011). 
 94. VANHONNAEKER, supra note 18, at 161. 
 95. See id. at 162 (“[W]hile international investment law protects investors in 
their relationship with the Host State (and its bodies), acts of piracy are usually 
committed by private parties, thus not falling under the scope of [international 
investment agreements] that only cover government interferences with investors’ 
proprietary rights.”). 
 96. See, e.g., TPP Agreement, supra note 6, art. 9.6.1 (“Each Party shall accord to 
covered investments treatment in accordance with applicable customary 
international law principles, including fair and equitable treatment and full 
protection and security.”); Giuditta Cordero Moss, Full Protection and Security, in 
STANDARDS OF INVESTMENT PROTECTION 131 (August Reinisch ed., 2008) (discussing 
the standard of “full protection and security”); Katia Yannaca-Small, Fair and Equitable 
Treatment Standard:  Recent Developments, in STANDARDS OF INVESTMENT PROTECTION, 
supra, at 111 (discussing the standard of “fair and equitable treatment”). 
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find it difficult to prove wrongdoing on the part of the State taking the 
form of insufficient efforts in their fight against IP piracy.”97 
B. Weaknesses 
Despite the myriad benefits of ISDS, there are many reasons why 
this dispute settlement mechanism is undesirable and problematic, 
especially when viewed from the developing countries’ perspective.  
To help facilitate a systematic analysis, this Section catalogues the 
various weaknesses of ISDS, dividing them into three distinct 
categories:  process-related, interpretation-related, and outcome-
related.  This Section then discusses each weakness in turn. 
1. Process-based weaknesses 
The current ISDS process has at least four types of weaknesses.  
First, arbitration costs can be very high.  In general, the costs “have 
averaged over USD 8 million with costs exceeding USD 30 million in 
some cases.”98  These costs could go up to as high as $70 million, as in 
the highly unusual Yukos Oil case discussed in Section II.B.3.99  
Considering that each claim in a WTO dispute generally costs about 
only $300,000 to $400,000 (based on 2004 figures),100 the costs of ISDS 
arbitrations are substantially higher.101  If developing countries already 
                                                     
 97. VANHONNAEKER, supra note 18, at 163. 
 98. David Gaukrodger & Kathryn Gordon, Investor-State Dispute Settlement:  A 
Scoping Paper for the Investment Policy Community 19 (Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development, Working Papers on International Investment No. 
2012/03, 2012); see also Matthew Hodgson, Costs in Investment Treaty Arbitration:  The 
Case for Reform, in RESHAPING THE ISDS SYSTEM, supra note 75, at 748, 749 (“The 
average Party Costs for Claimants and Respondents are in the region of U.S. $4.4 
million and U.S. $4.5 million, respectively.  To this can be added average Tribunal 
Costs of around U.S. $750,000.  The average ‘all in’ costs of an investment treaty 
arbitration are therefore just short of U.S. $10 million.  The median figure is notably 
lower, but still substantial, at around U.S. $6 million.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 99. See JOUBIN-BRET, supra note 72, at 2 (stating that the “the legal fees [in the 
Yukos Oil case] for the claimant alone [were] US$70 million”). 
 100. See Gregory Shaffer, Recognizing Public Goods in WTO Dispute Settlement:  Who 
Participates?  Who Decides?  The Case of TRIPS and Pharmaceutical Patent Protection, 7 J. 
INT’L ECON. L. 459, 473 (2004) (finding that “an average WTO claim costs in the 
range of US$300,000–400,000 in attorneys’ fees,” based on 2004 figures); see also 
Gregory Shaffer, Developing Country Use of the WTO Dispute Settlement System:  Why It 
Matters, the Barriers Posed, in TRADE DISPUTES AND THE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 
UNDERSTANDING OF THE WTO:  AN INTERDISCIPLINARY ASSESSMENT 167, 183–84 (James 
C. Hartigan ed., 2009) (discussing the legal costs involved in WTO disputes). 
 101. See JOUBIN-BRET, supra note 72, at 2 (“Compared with cases brought to the 
WTO [Dispute Settlement Body], . . . investment treaty cases are within a range of 5 
to 10 times more expensive than trade disputes.”). 
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have a difficult time affording the WTO dispute settlement process, the 
exceedingly high costs of ISDS arbitrations will certainly guarantee that 
most businesses in these countries will be shut out of the mechanism.102 
Second, ISDS arbitrators may be partial and unaccountable.103  For 
example, these arbitrators may have worked in law firms that have 
clients in the same industry.104  They may also have a tendency to 
serve corporate clients who are similar to those filing ISDS 
complaints.105  Indeed, developing country policymakers, academic 
and policy commentators, and civil society organizations often lament 
                                                     
 102. Thus far, commentators have proposed various measures to address the high 
costs of ISDS arbitrations.  See, e.g., Hodgson, supra note 98 (discussing ways to 
reform costs in investment treaty arbitration); Adam Raviv, Achieving a Faster ICSID, in 
RESHAPING THE ISDS SYSTEM, supra note 75, at 653, 695–96 (offering as solutions “a 
ceiling on fees for a specific matter” and “a hard time limit—say, six months—on 
issuing an award” so as to prevent arbitrators from “drag[ging] out deliberations simply 
to bill more time to the parties”); Jeffrey Sullivan & David Ingle, Interim Costs Orders:  
The Tribunal’s Tool to Encourage Procedural Economy, in RESHAPING THE ISDS SYSTEM, supra 
note 75, at 731, 732 (“One procedural mechanism that may assist in preventing 
procedural misconduct and unmeritorious claims is the use of interim costs orders.  If 
tribunals regularly used their case management powers to issue interim costs orders, 
they would be able to deter nefarious tactics while also balancing the two seemingly 
irreconcilable goals of due process and procedural economy.”). 
 103. See Ho, supra note 22, at 234 (“Some also contend that arbitrators lack the 
independence and impartiality of typical domestic or international tribunals.”); Joost 
Pauwelyn, The Rule of Law Without the Rule of Lawyers?  Why Investment Arbitrators Are 
from Mars, Trade Adjudicators from Venus, 109 AM. J. INT’L L. 761, 783 (2015) (“[O]n 
average, WTO panelists tend to be relatively low-key diplomats from developing 
countries (very few U.S./EU nationals), with a government background, and often 
without a law degree or legal expertise, whereas ICSID arbitrators are likely high-
powered, elite private lawyers or legal academics from western Europe or the United 
States[.]  [In addition,] the pool of ICSID arbitrators [is] an ideologically divided, 
closed network with a small number of individuals attracting most nominations, 
whereas the universe of WTO panelists is ideologically more homogeneous, with a 
relatively low reappointment rate and nominations more evenly distributed (with the 
consequence that panelists, on average, have relatively little experience)[.]”). 
  104. Joost Pauwelyn recounted the frequent criticisms of ICSID arbitrators: 
ICSID arbitrators . . . get referred to as “elite lawyers,” “ambitious investment 
lawyer[s] keen to make a lucrative living,” a “mafia,” “super arbitrators” who 
are “not just the mafia but a smaller, inner mafia,” adjudicators—not 
faceless—but with conflicts of interest and a “hidden agenda” (“one minute 
acting as counsel, the next framing the issue as an academic, or influencing 
policy as a government representative or expert witness”). 
Pauwelyn, supra note 103, at 780 (footnotes omitted); see also Gaukrodger & Gordon, 
supra note 98, at 44 (“It appears that over 50% of ISDS arbitrators have acted as 
counsel for investors in other ISDS cases while it has been estimated about 10% of 
ISDS arbitrators have acted as counsel for States in other cases.”). 
  105. See Pauwelyn, supra note 103, at 764 (noting “the closed network of specialist 
ISDS arbitrators and lawyers” in “the terrain of subject-matter specialists”). 
YU.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/13/2017  6:42 PM 
2017] INVESTMENT-RELATED ASPECTS OF IP RIGHTS 853 
the process’s bias toward the interests of transnational 
corporations.106  As President Evo Morales of Bolivia declared, 
“Governments in Latin America and I think all over the world never 
win the cases.  The transnationals always win.”107  These sentiments 
are understandable considering that the majority of the claimants in 
ISDS cases originated from developed countries.108 
Third, many of the ISDS proceedings have been kept in secret, and 
policymakers, commentators, and civil society organizations continue 
to have great difficulty uncovering what happens in these 
proceedings.109  For instance, the notice of claim in Philip Morris 
                                                     
 106. As Susan Franck observed, 
In investment arbitration, there is a lurking concern that the development 
status of arbitrators, particularly presiding arbitrators who wield especially 
strong influence, may be inappropriately associated with certain outcomes.  
One author even explains that there is “some concern in developing 
countries over the selection of arbitrators” at entities such as ICSID, and 
such appointments may create a “systemic . . . bias in favor of Western legal 
concepts and the positions.” 
Susan D. Franck, Development and Outcomes of Investment Treaty Arbitration, 50 HARV. 
INT’L L.J. 435, 450 (2009) [hereinafter Franck, Development and Outcomes] (quoting 
AMAZU A. ASOUZU, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND AFRICAN STATES:  
PRACTICE, PARTICIPATION AND INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 404–05 (2001)) (ellipses 
in original) (footnote omitted); see also id. at 451 (“In a 2005 speech, Roberto 
Dañino, then Secretary-General of ICSID, . . . explained that there is a concern 
‘expressed by a few . . . that ICSID arbitrators are predominantly nationals from 
developed countries, the implication being that they may be more favorably inclined 
towards investors’ from the developed world and less favorably inclined towards 
governments from the developing world.” (second ellipsis in original)). 
 107. Leslie Mazoch, Chavez Takes Cool View Toward OAS, Says Latin America Better off 
Without World Bank, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 30, 2007, 11:09 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/huff-wires/20070430/la-gen-venezuela-leftist-alternative. 
 108. As stated in the latest World Investment Report, 
Developed-country investors brought most of the 70 known cases in 2015.  
This follows the historical trend in which developed-country investors have 
been the main ISDS users, accounting for over 80 per cent of all known 
claims.  The most frequent home States in ISDS in 2015 were the United 
Kingdom, followed by Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands . . . . 
UNCTAD, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2016:  INVESTOR NATIONALITY:  POLICY 
CHALLENGES 105 (2016), http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2016_en.pdf. 
 109. See Kate Miles, Reconceptualising International Investment Law:  Bringing the 
Public Interest into Private Business, in INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW AND NATIONAL 
AUTONOMY 295, 295–96 (Meredith Kolsky Lewis & Susy Frankel eds., 2010) (“Although 
[ISDS] cases resolve questions that can affect significant matters of public policy, the 
public generally does not have access to the documents, the proceedings are 
conducted behind closed doors, and the submission of amicus curiae briefs is restricted, 
if permitted at all.”); Ho, supra note 22, at 234 (noting that “the proceedings and 
decisions may lack the same level of transparency as most judicial decisions”). 
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Asia’s ISDS proceeding against Australia was made available only 
through a request for declassification110 under the Australian 
Freedom of Information Act.111  Compared with ISDS, dispute 
settlement in the WTO is much more transparent—not only for 
complainants and respondents but also for third parties, regardless of 
whether they intervene or not.  Virtually all of the key public 
documents in the WTO process have been made available on the 
international trading body’s website.112 
Finally, investors may file frivolous lawsuits, thereby wasting the 
host state’s scarce resources.113  Even worse, those states that find it 
costly to go through the ISDS process may be just too eager to change 
their laws to avoid costly arbitrations.114  It is therefore no surprise 
that some commentators have criticized ISDS for providing “an 
oversized public insurance scheme for companies that are unwilling 
to assume the normal risks of doing business.”115 
Even worse, given the high costs of ISDS arbitrations and the 
potential for losing even more money through damage awards,116 
                                                     
 110. See Philip Morris Asia’s Notice of Claim, supra note 14. 
 111. Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) s 11A (Austl.). 
 112. See WTO Documents, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/docs_ 
e/docs_e.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2017). 
 113. See ISDS Fact Sheet, supra note 36. 
  114. See TPP’s ISDS:  Moving from State-to-State to Company-to-World Dispute Resolution, 
LEGAL READER (May 1, 2015), http://www.legalreader.com/tpps-isds-moving-from-
state-to-state-to-company-to-world-dispute-resolution (surmising that New Zealand 
“decided against changing their smoking laws out of fear of . . . retribution through 
ISDS”); see also MOUYAL, supra note 76, at 68 (“In response to [the foreign mining 
industry’s threat based on the U.K.–Indonesia BIT or the Australia–Indonesia BIT], 
Indonesia retreated from the ban [on open-cast mining in protected forest areas], 
first by exempting several of the companies from the ban and promising to assess the 
situation of other affected companies.  Subsequently the government decided to 
repeal the ban.”). 
 115. Maude Barlow, CETA Changes Make Investor-State Provisions Worse, HUFFINGTON 
POST (Feb. 2, 2016, 3:59 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/maude-barlow/ceta-
changes_b_9130538.html; see also Daniel J. Ikenson, A Compromise to Advance the Trade 
Agenda:  Purge Negotiations of Investor-State Dispute Settlement, CATO INST. (Mar. 4, 2014), 
http://www.cato.org/publications/free-trade-bulletin/compromise-advance-trade-
agenda-purge-negotiations-investor-state (“ISDS not only subsidizes MNCs 
[multinational corporations], but particular kinds of MNCs.  What may be too risky 
an investment proposition without ISDS for Company A is not necessarily too risky 
for Company B.  By reducing the risk of investing abroad, then, ISDS is a subsidy for 
more risk-averse companies.”). 
 116. See Susan D. Franck, Empirically Evaluating Claims About Investment Treaty 
Arbitration, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1, 57–58 (2007) (“Out of the eighty-two cases in the 
present study, only forty-four quantified an investor’s claimed damages either fully or 
partially.  The lowest amount claimed was in Maffezini v. Spain for approximately 
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many developing countries may settle disputes even when their laws 
have already met international standards, such as when they are in 
full compliance with the TRIPS Agreement or other multilateral 
agreements.117  Such coerced settlements regardless of compliance 
with international standards, in turn, would cause the dispute 
settlement process to lose legitimacy.118  To avoid the challenges 
posed by ISDS, countries such as Indonesia and South Africa have 
already started terminating international investment agreements.119 
                                                     
US$155,314 (ESP 30 million) whereas the highest amount claimed was in Generation 
Ukraine v. Ukraine for US$9.4 billion.  Overall, the average amount of damages 
claimed in those forty-four cases was approximately US$343.4 million.” (footnotes 
omitted)); id. at 58 (“There were fifty-two cases in which tribunals made awards that 
resulted in a damages determination (if any) for treaty-based claims.  Out of these 
cases, there were thirty-one instances in which investors were awarded nothing.  In 
the remaining twenty-one instances, . . . [t]he average amount of damages awarded 
by tribunals was approximately US$10.4 million.” (footnotes omitted)); Susan D. 
Franck, Using Investor-State Mediation Rules to Promote Conflict Management:  An 
Introductory Guide, 29 ICSID REV. 66, 79 (2014) [hereinafter Franck, Using Investor-
State Mediation Rules] (“[U]sing data from 159 final publicly-available awards [in a 
more recent study], the average amount awarded (including settlements and 
discontinuances where public records reflected a State transferred funds to the 
claimants) was around US$16.6 million.”); see also Ho, supra note 22, at 234 
(“Although there is a huge diversity in awards, even a lower award would still be 
substantial for any developing country, such that a potential award . . . could have a 
substantial impact on domestic decisions.”). 
 117. See Ho, supra note 22, at 222 (“Eli Lilly’s suit may prompt other companies to 
challenge not only patentability standards they disagree with, but also exceptions to 
patent rights, even where these exceptions are permissible under TRIPS.  This would 
threaten recent and proposed patent laws that commentators have hailed as 
promoting a better balance of patent rights and access to medicine.”). 
 118. See Peter K. Yu, Digital Copyright Reform and Legal Transplants in Hong Kong, 48 
U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 693, 718 (2010) (“[B]y coercing law-abiding citizens to pay 
settlements when they have not broken the law, the law will gradually lose its 
legitimacy, and the damage to the copyright system and the rule of law . . . could be 
quite high.”); Peter K. Yu, Tales of the Unintended in Copyright Law, 67 STUD. L. POL. & 
SOC’Y 1, 9 (2015) (“By forcing individual users to settle lawsuits regardless of the 
legality of their actions, the statutory damages provision has greatly undermined the 
attractiveness and legitimacy of not only copyright law but the entire legal system.”). 
 119. See Ben Bland & Shawn Donnan, Indonesia to Terminate More than 60 Bilateral 
Investment Treaties, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 26, 2014), 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/3755c1b2-b4e2-11e3-af92-00144feabdc0.html 
(“Indonesia is planning to terminate more than 60 bilateral investment treaties that 
allow disgruntled foreign investors to bypass local courts and seek compensation in 
international tribunals, amid a growing global backlash against such provisions.”); 
Adam Green, South Africa:  BITs in Pieces, BEYONDBRICS (Oct. 19, 2012, 3:48 PM), 
http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2012/10/19/south-africa-bits-in-pieces (“South Africa 
has terminated a bilateral investment treaty with Belgium and Luxembourg in the 
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2. Interpretation-based weaknesses 
The second type of weakness relates to interpretations by ISDS 
arbitrators.  As far as ISDS decisions are concerned, there are no 
binding precedents.120  Although stare decisis is a special feature of 
common law, as opposed to civil law, disputing parties from all 
around the world increasingly expect similar cases to be decided 
consistently and predictably.121  For example, WTO panels and the 
Appellate Body have used previous cases for explanation and support, 
even though they are not required to follow any precedent.122  As the 
                                                     
first of a series of planned shreddings of post apartheid-era agreements which are 
coming up for renewal.”). 
 120. Compare Marc Bungenberg & Catharine Titi, Precedents in International 
Investment Law, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 30, at 1505, 
1508 (“Despite the absence of a formal doctrine of binding precedent, investment 
tribunals generally rely on earlier awards to buttress their legal reasoning, often 
treating them as determinative or authoritative statements of applicable rules or 
principles of law.” (footnote omitted)), and Loretta Malintoppi, Independence, 
Impartiality, and Duty of Disclosure of Arbitrators, in OXFORD HANDBOOK, supra note 77, 
at 789, 792 (“While it cannot be said that the rule of legal precedent (stare decisis) 
applies in international arbitration in general, investment arbitration has witnessed a 
growth in reported jurisprudence.  Litigation parties frequently rely on this 
jurisprudence to support their legal arguments and tribunals often apply these 
precedents as grounds for their findings.”), with Christoph Schreuer & Matthew 
Weiniger, A Doctrine of Precedent?, in OXFORD HANDBOOK, supra note 77, at 1188, 1196 
(“[I]n some cases tribunals did not follow earlier decisions but adopted different 
solutions.  At times, they simply adopted a different solution without distancing 
themselves from the earlier decision.  At other times, they referred to the earlier 
decision and pointed out that they were unconvinced by what another tribunal had 
said and that, therefore, their decision departed from the one adopted earlier.”).  
For discussions of the doctrine of precedent in relation to international investment 
arbitration, see generally Bungenberg & Titi, supra; Joshua Karton, Lessons from 
International Uniform Law, in RESHAPING THE ISDS SYSTEM, supra note 75, at 48; 
Schreuer & Weiniger, supra; Andrés Rigo Sureda, Precedent in Investment Treaty 
Arbitration, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW, supra note 76, at 830. 
 121. See Reinisch, supra note 76, at 905–08 (discussing the danger of inconsistent 
investment arbitral awards). 
 122. As the WTO noted on its training materials, 
Even if adopted, the reports of panels and the Appellate Body are not 
binding precedents for other disputes between the same parties on other 
matters or different parties on the same matter, even though the same 
questions of WTO law might arise.  As in other areas of international law, 
there is no rule of stare decisis in WTO dispute settlement according to which 
previous rulings bind panels and the Appellate Body in subsequent cases.  
This means that a panel is not obliged to follow previous Appellate Body 
reports even if they have developed a certain interpretation of exactly the 
provisions which are now at issue before the panel.  Nor is the Appellate 
Body obliged to maintain the legal interpretations it has developed in past 
cases. . . .  If the reasoning developed in the previous report in support of 
YU.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/13/2017  6:42 PM 
2017] INVESTMENT-RELATED ASPECTS OF IP RIGHTS 857 
Appellate Body reasoned in Japan—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages,123 the 
use of earlier relevant cases could help “create legitimate 
expectations among WTO Members.”124 
Within the intellectual property field, there is also a considerable 
concern that ISDS arbitrators would subscribe to a narrow view of 
intellectual property rights.  In doing so, they may focus primarily on 
the protection levels without adequately considering the 
corresponding limitations or exceptions.  They may also ignore the 
many limitations, flexibilities, and safeguards that have been carefully 
built into the TRIPS Agreement.125  From the standpoint of a host 
state, especially one in the developing world, overlooking these 
limitations, flexibilities, and safeguards is particularly problematic, 
considering that ISDS is often included in TRIPS-plus trade or 
investment agreements—agreements that are established outside the 
multilateral process to ratchet up the TRIPS standards.126 
Finally, ISDS arbitrators may have tunnel vision.  With respect to 
intellectual property investments, they may focus narrowly on only 
the intellectual property side of the investment bargain.  As a result, 
they may ignore the existence of concessions outside the intellectual 
                                                     
the interpretation given to a WTO rule is persuasive from the perspective of 
the panel or the Appellate Body in the subsequent case, it is very likely that 
the panel or the Appellate Body will repeat and follow it.  This is also in line 
with a key objective of the dispute settlement system which is to enhance the 
security and predictability of the multilateral trading system . . . . 
Legal Effect of Panel and Appellate Body Reports and DSB Recommendations and Rulings, 
WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/disp_settlemen 
t_cbt_e/c7s2p1_e.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2017). 
 123. Appellate Body Report, Japan—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WTO Docs. 
WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R (Oct. 4, 1996). 
 124. Id. at 14. 
  125. See Yu, International Enclosure Movement, supra note 56, at 863, 869–70 
(discussing the limitations, flexibilities and public interest safeguards in the TRIPS 
Agreement).  For commentaries emphasizing the flexibilities within the TRIPS 
Agreement, see generally CARLOS M. CORREA, TRADE RELATED ASPECTS OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS:  A COMMENTARY ON THE TRIPS AGREEMENT (2007); 
UNCTAD-ICTSD PROJECT ON IPRS AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, RESOURCE BOOK 
ON TRIPS AND DEVELOPMENT (2005). 
 126. See Robert Burrell & Kimberlee Weatherall, Exporting Controversy?  Reactions to 
the Copyright Provisions of the U.S.-Australia Free Trade Agreement:  Lessons for U.S. Trade 
Policy, 2008 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 259 (criticizing the U.S.-Australia Free Trade 
Agreement); Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents, supra note 50, at 392–400 (discussing the 
growing use of bilateral and regional trade agreements to push for higher intellectual 
property standards).  See generally INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS 
(Christopher Heath & Anselm Kamperman Sanders eds., 2007) (collecting essays 
discussing free trade agreements in the intellectual property context). 
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property field, such as free lands, tax breaks, exemption from export 
custom duties, and preferential treatment on foreign exchange.127  
Overlooking these offsetting concessions is particularly problematic 
because the concessions would not have been offered in the first 
place had intellectual property protection and enforcement been as 
strong as investors had anticipated. 
3. Outcome-based weaknesses 
The third type of weakness concerns the final outcomes of ISDS 
arbitrations.  There are at least five widely documented weaknesses 
regarding arbitral awards.  First, the total compensation can be very 
high.  A case in point is the $50 billion ISDS award that was given as 
compensation for Russia’s wrongful expropriation of the now-defunct 
Yukos Oil, the country’s once biggest oil producer.128  To put this 
award in the right comparative context, it is important to recall that 
the gross domestic product (GDP) of many developing countries, 
including those in the European Union, does not reach that 
amount.129  Even Peru and Vietnam, two of the twelve TPP partners, 
                                                     
 127. As Peter Muchlinski observed, 
Incentives are used by governments to attract investment, to steer investment 
into favoured industries or regions, or to influence the character of an 
investment, for example, when technology-intensive investment is being 
sought.  They can take two major forms, fiscal incentives, based on tax 
advantages to investors, and financial incentives based on the provision of 
funds directly to investors to finance new investments, or certain operations, 
or to defray capital or operational costs.  Other types of incentives may not 
be easy to discern but they can have a positive effect on the overall 
profitability of an investment.  These may include general infrastructure 
development by the host country, market preferences or preferential 
treatment on foreign exchange. 
Muchlinski, supra note 77, at 33 (footnote omitted); see also Anastasia Telesetsky, A 
New Investment Deal in Asia and Africa:  Land Leases to Foreign Investors, in EVOLUTION IN 
INVESTMENT TREATY LAW AND ARBITRATION 539 (Chester Brown & Kate Miles eds., 
2011) [hereinafter EVOLUTION IN INVESTMENT TREATY] (discussing the various 
concessions that states in Asia and Africa have made to attract FDI). 
 128. See Henry Meyer, Russia Faces $50 Billion Fight in U.S., U.K. for Yukos Damages, 
BLOOMBERG (July 24, 2015, 9:40 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/20 
15-07-24/russia-faces-50-billion-fight-in-u-s-u-k-for-yukos-damages (reporting the $50 
billion arbitration award).  The award is currently under appeal in the Netherlands, 
and Russia has no plan to pay the damages.  Id.; Anthony Deutsch, Russia Appeals 
Order to Pay $50 Bln to Yukos Shareholders in Netherlands, REUTERS (Feb. 9, 2016, 5:42 
AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/russia-yukos-appeal-netherlands-idUSL8N15O1P2. 
 129. In 2015, those EU members that had a GDP lower than the Yukos Oil award 
included Bulgaria ($48.95 billion), Croatia ($48.73 billion), Cyprus ($19.32 billion), 
Estonia ($22.69 billion), Latvia ($27.04 billion), Lithuania ($41.24 billion), and 
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had a GDP of only less than four times the Yukos Oil award.  
According to World Bank data, the GDP of these countries was 
slightly above $190 billion in 2015.130 
Second, ISDS allows transnational corporations to challenge 
legitimate regulations, such as those concerning public health, labor, 
and the environment.131  Such challenges would create what 
commentators, intergovernmental bodies, and civil society 
organizations have widely referred to as “regulatory chill”132—a chilling 
effect that undermines a country’s sovereign ability to regulate harmful 
conducts, including those committed by transnational corporations.133  
Recent examples of such chill include Philip Morris’s attempts to use 
ISDS to challenge the plain-packaging regulations for tobacco 
products in Australia and Uruguay and Eli Lilly’s ongoing effort to 
challenge the patentability requirements in Canada.134 
Regulatory chill, while difficult to prove,135 is particularly 
problematic in the intellectual property field,136 an area in which 
                                                     
Slovenia ($42.75 billion).  GDP (Current US$), WORLD BANK, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD (last visited Feb. 5, 2017). 
 130. See id. (listing the 2015 GDP of Peru and Vietnam at $192.08 billion and 
$193.6 billion, respectively). 
 131. See MOUYAL, supra note 76, at 68 (discussing the adverse implications of the 
foreign mining industry’s threat of using the U.K.–Indonesia BIT or the Australia–
Indonesia BIT to challenge an Indonesian forestry act that bans open-cast mining in 
protected forest areas); Jane Kelsey & Lori Wallach, “Investor-State” Disputes in Trade 
Pacts Threaten Fundamental Principles of National Judicial Systems, PUBLIC CITIZEN (Apr. 
2012), https://www.citizen.org/documents/isds-domestic-legal-process-background-
brief.pdf (“Over $350 million in compensation has already been paid out to 
corporations in a series of Investor-State cases under NAFTA alone.  This included 
attacks on natural resource policies, environmental protection and health and safety 
measures, and more.”); see also supra text accompanying notes 13–24 (recounting 
Philip Morris’s attempts to use ISDS to challenge the plain-packaging regulations for 
tobacco products in Australia and Uruguay and Eli Lilly’s ongoing effort to challenge 
the patentability requirements in Canada). 
 132. See, e.g., MOUYAL, supra note 76, at 67–68 (providing examples of “regulatory 
chill”); UNCTAD, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2015:  REFORMING INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT GOVERNANCE 128 (2015) (considering “regulatory chill” to be a concern 
of ISDS); Kyla Tienhaara, Regulatory Chill and the Threat of Arbitration:  A View from 
Political Science, in EVOLUTION IN INVESTMENT TREATY, supra note 127, at 606 (using 
political science to analyze the “regulatory chill” hypothesis). 
 133. See Ho, supra note 22, at 233 (“A major issue is that the suits appear to 
improperly encroach on domestic authority and even have a chilling effect on 
legitimate state regulatory functions due to substantial awards, as well as legal costs of 
defending such cases.”). 
 134. See supra text accompanying notes 13–24. 
 135. As Jonathan Bonnitcha explained, 
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autonomy and policy space are badly needed for countries to tailor 
their intellectual property systems to local needs, interests, 
conditions, and priorities.137  As Ruth Okediji lamented, 
Intellectual property obligations in the investment context . . . pose 
a new threat to states’ traditional lawmaking powers by providing 
foreign actors [with] a singular opportunity to challenge laws that 
have been enacted with the domestic public interest in full view, 
even when they are in conformity with international intellectual 
property treaties.  Subverting a core judicial function—
interpretation of a domestic law already infused with multilateral 
obligations—to the oversight of a private international tribunal 
precariously alters the contours of state power and responsibility 
for compliant domestic legislation and policy prescriptions.138 
Third, ISDS will provide new fora for private investors and their 
supportive states to sue developing country governments.139  The 
typical fora in which complaints can be filed against these 
governments are domestic courts and international adjudicatory 
bodies, such as the WTO Dispute Settlement Body.140  By providing 
                                                     
Chilling effects are difficult to identify because they require counterfactual 
evidence about the regulations that would have existed in the absence of the 
purported chilling.  Regulatory chill due to [international investment treaty] 
protection is particularly difficult to isolate because, in addition to 
identifying a chilling effect, one must be able to exclude the possibility that it 
was attributable to some other cause. 
Jonathan Bonnitcha, Outline of a Normative Framework for Evaluating Interpretations of 
Investment Treaty Protections, in EVOLUTION IN INVESTMENT TREATY, supra note 127, at 
117, 134 (footnote omitted). 
 136. See Okediji, Is Intellectual Property “Investment”?, supra note 25, at 1133 (“The 
conception of intellectual property as a tool to advance national welfare has long 
been part of multilateral intellectual property relations.  The basis for determining 
the ‘legitimate expectations’ of an intellectual property ‘investment’ thus must 
resonate in domestic law.”). 
 137. See Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, Protecting Intellectual Property Rights Under BITs, 
FTAs and TRIPS:  Conflicting Regimes or Mutual Coherence?, in EVOLUTION IN INVESTMENT 
TREATY, supra note 127, at 485 (discussing the impact of the TRIPS Agreement and 
TRIPS-plus bilateral and regional trade and investment agreements on the state’s 
enjoyment of its policy space); see also Yu, International Enclosure Movement, supra note 
56, at 833–55 (discussing why policymakers need wide policy space to devise solutions 
to address internal problems). 
 138. Okediji, Is Intellectual Property “Investment”?, supra note 25, at 1122. 
 139. See ISDS Fact Sheet, supra note 36 (“For some critics there is a discomfort that 
ISDS provides an additional channel for investors to sue governments, including a 
belief that all disputes (even international law disputes) should be resolved in 
domestic courts.”). 
 140. See Pauwelyn, supra note 103, at 767 (“[P]rivate actors are, in many cases, 
pulling the strings and paying private law firms to do the litigation, before whatever 
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alternative fora, ISDS will allow private actors to bypass these widely 
used processes.  Even worse, the investors’ home governments can 
still file complaints through traditional state-to-state dispute 
settlement processes.  As a result, ISDS is likely to spark a vicious cycle 
that will generate more disputes.  After all, diplomatic and other non-
trade reasons may induce governments to exercise restraint in filing 
state-to-state complaints. 
Fourth, and more specifically in the intellectual property context, 
ISDS may encourage arbitrators to focus on rights that do not fall 
squarely within the TRIPS Agreement or other multilateral 
intellectual property agreements, such as those administered by the 
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO).  Although most 
international investment agreements define “investment” broadly to 
cover all forms of “intellectual property rights,”141 perhaps even 
including licenses to or applications of those rights,142 the TRIPS 
Agreement explicitly covers only eight categories of rights—namely, 
copyrights, patents, trademarks, trade secrets, geographical 
indications, industrial designs, layout designs of integrated circuits, 
and plant variety protections.143  To be sure, one can make a strong 
argument that the TRIPS Agreement also covers “utility models, trade 
names, and other forms of unfair competition,”144 due to its 
                                                     
forum or forums are best for the client:  in some cases, it may be the WTO; in others, 
investor-state arbitration; in yet others, parallel proceedings.”). 
 141. TPP Agreement, supra note 6, art. 9.1 (including “intellectual property 
rights” under subsection (f) of the definition of “investment”). 
 142. See id. art. 9.1 n.4 (“Whether a particular type of licence, authorisation, 
permit or similar instrument (including a concession to the extent that it has the 
nature of such an instrument) has the characteristics of an investment depends on 
such factors as the nature and extent of the rights that the holder has under the 
Party’s law.”); see also Mercurio, Awakening the Sleeping Giant, supra note 31, at 878–79 
(discussing whether an application for intellectual property rights would qualify as a 
covered investment).  As Carlos Correa explained, 
Patent applications . . . may be traded and, in some countries, patent 
applications generate rights even before they are granted, such as the ability 
to act against infringers.  Though it is clear that a still-unregistered invention 
is not an IPR, it may be argued that the application is, in any case, an 
“intangible property” as long as it is “owned” and can be assigned to third 
parties.  Further, some investment agreements refer in the definition of 
“investment” to “rights with respect to copyrights, patents . . . .”  This wording 
may be intended to encompass not only granted rights but also applications. 
Correa, Investment Protection, supra note 52, at 340 (footnotes omitted). 
 143. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, arts. 9–40. 
 144. Peter K. Yu, Enforcement, Enforcement, What Enforcement?, 52 IDEA 239, 256 
n.82 (2012). 
YU.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/13/2017  6:42 PM 
862 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:829 
incorporation of the Paris Convention.145  Nonetheless, it remains 
debatable whether the Agreement covers sui generis database 
protection, broadcast rights, and exclusivity regimes used to protect 
clinical trial data.  These additional protections are generally referred 
to as “TRIPS-extra” obligations—obligations that lie outside the scope 
of the TRIPS Agreement and that may not be subject to the 
mandatory WTO dispute settlement process.146 
Finally, ISDS may allow private investors to rewrite the TRIPS 
Agreement—or, for that matter, other multilateral trade or 
intellectual property agreements.147  Such rewriting will undermine 
the hard-earned bargains developing countries have won through the 
WTO negotiations.148  A case in point is the moratorium imposed on 
non-violation complaints—complaints of nullification or impairment 
of trade benefits when no substantive violation has occurred.149  Since 
the adoption of the TRIPS Agreement, this moratorium has been 
                                                     
 145. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, art. 2.1 (“Members shall comply with 
Articles 1 through 12, and Article 19, of the Paris Convention (1967).”). 
 146. See Yu, International Enclosure Movement, supra note 56, at 868–69 (discussing 
“TRIPS-extra” obligations). 
 147. See Ho, supra note 22, at 223 (arguing that “permitting companies to 
challenge domestic decisions regarding intellectual property through investor-state 
disputes is problematic because they disrupt internationally agreed norms under 
TRIPS, and also because the historical justifications for protecting foreign investors 
do not apply”); Okediji, Is Intellectual Property “Investment”?, supra note 25, at 1123–24 
(“On face value, Eli Lilly’s claims could effectively constitute a revision of NAFTA.  If 
Lilly is successful in its grander objective—a ruling that Canada is required to change 
its current utility standard—the implications for intellectual property multilateralism, 
and for intellectual property policy in all countries, would be stunning indeed.”). 
 148. See Susy Frankel, Interpreting the Overlap of International Investment and 
Intellectual Property Law, 19 J. INT’L ECON. L. 121, 124 (2016) (“The current investment 
disputes where investors claim indirect expropriation or the absence of fair and 
equitable treatment of IP are not just IP in a new forum, but point toward a shift 
away from the balancing mechanisms that are integral to IP (even if those 
mechanisms do not always operate as well as they might) to a sphere which has fewer 
(if any) equivalent balancing mechanisms.” (footnotes omitted)); Ho, supra note 22, 
at 250 (“Beyond interfering with an existing dispute resolution process and 
producing potentially inconsistent decisions, permitting investor-state arbitrations to 
overrule internationally agreed upon domestic flexibilities under TRIPS seems 
particularly unfair to countries since TRIPS already encroaches on traditional 
domestic authority in the area of intellectual property rights.”); see also Ruth L. 
Okediji, Back to Bilateralism?  Pendulum Swings in International Intellectual Property 
Protection, 1 U. OTTAWA L. & TECH. J. 125, 129 (2004) (lamenting that bilateral free 
trade agreements threaten to “roll back both substantive and strategic gains” won by 
developing countries in multilateral process). 
 149. See generally Susy Frankel, Challenging TRIPS-Plus Agreements:  The Potential 
Utility of Non-Violation Disputes, 12 J. INT’L ECON. L. 1023, 1059 (2009) (discussing non-
violation complaints in the TRIPS context). 
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repeatedly extended—most recently during the Tenth WTO 
Ministerial Conference in Nairobi in December 2015.150  Despite this 
extension, nothing can prevent ISDS arbitrators from considering 
complaints that are based on impaired benefits or frustrated 
expectations, as opposed to substantive violations. 
Similarly, Brook Baker and Katrina Geddes expressed concern that 
“there is a risk that an IP rightholder might bring a claim because of a 
governmental failure to intercept alleged infringing products in-transit 
via stringent border measures.”151  In their view, such a failure “might 
be interpreted to violate the right to fair and equitable treatment in 
administrative border procedures.”152  Considering the controversy 
generated by in-transit seizures of pharmaceutical products during the 
negotiation of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement,153 their 
concern is well justified.  At that time, the repeated seizures of in-
transit generic drugs were so contentious that India and Brazil filed 
complaints against the European Union and the Netherlands before 
the WTO Dispute Settlement Body.154  Although India and the 
                                                     
 150. See World Trade Organization, TRIPS Non-Violation and Situation Complaints:  
Ministerial Decision of 19 December 2015, WTO Doc. WT/MIN(15)/41 (noting the 
agreement not to initiate any non-violation complaints under the TRIPS Agreement 
until the next WTO Ministerial Meeting in December 2017). 
 151. Brook K. Baker & Katrina Geddes, Corporate Power Unbound:  Investor-State 
Arbitration of IP Monopolies on Medicines—Eli Lilly v. Canada and the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership Agreement, 23 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 34 (2015) (footnote omitted). 
 152. Id. 
 153. See Peter K. Yu, Six Secret (and Now Open) Fears of ACTA, 64 SMU L. REV. 975, 
1009 (2011) (“[I]n the middle of the negotiations, the discussion of the seizure of in-
transit generic drugs became a very hot issue due to new developments in Germany, 
the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.”); Peter K. Yu, Virotech Patents, Viropiracy, 
and Viral Sovereignty, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1563, 1588 (2013) (“During the ACTA 
negotiations, stories about the seizure of pharmaceuticals in Europe have raised 
important questions about the intellectual property enforcement standards set in the 
TRIPS Agreement and the handling of in-transit goods under the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.”).  For discussions of the seizure of in-transit drugs, 
see generally CYNTHIA M. HO, ACCESS TO MEDICINE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY:  
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS ON PATENTS AND RELATED RIGHTS 285–323 (2011); 
Frederick M. Abbott, Seizure of Generic Pharmaceuticals in Transit Based on Allegations of 
Patent Infringement:  A Threat to International Trade, Development and Public Welfare, 1 
WIPO J. 43, 44 (2009); Bryan Mercurio, “Seizing” Pharmaceuticals in Transit:  Analysing 
the WTO Dispute That Wasn’t, 61 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 389 (2012). 
 154. See Request for Consultations by India, European Union and a Member State—
Seizure of Generic Drugs in Transit, WTO Doc. WT/DS408/1 (May 19, 2010); Request 
for Consultations by Brazil, European Union and a Member State—Seizure of Generic Drugs 
in Transit, WTO Doc. WT/DS409/1 (May 19, 2010). 
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European Union eventually reached an interim settlement in July 
2011,155 neither Brazil nor India has withdrawn its complaint. 
4. Summary 
Although ISDS has some benefits, it also has many major 
drawbacks, including those relating to the arbitration process, the 
arbitrators’ interpretations, and final arbitral outcomes.  Even more 
problematic, the proceedings Philip Morris and Eli Lilly initiated 
have revealed the major flaws of ISDS, as none of those proceedings 
actually intends to take advantage of the mechanism’s purported 
benefits.  Australia and Canada are not generally considered to be 
countries lacking in respect for the rule of law or a well-functioning 
judicial system.  Nor have the governments in these countries been 
widely criticized for their complicity in acts of piracy and 
counterfeiting.  Instead, these proceedings were merely initiated to 
challenge the host states’ legitimate regulations, such as tobacco 
control measures or patentability requirements. 
From a legal standpoint, challenging intellectual property 
standards is not only controversial but also highly problematic 
because any change in these standards could affect disparate players 
in different ways.  As Peter Jaszi noted, “one nation’s ‘piracy[]’ is 
another man’s ‘technology transfer.’”156  Given the multifaceted 
impacts that a change in intellectual property standards will have, Eli 
Lilly’s NAFTA complaint has put Canada in a catch-22 situation.  If 
the promise doctrine is held to be inconsistent with the country’s 
investment-related obligations, Canada will have to abandon the 
doctrine lest it be required to compensate multinational 
pharmaceutical companies for their lost expectations.  Nevertheless, 
if Canada did abandon the doctrine in an effort to settle the 
investment dispute with Eli Lilly, it would have to stand ready to face 
ISDS complaints from generic drug manufacturers.  As Professor 
Okediji insightfully observed, 
[F]oreign generic pharmaceutical companies that have invested in 
the Canadian market arguably have benefitted from the very utility 
doctrine Lilly is contesting.  If Canada changes its law to address 
Lilly’s demands, could those firms successfully claim that the new 
                                                     
 155. See India, EU Ink Deal to End Drug Seizure for Now, TIMES INDIA (July 29, 2011, 
1:21 AM), http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/india-business/India-EU-
ink-deal-to-end-drug-seizure-for-now/articleshow/9401916.cms. 
 156. Peter Jaszi, A Garland of Reflections on Three International Copyright Topics, 8 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 47, 63 (1989). 
YU.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/13/2017  6:42 PM 
2017] INVESTMENT-RELATED ASPECTS OF IP RIGHTS 865 
standard amounts to an indirect appropriation since it would alter 
the competitive equilibrium between them and Lilly?157 
It is therefore understandable why Professor Okediji called for the 
development of an ISDS provision that is narrowly tailored to “a 
particular action, rather than the interpretation of an intellectual 
property standard.”158 
III. TPP INVESTMENT CHAPTER 
On February 4, 2016, the United States and its eleven trading 
partners in the Asia-Pacific region signed the TPP Agreement in 
Auckland, New Zealand.159  This Agreement contains thirty chapters, 
including one each on investment (Chapter 9), intellectual property 
(Chapter 18), and dispute settlement (Chapter 28).160  Because 
policymakers, commentators, and civil society organizations have 
already widely criticized the intellectual property chapters in TRIPS-
plus trade agreements,161 this Part does not rehash these criticisms.  
Instead, this Part devotes its analysis to the other two chapters, which 
help develop the TPP ISDS mechanism.  In the view of its critics, this 
mechanism will not only allow private intellectual property investors 
to sue national governments without the support of their home 
governments, but it will also amplify the widely documented 
deleterious impacts of the TPP intellectual property chapter.162 
                                                     
 157. Okediji, Is Intellectual Property “Investment”?, supra note 25, at 1127. 
 158. As Professor Okediji observed, 
A narrowly tailored ISDS provision could be useful for situations where a 
host country specifically targets the intellectual property right of a particular 
investor.  An example may be the issuance of a compulsory license without 
complying with the domestic process established to provide legal certainty 
for an investor pursuant to TRIPS.  Because this type of dispute targets a 
particular action, rather than the interpretation of an intellectual property 
standard, the policy-making ability of the host state is not threatened, and 
the dispute would not undo the TRIPS balance or compel potentially 
inconsistent normative outcomes across countries. 
Id. at 1137. 
 159. Trans-Pacific Partnership Ministers’ Statement, supra note 7. 
 160. TPP Agreement, supra note 6, chs. 9, 18, 28. 
 161. See sources cited supra note 126. 
 162. As Carlos Correa explained, 
Intellectual property rights, registered or not, are protected investments 
under BITs and trade agreements that incorporate rules on investment.  
This adds another layer of treaty-based protection onto rights protected 
under the TRIPS Agreement and other international conventions.  But this 
protection goes beyond TRIPS, because investment agreements apply to 
rights not covered by the TRIPS Agreement and incorporate the national 
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To provide a better understanding of the investment-related 
aspects of the TPP Agreement, this Part closely examines the ISDS 
mechanism outlined in the Agreement’s investment chapter.  
Although this chapter goes beyond ISDS to cover other investment-
related issues—such as freedom from discrimination, protection 
against uncompensated expropriation of property, protection against 
denial of justice, and the right to transfer capital163—this Part will 
focus on the various safeguards that the TPP Agreement has put in 
place to improve this mechanism.  This Part ends by briefly 
identifying the weaknesses that the Agreement has yet to address. 
A. Sovereignty and Regulatory Space 
The TPP Agreement has instituted at least four sets of 
improvements to address the current weaknesses of ISDS.  The first 
set of improvements targets the concerns about sovereignty and 
regulatory space.  These improvements help reserve to each TPP 
partner the ability to regulate in the public interest.164  Article 9.16 of 
the TPP Agreement explicitly declares, 
                                                     
treatment principle clause without the exceptions provided for under IPR 
treaties. 
Correa, Investment Protection, supra note 52, at 352. 
 163. As the United States Trade Representative (USTR) declared in its fact sheet 
on ISDS, 
In U.S. agreements, the investment rules enforced by ISDS provide investors 
in foreign countries [with] basic protections from foreign government 
actions such as: 
  Freedom from discrimination:  An assurance that Americans doing business 
abroad will face a level playing field and will not be treated less favorably 
than local investors or competitors from third countries. 
  Protection against uncompensated expropriation of property:  An assurance that 
the property of investors will not be seized by the government without the 
payment of just compensation. 
  Protection against denial of justice:  An assurance that investors will not be 
denied justice in criminal, civil, or administrative adjudicatory proceedings. 
  Right to transfer capital:  An assurance that investors will be able to move 
capital relating to their investments freely, subject to safeguards to provide 
governments flexibility, including to respond to financial crises and to 
ensure the integrity and stability of the financial system. 
ISDS Fact Sheet, supra note 36. 
 164. See OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, TPP CHAPTER SUMMARY—INVESTMENT 6 
(2016) [hereinafter INVESTMENT CHAPTER SUMMARY], https://ustr.gov/sites/default/ 
files/TPP-Chapter-Summary-Investment.pdf (“TPP includes new language 
underscoring that countries retain the right to regulate in the public interest, 
including to protect public health, safety, financial stability, and the environment.  
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Nothing in this Chapter shall be construed to prevent a Party from 
adopting, maintaining or enforcing any measure otherwise 
consistent with this Chapter that it considers appropriate to ensure 
that investment activity in its territory is undertaken in a manner 
sensitive to environmental, health or other regulatory objectives.165 
To ensure financial stability, Article 9.3.3 further states that the 
investment chapter does not cover financial services.166 
During the TPP negotiations, Philip Morris’s ISDS proceedings 
have sparked serious concerns among some TPP partners, most 
notably Australia and Malaysia.167  To alleviate these concerns, Article 
29.5 explicitly recognizes the health authorities’ ability to introduce 
tobacco control measures: 
A Party may elect to deny the benefits of Section B of Chapter 9 
(Investment) with respect to claims challenging a tobacco control 
measure of the Party.  Such a claim shall not be submitted to 
arbitration under Section B of Chapter 9 (Investment) if a Party 
has made such an election.  If a Party has not elected to deny 
benefits with respect to such claims by the time of the submission 
of such a claim to arbitration under Section B of Chapter 9 
(Investment), a Party may elect to deny benefits during the 
proceedings.  For greater certainty, if a Party elects to deny benefits 
with respect to such claims, any such claim shall be dismissed.168 
Although this provision is important to intellectual property and 
investment policies, the provision interestingly cannot be found in 
either the intellectual property or investment chapter.  Instead, it is 
available in the exceptions chapter—the second last chapter of the 
TPP Agreement. 
                                                     
TPP will also include a separate, explicit recognition of health authorities’ right to 
adopt tobacco control measures in order to protect public health.”). 
 165. TPP Agreement, supra note 6, art. 9.16. 
 166. Id. art. 9.3.3. 
 167. See Julien Chaisse, TPP Agreement:  Towards Innovations in Investment Rule-
Making, in THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP:  A QUEST FOR A TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
TRADE AGREEMENT 147, 153 (C.L. Lim et al. eds., 2012) [hereinafter TRANS-PACIFIC 
PARTNERSHIP] (“Australia is trying to persuade all TPP members to do away with ISDS 
in the investment chapter.”); Bryan Mercurio, Safeguarding Public Welfare?—Intellectual 
Property Rights, Health and the Evolution of Treaty Drafting in International Investment 
Agreements, 6 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 252, 273–75 (2015) [hereinafter Mercurio, 
Safeguarding Public Welfare?]  (discussing Malaysia’s proposal for “a complete carve-
out from all TPP obligations for any tobacco control measure”). 
 168. TPP Agreement, supra note 6, art. 29.5. 
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B. ISDS Process 
The second set of improvements addresses the procedural flaws of 
ISDS.  Specifically, the TPP Agreement empowers arbitral tribunals to 
review and dismiss frivolous claims as well as to award costs and 
attorneys’ fees.169  Article 9.23.4 states that “a tribunal shall address 
and decide as a preliminary question any objection by the respondent 
that . . . a claim is manifestly without legal merit.”170  Article 9.29.4 
states further, “[i]f the tribunal determines [the] claims to be 
frivolous, the tribunal may award to the respondent reasonable costs 
and attorney’s fees.”171  Although this fee-shifting arrangement is 
important to investors, it would limit the host state’s ability to control 
arbitration costs.172  By adding these costs on top of compensation, 
this arrangement would also greatly increase the burden of any host 
state losing in the arbitration. 
In addition, the TPP Agreement imposes on investors “the burden 
of proving all elements of [their] claims, consistent with general 
principles of international law applicable to international 
arbitration.”173  The Agreement also limits claims to those that have 
occurred within three-and-a-half years174 and that involve more than 
                                                     
 169. See INVESTMENT CHAPTER SUMMARY, supra note 164, at 4 (“Ensuring, as under 
the U.S. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, that panels are able, on an expedited basis, 
to review and dismiss frivolous claims and award costs and attorneys’ fees to the 
respondent government.”). 
 170. TPP Agreement, supra note 6, art. 9.23.4; see also INVESTMENT CHAPTER 
SUMMARY, supra note 164, at 6 (“TPP expands existing rules discouraging frivolous 
suits by permitting governments to seek expedited review and dismissal of claims that 
are ‘manifestly without legal merit.’”). 
 171. TPP Agreement, supra note 6, art. 9.29.4. 
 172. See JOUBIN-BRET, supra note 72, at 4 (“Another recent development in 
investment arbitration, alongside the skyrocketing of costs, is the trend to shift costs 
to the losing party and to depart from the traditional rule in international arbitration 
that each party bears its costs.  While this development could be seen as a positive 
way of restoring balance and barring frivolous claims, it also brings new risk for states 
in the defence and control over costs of investment arbitration and, of course, an 
increased responsibility for state actors in charge of investment arbitration cases.”). 
 173. TPP Agreement, supra note 6, art. 9.23.7; see also INVESTMENT CHAPTER 
SUMMARY, supra note 164, at 6 (“A new provision in TPP clarifies that the claimant —
 the investor bringing the case against the government — bears the burden to prove 
all elements of its claims, including claims of breach of the minimum standard of 
treatment . . . obligation, an obligation which guarantees investors due process and 
certain other protections in accordance with customary international law.”). 
 174. See TPP Agreement, supra note 6, art. 9.21.1 (“No claim shall be submitted to 
arbitration . . . if more than three years and six months have elapsed from the date 
on which the claimant first acquired, or should have first acquired, knowledge of the 
breach alleged . . . .”); see also ISDS Fact Sheet, supra note 36 (“A three-year statute of 
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mere expectations of profits.175  For the minimum standards of 
treatment, Article 9.6.4 explicitly states that “the mere fact that a 
Party takes or fails to take an action that may be inconsistent with an 
investor’s expectations does not constitute a breach . . . even if there 
is loss or damage to the covered investment as a result.”176 
To prevent forum shopping, the TPP Agreement requires 
claimants in ISDS proceedings to “waive the right to initiate parallel 
proceedings in other fora challenging the same measures.”177  
Although Article 28.4.1 allows the claimant to “select the forum in 
which to settle the dispute,”178 Article 28.4.2 states, “Once a 
complaining Party has requested the establishment of, or referred a 
matter to, a panel or other tribunal under an agreement referred to 
in paragraph 1, the forum selected shall be used to the exclusion of 
other fora.”179  Thus, by “prevent[ing] a party from pursuing the same 
claims both in ISDS proceedings and domestic courts,”180 this waiver 
will greatly reduce the host state’s burden of defending investor-state 
disputes simultaneously in multiple fora. 
To further minimize burden, Article 9.28 permits the consolidation 
of ISDS claims that “have a question of law or fact in common and 
[that] arise out of the same events or circumstances.”181  Such 
consolidation will benefit the disputing parties on both sides as it will 
“increase efficiency, reduce litigation costs, and prevent strategic 
initiation of duplicative litigation.”182 
Finally, the TPP Agreement limits the ISDS mechanism to a 
specific group of complainants.  Specifically, it “allows a TPP Party to 
deny benefits to ‘shell companies’ owned by persons of that Party or a 
non-Party that establishes in another TPP country in order to take 
advantage of treaty rights but that lack substantial business activities 
                                                     
limitations protects respondents against old claims, which are difficult for 
governments to defend in part because access to documents and witnesses becomes 
more difficult over time.”). 
 175. See INVESTMENT CHAPTER SUMMARY, supra note 164, at 6 (“TPP explicitly 
clarifies that an investor cannot win a claim for breach of the [minimum standards of 
treatment] obligation merely by showing that a government measure frustrated its 
expectations (for example, its expectations of earning certain profits).”). 
 176. TPP Agreement, supra note 6, art. 9.6.4. 
 177. INVESTMENT CHAPTER SUMMARY, supra note 164, at 5. 
 178. TPP Agreement, supra note 6, art. 28.4.1. 
 179. Id. art. 28.4.2. 
 180. ISDS Fact Sheet, supra note 36. 
 181. TPP Agreement, supra note 6, art. 9.28.1. 
 182. ISDS Fact Sheet, supra note 36. 
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in that country.”183  Article 9.1 specifically defines the term 
“enterprise of a Party” as “an enterprise constituted or organised 
under the law of a Party, or a branch located in the territory of a 
Party and carrying out business activities there.”184 
C. Transparency 
The third set of improvements concerns transparency.  Under the 
TPP Agreement, arbitral proceedings will remain open and publicly 
accessible.185  Article 9.24.1 specifically requires the respondent to 
make publicly available the following documents: 
(a) the notice of intent; 
(b) the notice of arbitration; 
(c) pleadings, memorials and briefs submitted to the tribunal by a 
disputing party and any written submissions submitted pursuant to 
Article 9.23.2 (Conduct of the Arbitration) and Article 9.23.3 and 
Article 9.28 (Consolidation); 
(d) minutes or transcripts of hearings of the tribunal, if available; 
and 
(e)  orders, awards and decisions of the tribunal.186 
According to the Office of the United States Trade Representative 
(USTR), the State Department’s website will contain all submissions, 
hearing transcripts, and other key documents regarding TPP-based 
                                                     
 183. INVESTMENT CHAPTER SUMMARY, supra note 164, at 3; see also Carlos Correa & 
Jorge E. Viñuales, Intellectual Property Rights as Protected Investments:  How Open Are the 
Gates?, 19 J. INT’L ECON. L. 91, 108 (2016) (“The entreprise-based approach would 
not allow the right-holder of IPRs to claim investors’ rights in a country where it has 
not established or acquired an enterprise, thereby limiting the possibility of using 
[international investment agreements] as a basis to challenge national decisions on 
the validity or enforceability of IPRs.”); Christina Knahr, Investments “in the Territory” 
of the Host State, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW, supra note 76, at 42, 42 
(discussing what constitutes investments “in the territory” of the host state); Christina 
Knahr, The Territorial Nexus Between an Investment and the Host State, in INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 30, at 590, 590 (discussing the nexus between 
the investment and the host state).  For similar discussions, but with a focus on the 
investors, see generally Mark Feldman, Distinguishing Investors from Exporters Under 
Investment Treaties, in RESHAPING THE ISDS SYSTEM, supra note 75, at 760; Lucy F. Reed 
& Jonathan E. Davis, Who Is a Protected Investor?, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 
HANDBOOK, supra note 30, at 614 (discussing who is a protected investor within the 
meaning of an international investment agreement). 
 184. TPP Agreement, supra note 6, art. 9.1. 
  185. Id. art. 9.24.1–2. 
 186. Id. art. 9.24.1. 
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investment cases against the United States.187  Such transparency will 
ensure high-quality decision making while promoting democratic 
values, public participation, accountability, and legitimacy.188 
In addition, TPP partners will establish a code of conduct for ISDS 
arbitrators to ensure independence and impartiality.189  Article 
28.10.1(d) of the TPP Agreement explicitly requires all members of 
the dispute settlement panels, including ISDS arbitrators, to “comply 
with the code of conduct in the Rules of Procedure.”190  Before any 
final rulings, disputing parties will also have an opportunity to review 
and comment on proposed arbitral awards.191  Article 28.17.7 
specifically grants to these parties the opportunity to “submit written 
comments to the panel on its initial report,”192 somewhat similarly to 
the interim review provided in the WTO dispute settlement 
process.193  Through a decision of the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
Commission,194 TPP partners can further agree on joint 
interpretations that will bind arbitral tribunals.195 
                                                     
 187. See INVESTMENT CHAPTER SUMMARY, supra note 164, at 4 (“For investor-State 
cases against the United States under TPP, all submissions, hearing transcripts, and 
other key documents will be available on the U.S. State Department website.”). 
 188. See Joachim Delaney & Daniel Barstow Magraw, Procedural Transparency, in 
OXFORD HANDBOOK, supra note 77, at 721, 761–62. 
 189. INVESTMENT CHAPTER SUMMARY, supra note 164, at 6.  For discussions on issues 
relating to the independence and impartiality of international arbitrators, see 
generally Malintoppi, supra note 120; Audley Sheppard, Arbitrator Independence in 
ICSID Arbitration, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW, supra note 76, at 131. 
 190. TPP Agreement, supra note 6, art. 28.10.1(d). 
 191. See INVESTMENT CHAPTER SUMMARY, supra note 164, at 4 (“Ensuring that 
disputing parties will be able to review and comment on proposed arbitral awards 
prior to their issuance, and to allow both disputing parties the option to challenge a 
tribunal award.”). 
 192. TPP Agreement, supra note 6, art. 28.17.7. 
 193. See DSU, supra note 70, art. 15 (providing for an interim review stage). 
 194. See TPP Agreement, supra note 6, art. 27.1–.2.2 (calling for the Commission’s 
establishment and outlining its functions); see also Sergio Puig, The Role of Procedure in 
the Development of Investment Law:  The Case of Section B of Chapter 11 of NAFTA, in 
EVOLUTION IN INVESTMENT TREATY, supra note 127, at 339, 362–65 (discussing the 
binding interpretation of the Free Trade Commission within NAFTA). 
 195. See TPP Agreement, supra note 6, art. 9.25.3 (“A decision of the Commission 
on the interpretation of a provision of this Agreement . . . shall be binding on a 
tribunal, and any decision or award issued by a tribunal must be consistent with that 
decision.”); see also INVESTMENT CHAPTER SUMMARY, supra note 164, at 5 (“Ensuring 
that TPP Parties, at any time, can agree on interpretations of the agreement that are 
binding on tribunals.”). 
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D. Tunnel Vision 
The final set of improvements responds to concerns about the 
ISDS arbitrators’ tunnel vision and their over-emphasis of intellectual 
property rights as investors’ rights.  As Rochelle Dreyfuss and Susy 
Frankel described, 
Because investor rights and IP rights are both private rights, IP 
holders tend to equate the investment protectable under these 
instruments to the private economic value of their IP rights.  
Further, they see IP rights as reliance interests that are defined by 
the law at the time they made their investment or, more extremely, 
when the agreement references TRIPS or its own IP chapter, the 
law at the time when the investment agreement was made.196 
To avoid narrow interpretation and over-emphasis on the 
investment’s economic value, the TPP Agreement allows civil society 
organizations, environmental groups, labor unions, and other interested 
stakeholders to file amicus curiae briefs197—arrangements that can also 
be found in NAFTA198 and the WTO.199  Article 9.23.3 provides, 
After consultation with the disputing parties, the tribunal may 
accept and consider written amicus curiae submissions regarding a 
matter of fact or law within the scope of the dispute that may assist 
                                                     
 196. Dreyfuss & Frankel, supra note 26, at 589. 
 197. See INVESTMENT CHAPTER SUMMARY, supra note 164, at 4 (“Ensuring that 
interested stakeholders, including labor unions, civil society organizations and other 
interested stakeholders, can submit amicus curiae or ‘friend of the court’ briefs.”); see also 
Andrea K. Bjorklund, The Participation of Sub-National Government Units as Amici Curiae in 
International Investment Disputes, in EVOLUTION IN INVESTMENT TREATY, supra note 127, at 
298 (discussing the historically limited participation of sub-state actors in the filing of 
amicus curiae briefs); Delaney & Magraw, supra note 188, at 777–80 (discussing the 
advantages of public participation through the filing of amicus curiae briefs). 
 198. See Daniel Kalderimis, Exploring the Differences Between WTO and Investment 
Treaty Dispute Resolution, in TRADE AGREEMENTS AT THE CROSSROADS 46, 54–55 (Susy 
Frankel & Meredith Kolsky Lewis eds., 2014) (discussing the filing of amicus curiae 
briefs in NAFTA disputes); Puig, supra note 194, at 360–62 (discussing the filing of 
amicus curiae briefs in Chapter 11 cases). 
 199. See generally Steve Charnovitz, Opening the WTO to Nongovernmental Interests, 24 
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 173, 183–91 (2000) (examining the role that nongovernmental 
organizations do and should play in the WTO dispute settlement process, including the 
submission of amici curiae briefs); Jacqueline Peel, Giving the Public a Voice in the 
Protection of the Global Environment:  Avenues for Participation by NGOs in Dispute Resolution 
at the European Court of Justice and World Trade Organization, 12 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & 
POL’Y 47, 61–70 (2001) (discussing the opportunity that the WTO dispute settlement 
process provides to nongovernmental organizations for participating in environmental 
cases); Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Unfriendly Actions:  The Amicus Brief Battle at the WTO, 
7 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 87, 95–101 (2001) (exploring the arguments supporting and 
criticizing the increased judicialization of WTO dispute resolution, with a particular 
emphasis on the battle over amicus curiae briefs). 
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the tribunal in evaluating the submissions and arguments of the 
disputing parties from a person or entity that is not a disputing 
party but has a significant interest in the arbitral proceedings.200 
Likewise, Article 28.13(e) states that “the [dispute settlement] panel 
shall consider requests from non-governmental entities located in the 
territory of a disputing Party to provide written views regarding the 
dispute that may assist the panel in evaluating the submissions and 
arguments of the disputing Parties.”201 
As Professors Dreyfuss and Frankel reminded us, “More transparency, 
receptivity to amicus briefing, consultation with other international 
organizations (along the lines of the relationship between the WTO and 
WIPO), and references to the decisions of other tribunals would provide 
decision makers with a broader context in which to consider disputed 
issues.”202  The filing of amicus curiae briefs can be highly beneficial as 
these briefs “can improve the quality of decisions by providing factual 
information of various types to the tribunal of which it would not 
otherwise be aware.”203  Such filing “can also provide [the relevant 
tribunal] with specialized expertise relating to public interest concerns 
in a case . . . [as well as] legal argumentation that the parties, for various 
reasons, do not provide to the tribunal.”204 
In addition, the TPP Agreement allows non-disputing parties, such 
as the investors’ home states, to make submissions to arbitral 
tribunals.205  Article 28.14, which covers third-party participation, 
specifically declares, 
A Party that is not a disputing Party and that considers it has an 
interest in the matter before the panel shall, on delivery of a 
written notice to the disputing Parties, be entitled to attend all 
hearings, make written submissions, present views orally to the 
panel, and receive written submissions of the disputing Parties.206 
E. Summary 
Taken together, the improvements in the TPP Agreement have 
provided the ISDS mechanism with some important upgrades.  
Nevertheless, the added substantive and procedural safeguards fail to 
alleviate many of the weaknesses documented in Section II.B.  For 
                                                     
 200. TPP Agreement, supra note 6, art. 9.23.3. 
 201. Id. art. 28.13(e). 
 202. Dreyfuss & Frankel, supra note 26, at 599. 
 203. Delaney & Magraw, supra note 188, at 778. 
 204. Id. (footnote omitted). 
 205. See INVESTMENT CHAPTER SUMMARY, supra note 164, at 4. 
 206. TPP Agreement, supra note 6, art. 28.14. 
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instance, arbitration costs remain high with averages of about $8–10 
million and amounts as high as over $30 million.207  Any host state losing 
in ISDS arbitrations will also be liable for hefty damage awards in 
addition to suffering from reputation loss vis-à-vis both states and foreign 
investors.208  For developing countries, such awards will undoubtedly 
take away the money that could have been spent on addressing other 
competing, and at times more important, public needs.209 
In addition, transnational corporations will have opportunities to 
directly challenge regulations in host states in the developing world 
without the assistance or intervention of their home governments.210  
Regulatory chill therefore remains a wide and continuous concern, 
not to mention the largely unsettled debate concerning whether the 
special carve-out for tobacco control measures in Article 29.5 has 
actually made it better or worse for host states to defend legitimate 
regulations not specifically identified by the TPP Agreement.211 
                                                     
 207. See Gaukrodger & Gordon, supra note 98, at 19; Hodgson, supra note 98, at 749. 
 208. As Kyla Tienhaara observed, 
In addition to the legal costs and fees associated with investment arbitration 
(which may be awarded to one party or divided between the parties), there is 
also the reputational effect that investor-State disputes have.  Allee and 
Peinhardt have found that the existence of arbitral proceedings against a 
government, regardless of the eventual outcome of the dispute, has a 
negative impact on the State’s reputation in the eyes of foreign investors.  
Their data suggests that States are likely to receive less foreign direct 
investment following an investor’s lodging of a BIT claim.  Other possible 
negative impacts that could worry a host government faced with a dispute 
include strained relations with the government of the investor’s home State 
(which may be an important trading partner or provider of financial aid) 
and/or with the World Bank. 
Tienhaara, supra note 132, at 613. 
 209. These needs include 
purification of water, generation of power, improvement of public health, 
reduction of child mortality, provision of education, promotion of public 
security, building of basic infrastructure, reduction of violent crimes, relief of 
poverty, elimination of hunger, promotion of gender equality, protection of 
the environment and response to terrorism, illegal arms sales, human and 
drug trafficking, illegal immigration and corruption. 
Peter K. Yu, Enforcement, Economics and Estimates, 2 WIPO J. 1, 3–4 (2010). 
 210. TPP Agreement, supra note 6, art. 9.19. 
 211. While the carve-out has made clear the exemption of tobacco control 
measures from ISDS, it could undermine the efforts to exempt other equally 
important but unspecified regulations.  See Mercurio, Safeguarding Public Welfare?, 
supra note 167, at 272–75 (discussing the difficulties in creating a carve-out for 
tobacco control measures at the TPP negotiations); Sean Flynn, TPP Carve out for 
Tobacco Shows Core Flaws in Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), INFOJUSTICE.ORG 
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Within the intellectual property area, the ISDS mechanism will 
enable intellectual property rights holders to push for protection not yet 
covered by the TRIPS Agreement.  Thus far, many host states have been 
actively avoiding additional intellectual property obligations under 
TRIPS-plus bilateral, regional, and plurilateral trade agreements.  Yet 
the broad definition of covered investment may allow intellectual 
property rights holders to use ISDS to demand higher standards of 
intellectual property protection and enforcement even when those 
standards are not required.  If ISDS-based strategies prove successful, 
developed country governments and multinational corporations may 
become more eager to rewrite international intellectual property rules 
outside the usual multilateral fora, such as the WTO and WIPO.212 
IV. MODEST PROPOSALS 
The previous Part discusses both the substantive and procedural 
safeguards that the TPP Agreement has instituted to address ISDS-
related concerns.  The TPP still has many weaknesses, however, and 
this Part proposes two sets of improvements to address them.  The first 
set consists of conceptual improvements, covering all forms of 
investments, including those in the intellectual property field.  The 
second set contains institutional improvements.  These improvements 
are important to the ISDS mechanism in not only the TPP Agreement 
but also other international trade or investment agreements.  While 
many of the conceptual and institutional improvements discussed in 
this Part can be introduced without modifying the TPP Agreement, 
others may require at least some modification. 
A. Conceptual Improvements 
The first set of improvements consists of those aiming to 
strengthen our ability to conceptualize investments in the proper 
context.  Because intellectual property rights are intangible and 
                                                     
(Oct. 1, 2015), http://infojustice.org/archives/35107 (criticizing the inadequacy of 
the TPP carve-out for tobacco control measures). 
 212. See Yu, Non-Multilateral Approach, supra note 4 (discussing efforts to set 
international intellectual property norms outside the traditional multilateral fora).  
For further discussions of what commentators have referred to as the “country club” 
approach to international intellectual property norm-setting, see generally Daniel 
Gervais, Country Clubs, Empiricism, Blogs and Innovation:  The Future of International 
Intellectual Property Norm Making in the Wake of ACTA, in TRADE GOVERNANCE IN THE 
DIGITAL AGE:  WORLD TRADE FORUM 323 (Mira Burri & Thomas Cottier eds., 2012); 
Peter K. Yu, The ACTA/TPP Country Clubs, in ACCESS TO INFORMATION AND 
KNOWLEDGE:  21ST CENTURY CHALLENGES IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND KNOWLEDGE 
GOVERNANCE 258 (Dana Beldiman ed., 2014). 
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elusive by nature,213 having proper conceptualization is especially 
significant in the intellectual property field.  Such conceptualization 
is also important given the hitherto limited attention to the interplay 
of intellectual property and investment law.214 
Just as investment issues are new to those in the intellectual 
property field, intellectual property issues are also new to those in the 
investment field.  For example, investment law experts may not be 
fully knowledgeable about the many complexities and nuances within 
intellectual property law and policy.  Likewise, intellectual property 
law experts may be unfamiliar with the tradition and unique language 
of investment law, such as “direct and indirect expropriation of 
property,” “minimum standard of treatment,” “fair and equitable 
treatment,” and “full protection and security.”215 
To a large extent, the linkage between intellectual property and 
investment reminds us of the earlier challenges confronting the 
incorporation of intellectual property rights into the trade regime in 
the late 1980s and the early 1990s.216  Such linkage also brings to 
                                                     
 213. See Marshall Leaffer, Character Merchandising in the U.K., a Nostalgic Look, 11 U. 
MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 453, 454 (1994) (noting that “unlike physical property—
land or chattels—intangible property, by its very nature, has vague boundaries”); Peter 
S. Menell, Envisioning Copyright Law’s Digital Future, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 63, 67–68 
(2002) (noting that copyright law is “a notoriously complex and subtle body of law”). 
 214. See Mercurio, Awakening the Sleeping Giant, supra note 31, at 871–72 (“While 
existing literature on international investment agreements . . . and investor-state 
dispute settlement is both rich and diverse the relative absence of literature 
reviewing and analyzing the legal requirements and potential effect of intellectual 
property . . . provisions in [international investment agreements] is striking.  The 
absence of scholarly attention is even more surprising given the voluminous 
literature on IP chapters of [free trade agreements].”). 
 215. See TPP Agreement, supra note 6, art. 9.6.1 (“Each Party shall accord to 
covered investments treatment in accordance with applicable customary 
international law principles, including fair and equitable treatment and full 
protection and security.”); id. art. 9.6.2 (defining “fair and equitable treatment” to 
include “the obligation not to deny justice in criminal, civil or administrative 
adjudicatory proceedings in accordance with the principle of due process embodied 
in the principal legal systems of the world” and “full protection and security” as 
“requir[ing] each Party to provide the level of police protection required under 
customary international law”). 
 216. As I noted in the context of teaching international intellectual property law 
in the post-TRIPS era, 
The entering into effect of the TRIPs Agreement has also brought to the 
field many teachers who have taught or researched in the areas of public 
international law, international organizations, international trade, or 
international business transactions.  Those teachers therefore may not be 
interested in teaching the course as an intellectual property law course 
alone.  Being “migrants” or “visitors,” they also may not have the standard 
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mind the discourse on intellectual property and human rights in the 
late 1990s and the early 2000s.217  At that time, many “transnational 
corporations and their supporting developed countries . . . [have 
found] alien the human rights language and the forum structure.”218  
The same challenges exist today when intellectual property and 
investment are discussed together.219 
This Section will outline three sets of conceptual improvements.  
The first set is specifically related to intellectual property protection.  
It calls for a deeper inquiry concerning the investment-related aspects 
of intellectual property rights.  The second and third sets are not as 
directly related but are still substantially related to intellectual 
property protection.  While the second set calls for a more 
sophisticated understanding of the limited role of such protection in 
the investment environment, the final set underscores the need to 
interpret intellectual property provisions in international trade or 
investment agreements by reference to other multilateral agreements 
as well as national jurisprudence. 
1. What constitutes investment? 
A critical question concerning the investment-related aspects of 
intellectual property rights is what constitutes investment.220  This 
                                                     
experience or background expected from intellectual property law experts.  
As a result, these teachers are more likely to see the course as one that will 
help students better understand the changing global legal environment, the 
international and regional lawmaking processes, and techniques for 
resolving cross-border disputes. 
Peter K. Yu, Teaching International Intellectual Property Law, 52 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 923, 
941–42 (2008). 
 217. For the Author’s earlier articles on intellectual property and human rights, 
see Peter K. Yu, Digital Copyright Enforcement Measures and Their Human Rights Threats, 
in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 455 
(Christophe Geiger ed., 2015) [hereinafter RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS]; 
Peter K. Yu, The Anatomy of the Human Rights Framework for Intellectual Property, 69 SMU L. 
REV. 37 (2016); Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property and Human Rights in the Nonmultilateral 
Era , 64 FLA. L. REV. 1045 (2012); Peter K. Yu, Reconceptualizing Intellectual Property Interests 
in a Human Rights Framework, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1039 (2007) [hereinafter Yu, 
Reconceptualizing Intellectual Property Interests]; Peter K. Yu, Ten Common Questions About 
Intellectual Property and Human Rights, 23 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 709 (2007). 
 218. Yu, Reconceptualizing Intellectual Property Interests, supra note 217, at 1136. 
 219. See Biadgleng, supra note 53, at 32 (“IP issues have their own dimension, 
jurisprudence and political economy completely different from investment.”). 
 220. For discussions of ways to identify an investment within the meaning of 
international investment agreements, see generally Jan Asmus Bischoff & Richard 
Happ, The Notion of Investment, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW HANDBOOK, supra 
note 30, at 495; Emmanuel Gaillard, Identify or Define?  Reflections on the Evolution of the 
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question is highly complicated because most international investment 
agreements have a broad definition of covered investment.  For 
instance, Article 9.1 of the TPP Agreement defines “investment” as 
“every asset that an investor owns or controls, directly or indirectly, that 
has the characteristics of an investment, including such characteristics 
as the commitment of capital or other resources, the expectation of 
gain or profit, or the assumption of risk.”221  Article 9.1 further states 
that “[f]orms that an investment may take include . . . intellectual 
property rights,”222 without providing any definition of those rights. 
The TPP investment chapter, however, does not further delineate 
the coverage of “intellectual property rights.”  Instead, these rights are 
defined in Article 18.1, which states that “intellectual property refers to 
all categories of intellectual property that are the subject of Sections 1 
through 7 of Part II of the TRIPS Agreement.”223  Because Article 18.1 is 
not part of the investment chapter, one could argue against applying 
this definition to the chapter.  Regardless of its applicability, however, an 
important inquiry can be made about what rights are covered as 
investments within the meaning of the TPP investment chapter. 
However broad the coverage is, intellectual property rights should 
not be automatically equated with covered investments once they 
emerge or have been acquired in the host state.224  After all, many of 
                                                     
Concept of Investment in ICSID Practice, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW, supra note 
76, at 403; David A.R. Williams & Simon Foote, Recent Developments in the Approach to 
Identifying an “Investment” Pursuant to Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention, in 
EVOLUTION IN INVESTMENT TREATY, supra note 127, at 42. 
 221. TPP Agreement, supra note 6, art. 9.1. 
 222. Id. (including “intellectual property rights” under subsection (f) of the 
definition of “investment”). 
 223. Id. art. 18.1. 
 224. See Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, Investment Law and Intellectual Property Rights, 
in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 30, at 1692, 1696 (“The 
fact that BITs and [free trade agreements] include IPRs as a form of investment . . . is 
merely the starting point for analysing how and when IPRs are protected by the 
general guarantees provided to investors in these agreements.”); Correa & Viñuales, 
supra note 183, at 112 (“[T]he acquisition of IPRs does not imply the assumption of 
any risk.  Even when registration is required, the applicant does not expose its capital 
to any loss.  It simply asserts rights against third parties who would be thereafter 
excluded from the use of the protected subject matter.”); Okediji, Is Intellectual 
Property “Investment”?, supra note 25, at 1125–26 (“At a minimum, a determination 
that an intellectual property rights owner is also an investor cannot plausibly be 
based solely on acquiring rights, particularly since member states of the WTO have 
no choice but to accord such rights, and to do so on the terms set by the TRIPS 
Agreement.”).  See generally VANHONNAEKER, supra note 18, at 7–33 (discussing 
whether intellectual property and related rights would qualify as investments). 
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these rights can exist without any actual investments into that state.  
As Ruth Okediji reminded us, 
Intellectual property rights can be held simultaneously in many 
countries and in some cases, like copyright, without any formalities 
or other domestic process that would indicate a specific investment 
purpose.  Is merely having authorial works in circulation in a host 
country sufficient to constitute an “investment in a given country?”  
Similarly, where patent rights are acquired by mere registration, 
such as in many least-developed countries, should this alone confer 
the status of an “investment”?  Should requirements of local 
working conditions that more firmly anchor the patent grant to 
domestic priorities make a difference in an assessment of a 
protected investment?225 
In fact, if intellectual property rights acquired in the host state can 
automatically become investments regardless of whether investments 
have actually been made in the first place,226 many of the safeguards 
and adjustments provided by the TRIPS Agreement will be 
immediately lost.  As Bryan Mercurio cautioned, “If ownership of an 
IPR is an ‘investment’, the question becomes whether a compulsory 
                                                     
 225. Okediji, Is Intellectual Property “Investment”?, supra note 25, at 1125. 
 226. As the tribunal in Bayview Irrigation District v. United Mexican States declared, 
[I]n order to be an “investor” within the meaning of NAFTA Art. 1101 (a), 
an enterprise must make an investment in another NAFTA State, and not in 
its own.  Adopting the terminology of the Methanex v. United States Tribunal, 
it is necessary that the measures of which complaint is made should affect an 
investment that has a “legally significant connection” with the State creating 
and applying those measures.  The simple fact that an enterprise in one 
NAFTA State is affected by measures taken in another NAFTA State is not 
sufficient to establish the right of that enterprise to protection under NAFTA 
Chapter Eleven:  it is the relationship, the legally significant connection, with 
the State taking those measures that establishes the right to protection, not 
the bare fact that the enterprise is affected by the measures. 
Bayview Irrigation Dist. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/05/1, 
Award, ¶ 101 (June 19, 2007), http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/icsidblobs/onli 
neawards/C246/DC653_En.pdf; see also ASEAN–Australia–New Zealand Free Trade 
Agreement art. 2(d) n.4, ASEAN–Australia–New Zealand, Feb. 27, 2009, 
http://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/aanzfta/official-documents/Pages/agreement 
-establishing-the-asean-australia-new-zealand-free-trade-area-aanzfta.aspx (“[T]he 
Parties understand that an investor that ‘seeks to make’ an investment refers to an 
investor of another Party that has taken active steps to make an investment.”); Correa 
& Viñuales, supra note 183, at 114 (“Chapter 11 of the NAFTA is not intended to 
protect a company’s activities as a foreign exporter of goods into the territory of a 
NAFTA Party.  The same reasoning would apply in a case where a patent, trademark 
or other IPR were not associated with a presence in the host country that could be 
qualified as an investment.” (footnote omitted)). 
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license can be an expropriation of that investment.”227  Given the 
high stakes involved, it is important to develop analytical frameworks 
that can be used to determine whether investments have been made 
within the meaning of the TPP investment chapter or other 
international investment agreements.  This question is important 
because the issuance of compulsory licenses is at the heart of the 
negotiations surrounding the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS 
Agreement and Public Health.228 
One test that has garnered considerable support from 
commentators229 is the one adopted in Salini Costruttori S.p.A. v. 
Kingdom of Morocco,230 a case involving the construction of a Moroccan 
highway by Italian contractors.231  This test took into consideration 
four distinct factors:  “[1] contributions, [2] a certain duration of 
performance of the contract . . . [3] a participation in the risks of the 
transaction . . . [and] [4] the contribution to the economic 
development of the host State of the investment.”232  Applied to the 
intellectual property context, Lukas Vanhonnaeker translated these 
factors as follows: 
                                                     
 227. Mercurio, Awakening the Sleeping Giant, supra note 31, at 911.  For discussions 
of the interplay between compulsory licenses and international investment 
agreements, see generally VANHONNAEKER, supra note 18, at 47–68; Correa, Investment 
Protection, supra note 52; Gibson, supra note 87; Lin Tsai-Yu, Compulsory Licenses for 
Access to Medicines, Expropriation and Investor-State Arbitration Under Bilateral Investment 
Agreements—Are There Issues Beyond the TRIPS Agreement?, 40 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & 
COMPETITION L. 152 (2009); Peter B. Rutledge, TRIPS and BITs:  An Essay on 
Compulsory Licenses, Expropriation, and International Arbitration, 13 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 
ONLINE 149 (2012). 
 228. World Trade Organization, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public 
Health, Nov. 14, 2001, WTO Doc. WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 41 I.L.M. 755 (2002); see 
also Yu, International Enclosure Movement, supra note 56, at 872–86 (discussing the 
negotiations surrounding the Doha Declaration). 
 229. See Gaillard, supra note 220, at 403 (describing Salini as “[a]n important 
milestone in the evolution of the ICSID case law on the notion of investment”); 
Correa & Viñuales, supra note 183, at 100 n.30 (describing Salini as providing the 
“most influential precedent” concerning qualifications to a broad definition of 
“investment”); Okediji, Is Intellectual Property “Investment”?, supra note 25, at 1137 (“A 
[possible] approach is to require a complainant to establish that its intellectual 
property rights have had a clear economic benefit to the host country and thus 
constitutes an ‘investment.’ One key factor in such an ‘investment test’ could be 
requiring the claimant to establish the significance of the intellectual property to the 
host State’s economic development.”). 
 230. ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4, Decision on Jurisdiction (July 31, 2001), 6 ICSID 
Rep. 400 (2004). 
 231. Id. ¶ 1. 
 232. Id. ¶ 52. 
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(i) IP is susceptible to be invested for a certain duration; (ii) it is 
likely to generate profit and return on a regular basis; (iii) IP, and 
more precisely, IPRs “share the unique and constant risk of 
infringement by third parties not privileged in their use”; (iv) IP 
investment often represents a substantial commitment; and (v) 
such assets have a significant potential to contribute to the Host 
State’s development.233 
Apart from developing analytical frameworks to determine whether 
investments have been made within the meaning of the international 
investment agreement concerned, it is also important to recall the 
contingent nature of intellectual property rights.234  Just because 
these rights have been granted does not mean that they can be 
enforced through the international investment agreement.  There 
are at least four reasons for such non-enforcement. 
The first reason concerns the limited duration of intellectual 
property rights.  The international standard for copyright protection 
provided by both the Berne Convention and the TRIPS Agreement is 
the life of the author plus fifty years.235  When the copyright term is not 
calculated based on the author’s life, the TRIPS Agreement fixes that 
term at a minimum of fifty years.236  For trademark protection, the 
Agreement sets the term of both initial registration and subsequent 
renewal to a minimum of seven years.237  For patent protection, the 
Agreement stipulates that such protection “shall not end before the 
expiration of a period of twenty years counted from the filing date.”238 
The TPP Agreement extends the minimum terms in all three areas.  
Article 18.63 increases the protection of copyright and related rights 
                                                     
 233. VANHONNAEKER, supra note 18, at 26 (footnotes omitted). 
 234. See Okediji, Is Intellectual Property “Investment”?, supra note 25, at 1126 (“[A]ll 
intellectual property rights are to some extent contingent rights only; whether a 
claimant is a rightful owner, has complied with national eligibility standards for 
protection, whether there are any applicable subject-matter limits or supervening 
policy considerations, or whether a granting agency has appropriately granted (or 
denied) such rights are always subject to question before national courts.”). 
 235. See Berne Convention, supra note 39, art. 7(1); TRIPS Agreement, supra note 
2, art. 9 (“Members shall comply with Articles 1 through 21 of the Berne 
Convention . . . .”). 
 236. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, art. 12 (“Whenever the term of 
protection of a work, other than a photographic work or a work of applied art, is 
calculated on a basis other than the life of a natural person, such term shall be no 
less than 50 years from the end of the calendar year of authorized publication, or, 
failing such authorized publication within 50 years from the making of the work, 50 
years from the end of the calendar year of making.”). 
 237. See id. art. 18. 
 238. Id. art. 33. 
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to the life of the author plus seventy years.239  When the copyright 
term is not calculated based on the author’s life, the TPP Agreement 
extends the term to a minimum of seventy years.240  For trademark 
protection, Article 18.26 increases the terms of both initial registration 
and subsequent renewal to a minimum of ten years,241 matching the 
terms found in the United States.242  For patent protection, Article 
18.46 allows for an adjustment of the patent term based on 
unreasonable delay on the part of the patent office.243  This adjustment 
achieves the same effect as the Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984 in the 
United States, which provides for a limited extension of the patent 
term.244  Notwithstanding these extensions, all the intellectual property 
terms identified in the TPP Agreement remain limited in duration. 
The second reason pertains to renewal or maintenance fees, which 
are required for trademark and patent protections in most jurisdictions, 
including the United States.  Although the TRIPS Agreement allows 
trademarks to be “renewed indefinitely,”245 section 9 of the Lanham Act 
allows “each registration . . . [to] be renewed for periods of 10 years at 
the end of each successive 10-year period following the date of 
registration upon payment of the prescribed fee and the filing of a written 
application.”246  Similarly, to maintain protection in the United States, 
patent holders are required to pay maintenance fees “three times during 
the life of a patent, and may be paid without surcharge at 3 to 3.5 years, 
7 to 7.5 years, and 11 to 11.5 years after the date of issue.”247 
Given these renewal or maintenance requirements, intellectual 
property rights holders will have to take proactive actions to ensure 
that their protection remains in effect.  Just because their rights have 
                                                     
 239. See TPP Agreement, supra note 6, art. 18.63(a). 
 240. See id. art. 18.63(b). 
 241. See id. art. 18.26. 
 242. See 15 U.S.C. § 1058(a) (2012) (“Each registration shall remain in force for 
10 years . . . .”); id. § 1059(a) (“[E]ach registration may be renewed for periods of 10 
years at the end of each successive 10-year period following the date of registration 
upon payment of the prescribed fee and the filing of a written application . . . .”). 
 243. See TPP Agreement, supra note 6, art. 18.46. 
 244. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 
98-417, § 156, 98 Stat. 1585, 1598 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2012)). 
 245. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, art. 18. 
 246. 15 U.S.C. § 1059(a) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 247. Maintain Your Patent, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., http://www.uspto.gov/pat 
ents-maintaining-patent/maintain-your-patent (last visited Feb. 5, 2017); see also id. 
(“A maintenance fee is a fee that is required for maintaining in force all utility and 
reissue utility patents based on applications filed on or after December 12, 1980 . . . .  
If a maintenance fee is not paid the patent protection lapses and the rights provided 
by a patent are no longer enforceable.”). 
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been initially granted does not mean that they will enjoy the full 
protection for the entire duration of an international investment 
agreement.  Indeed, some patent researchers, especially those in 
economics or other non-law fields, have mistaken the TRIPS term of 
twenty years as a proxy for the length of patent protection.  Yet “[i]t is 
pointless to assume that the length of [such] protection to be a static 
20 years without taking into consideration maintenance or renewal 
fees and potential regulatory delays.”248 
The third reason relates to the potential subsequent invalidation of 
protected rights, even if those rights have been initially granted in the 
first place.249  This contingency is particularly salient in the ISDS 
proceeding Eli Lilly filed against Canada, which concerned two 
patents that the Canadian courts have subsequently invalidated 
despite the initial grants.250  Although such invalidations seem 
problematic from a property standpoint, the non-exclusive and non-
excludable nature of intellectual property rights has made these 
rights an ill fit for an analysis based on traditional property rights.251 
Also complicating this analysis is that, unlike in most claims of 
direct expropriation of real or other tangible property, the ownership 
of intellectual property rights has not been transferred to Canada; 
instead, the drugs are now in the public domain, free for anybody to 
copy.252  In expropriation cases, seeking compensation from the 
government concerned is logical because that government has 
obtained direct financial benefits.  In intellectual property disputes, 
however, the government did not receive similar benefits.  Instead, it 
merely performed the statutory duty of determining whether the 
                                                     
 248. Yu, Enforcement, Economics and Estimates, supra note 209, at 8–9; see also Jeremy 
Phillips, “I Wouldn’t Want to Be Starting from Here,” or Why Isn’t Intellectual Property 
Research Better than It Is?, 1 WIPO J. 138, 140 (2009) (noting the mistaken claim that 
“it was ‘common knowledge’ that patents lasted for 20 years,” without regard to 
either jurisdiction or renewal procedures). 
 249. See Ho, supra note 22, at 243 (“Intellectual property rights are different than 
other types of property because they can be and often are later canceled.  The 
cancellation of the rights means there were no legitimate rights to begin with, so in 
these cases there should be no recognized investment that would trigger the ability 
to file an investor-state dispute.”). 
 250. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Government of Canada, ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2, 
Notice of Arbitration (Sept. 12, 2013), http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/icsidblo 
bs/onlineawards/c3544/dc4612_En.pdf; see supra text accompanying notes 19–24. 
 251. For discussions of the non-rivalrous and non-excludable nature of intellectual 
property, see generally William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis 
of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 344–61 (1989); Mark A. Lemley, Property, 
Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1033–46 (2005). 
 252. See Ho, supra note 22, at 263. 
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applicant of an intellectual property right has met eligibility 
requirements,253 such as the patentability requirement as qualified by 
the Canadian “promise doctrine.”254 
Moreover, patent rights have been invalidated more often than one 
would expect.  In a widely cited study published in the late 1990s, 
John Allison and Mark Lemley showed that U.S. courts had found a 
challenged patent invalid in 46% of the 300 final validity decisions 
examined.255  A few years ago, Carlos Correa also observed, 
In the US . . . , patent owner’s likelihood of success in patent 
validity challenges is only 51 per cent if the trial is heard before a 
judge alone.  If the trial is heard before a judge and jury:  68 per 
cent.  Overall chances of success for the patent owner if the trial is 
held in Massachusetts and Northern California, respectively:  30 
per cent, 68 per cent.256 
Indeed, the widely documented patent quality problem in the United 
States sparked repeated calls for patent reform,257 which eventually 
resulted in a complete overhaul of the U.S. patent system through the 
adoption of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act258 in September 2011.  
If these criticisms indeed reflected the problems of the U.S. patent 
system—a system that is far more developed than the systems in many 
other countries—one has to wonder whether mere patent invalidations 
would provide adequate support for an ISDS complaint. 
                                                     
 253. See id. at 243 (“[U]nlike most forms of real property, which exist without state 
intervention, some types of intellectual property only exist if granted by the state . . . .  
For example, a patent right does not exist without a state agency such as the U.S. 
Patent and Trademark Office reviewing an application to evaluate whether a patent 
is deserved.” (footnote omitted)). 
 254. See supra text accompanying note 22. 
 255. See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of 
Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 205 (1998). 
 256. Carlos M. Correa, The Push for Stronger Enforcement Rules:  Implications for 
Developing Countries, in INT’L CTR. FOR TRADE & SUSTAINABLE DEV., THE GLOBAL DEBATE 
ON THE ENFORCEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
27, 67–68 n.84 (2009), http://www.ictsd.org/sites/default/files/research/2012/02/ 
the-global-debate-on-the-enforcement-of-intellectual-property-rights-and-developing-
countries.pdf. 
 257. For discussions of problems within the U.S. patent system before the 
adoption of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, see generally U.S. FED. TRADE 
COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION:  THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND 
PATENT LAW AND POLICY (2003); ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS 
DISCONTENTS:  HOW OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND 
PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2004); A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 
(Stephen A. Merrill, Richard C. Levin & Mark B. Myers eds., 2004). 
 258. Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011). 
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The final reason involves limits on intellectual property rights both 
within and outside the system.  Endogenous limits are those 
constraints that have been internalized within the intellectual 
property system.259  Although those new to the intellectual property 
field, including many ISDS arbitrators, tend to focus only on 
protections, limitations and exceptions are just as important as the 
rights themselves.260  Among the widely cited endogenous constraints 
are those concerning fair use;261 exhaustion of rights;262 exceptions 
for research or experimental use,263 early working,264 and the 
development of diagnostics;265 as well as special arrangements for 
compulsory licensing, parallel importation, and government use.266 
                                                     
 259. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003) (underscoring the various 
“built-in First Amendment accommodations” in existing copyright law); Harper & Row, 
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985) (stating that the Framers of 
the Constitution “intended copyright itself to be the engine of free expression”). 
 260. See JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE AND SPLEENS:  LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION 
OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 138 (1996); see also Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 
5 (1966) (noting that the intellectual property clause “is both a grant of power and a 
limitation”).  For an important study on limitations and exceptions, see generally P. 
BERNT HUGENHOLTZ & RUTH L. OKEDIJI, CONCEIVING AN INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENT ON 
LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS TO COPYRIGHT:  FINAL REPORT (2008), http://www.ivir.nl/ 
publicaties/download/limitations_exceptions_copyright.pdf. 
 261. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
 262. See, e.g., id. § 109(a) (codifying the first sale doctrine). 
 263. See Karin Timmermans, Ensuring Access to Medicines in 2005 and Beyond, in 
NEGOTIATING HEALTH, supra note 54, at 41, 52 (noting the need for “a research 
exemption”).  For discussions of the experimental use exemption, see generally 
Rochelle Dreyfuss, Protecting the Public Domain of Science:  Has the Time for an 
Experimental Use Defense Arrived?, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 457 (2004); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, 
Patents and the Progress of Science:  Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1017 (1989); Janice M. Mueller, No “Dilettante Affair”:  Rethinking the Experimental 
Use Exception to Patent Infringement for Biomedical Research Tools, 76 WASH. L. REV. 1 
(2001); Katherine J. Strandburg, What Does the Public Get?  Experimental Use and the 
Patent Bargain, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 81. 
 264. See COMM’N ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS, INTEGRATING INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY 50 (2002) (discussing the importance of 
the Bolar exception, which “makes it legal for a generic producer to import, 
manufacture and test a patented product prior to the expiry of the patent in order 
that it may fulfill the regulatory requirements imposed by particular countries as 
necessary for marketing as a generic”). 
 265. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, art. 27.3(a) (“Members may . . . exclude from 
patentability . . . diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods for the treatment of 
humans or animals . . . .”); EDSON BEAS RODRIGUES JR., THE GENERAL EXCEPTION CLAUSES 
OF THE TRIPS AGREEMENT:  PROMOTING SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 159–236 (2012) 
(discussing the research-and-development and genetic diagnostic test exceptions). 
 266. See ELLEN F.M. ’T HOEN, THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF PHARMACEUTICAL MONOPOLY 
POWER:  DRUG PATENTS, ACCESS, INNOVATION AND THE APPLICATION OF THE WTO DOHA 
DECLARATION ON TRIPS AND PUBLIC HEALTH 39–59 (2009) (discussing compulsory 
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Limits on intellectual property rights can also be found outside the 
intellectual property system.  Widely cited exogenous limits include 
those constraints found in human rights treaties,267 constitutions,268 
competition law,269 or in relation to “morality, public order and the 
general welfare in a democratic society.”270  Exogenous limits are 
                                                     
licenses and parallel importation in relation to the flexibilities provided by the TRIPS 
Agreement). 
 267. See Carlos M. Correa, Mitigating the Impact of Intellectual Property in Developing 
Countries Through the Implementation of Human Rights, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON 
HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 217, at 201, 208–11 (discussing the use of human rights 
obligations to mitigate the impact of high intellectual property standards in 
developing countries); HOLGER HESTERMEYER, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE WTO:  THE 
CASE OF PATENTS AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES 229–55 (2007) (discussing TRIPS 
flexibilities in relation to the protection of human rights); Geertrui Van Overwalle, 
Human Rights’ Limitations in Patent Law, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS:  A PARADOX 236 (Willem Grosheide ed., 2010) (discussing the human rights 
limitations in patent law); Yu, Reconceptualizing Intellectual Property Interests, supra note 
217, at 1096–99 (discussing compulsory licensing based on human rights). 
 268. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.  For excellent discussions of the relationship 
between copyright law and the First Amendment, see generally sources cited in Peter 
K. Yu, The Escalating Copyright Wars, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 907, 927 n.145 (2004). 
 269. See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Sub-Comm’n on the Promotion & Prot. of 
Human Rights, The Impact of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights on Human Rights:  Report of the High Commissioner, ¶ 64, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/13 (June 27, 2001) (“The High Commissioner encourages 
States to consider the elaboration of competition laws that prevent abuses of IPRs 
that lead to violations of the right to health—in particular restrictive licensing 
practices or the setting of high prices for essential drugs.”); Jonathan Berger, 
Advancing Public Health by Other Means:  Using Competition Policy, in NEGOTIATING 
HEALTH, supra note 54, at 181, 182 (exploring how developing countries can use 
competition policy to “increase access to a sustainable supply of affordable essential 
medicines”); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, International Competition Rules for Governments 
and for Private Business:  A “Trade Law Approach” for Linking Trade and Competition Rules 
in the WTO, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 545, 563 (1996) (“[D]eveloping countries with 
underdeveloped national competition and intellectual property rights laws . . . will 
need more systematic rules on the protection of competition among trade-related 
intellectual property rights and on the prevention of their anticompetitive abuse.”); 
J.H. Reichman, From Free Riders to Fair Followers:  Global Competition Under the TRIPS 
Agreement, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 11, 52–58 (1997) (proposing to use 
“competition law to curb the abuse of market power” as a pro-competitive strategy for 
implementing the TRIPS Agreement in developing countries). 
 270. See G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 29(2) 
(Dec. 10, 1948) (“In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be 
subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of 
securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of 
meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a 
democratic society.”); see also International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights art. 4, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976) 
(“The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize that, in the enjoyment of 
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important because they remind investors of their social responsibilities.  
As Kate Miles observed, “there is a need for more balanced international 
investment agreements that retain strong investor protection but impose 
corresponding levels of investor responsibility.”271 
When both endogenous and exogenous limits are taken into 
account, the intellectual property rights available under the 
international investment agreement may be more limited than what 
the three words “intellectual property rights” have suggested in the 
definition of covered investment.  As far as international investment 
obligations are concerned, circumstances may also exist to preclude 
findings of violations.  These circumstances include necessity, force 
majeure, and countermeasures taken to address actual and alleged 
breaches of international law by the investors’ home states.272 
2. Intellectual property protection and the investment environment 
The previous Section underscores the need to undertake a deeper 
inquiry into what constitutes investment.  This Section turns to the 
need for a more sophisticated understanding of the role of 
intellectual property protection in an investment environment.  
Although there is a tendency to emphasize the role of such 
protection in attracting FDI, policymakers and commentators have 
                                                     
those rights provided by the State in conformity with the present Covenant, the State 
may subject such rights only to such limitations as are determined by law only in so 
far as this may be compatible with the nature of these rights and solely for the 
purpose of promoting the general welfare in a democratic society.”); Convention on 
the Grant of European Patents art. 53(a), Oct. 5, 1973, as amended by Decision of the 
Administration Council of the European Patent Organization of Dec. 21, 1978, 1065 
U.N.T.S. 255 (“European patents shall not be granted in respect of . . . inventions the 
commercial exploitation of which would be contrary to ‘ordre public’ or 
morality . . . .”); TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, art. 27.2 (“Members may exclude 
from patentability inventions, the prevention within their territory of the commercial 
exploitation of which is necessary to protect ordre public or morality . . . .”). 
 271. Miles, supra note 109, at 296; see also Jacqueline Lipton, Information Property:  
Rights and Responsibilities, 56 FLA. L. REV. 135, 165 (2004) (“If information property 
rights are here to stay, we should consider ways in which responsibilities of property 
ownership can be developed and imposed on right holders as part of our legal 
system.”). For discussions of investors’ responsibilities, see generally Peter 
Muchlinski, Corporate Social Responsibility, in OXFORD HANDBOOK, supra note 77, at 637; 
Karsten Nowrot, Obligations of Investors, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 
HANDBOOK, supra note 30, at 1154. 
 272. See Christina Binder, Circumstances Precluding Wrongfulness, in INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 30, at 442 (discussing the circumstances that 
may preclude findings of violations of international investment agreements). 
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widely questioned whether strong intellectual property protection 
actually causes greater FDI flows.273 
To date, economists have provided an abundance of empirical 
studies demonstrating the ambiguity of this causal relationship.274  
For example, Claudio Frischtak states that a country’s overall 
investment climate is often more influential on FDI decisions than 
the strength of intellectual property protection it offers.275  Carsten 
Fink and Keith Maskus observed that “[a] poor country hoping to 
attract inward FDI would be better advised to improve its overall 
investment climate and business infrastructure than to strengthen its 
patent regime sharply, an action that would have little effect on its 
own.”276  Professor Maskus further stated that, if stronger intellectual 
property protection always led to more FDI, “recent FDI flows to 
developing economies would have gone largely to sub-Saharan Africa 
and Eastern Europe . . . [rather than] China, Brazil, and other high-
growth, large-market developing economies with weak IPRs.”277 
As if these studies were not enough, policymakers and 
commentators have questioned whether intellectual property 
protection should be strengthened indefinitely regardless of the local 
contexts.  Indeed, there is no guarantee that stronger protection will 
promote further creativity and innovation even if the existing level of 
protection is needed to incentivize such creativity and innovation.  As 
Judge Alex Kozinski warned us in his famous dissent in White v. 
Samsung Electronics America, Inc.,278 “Overprotecting intellectual 
                                                     
 273. See Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property, Economic Development, and the China Puzzle, 
in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT:  STRATEGIES TO OPTIMIZE 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN A TRIPS PLUS ERA 173, 176–77 (Daniel J. Gervais ed., 1st 
ed. 2007) (“Conventional wisdom holds that strong intellectual property protection 
is needed to attract foreign investment . . . .  However, recent empirical research 
questions this conventional wisdom.”). 
 274. See generally id. at 176–80 (reviewing the economic literature that discusses 
this ambiguous relationship). 
 275. See Claudio R. Frischtak, Harmonization Versus Differentiation in Intellectual 
Property Right Regimes, in GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN 
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 89, 99–100 (Mitchel B. Wallerstein et al. eds., 1993) 
(noting that the nature of a country’s intellectual property regime was traditionally a 
secondary concern in a company’s FDI decision). 
 276. Carsten Fink & Keith E. Maskus, Why We Study Intellectual Property Rights and 
What We Have Learned, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND DEVELOPMENT 1, 7 (Carsten 
Fink & Keith E. Maskus eds., 2005). 
 277. Maskus, Role of Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 57, at 128–29 (footnotes 
omitted). 
 278. 989 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
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property is as harmful as underprotecting it.”279  Likewise, Josh 
Lerner wrote, “Almost all economists would agree that some 
intellectual property protection is better than no intellectual property 
protection at all.  But this does not mean that very strong protection 
is better than a more moderate level of protection.”280 
To develop a more sophisticated understanding of investment 
protection, it is important to examine protection from the sides of 
both the investor and the host state.  On either side, adjustments may 
have been made to increase or decrease the overall level of 
protection the host state has provided to the investor.  Unfortunately, 
this type of complementary protection is generally not the focus of 
any inquiry into the level of intellectual property protection. 
Consider, for instance, the evaluation of the moral rights 
protection offered to a foreign investor-artist in the United States.  
Thus far, policymakers and commentators have repeatedly noted that 
the country’s limited protection281 can be enhanced by laws relating to 
unfair competition, breach of contract, defamation, and the right to 
privacy.282  Yet those criticizing the United States for its failure to fully 
comply with the moral rights provision of the Berne Convention283 
remain reluctant to recognize these substitutes.  The critics’ narrower 
focus is understandable considering that the inquiry mostly concerns 
intellectual property rights—or, more specifically, copyright and 
related rights.  As important as the protections offered by defamation 
laws and the right to privacy are, they are simply not part of the 
intellectual property system.  Nevertheless, the analysis would be 
                                                     
 279. Id. at 1513. 
 280. Josh Lerner, The Patent System in a Time of Turmoil, 2 WIPO J. 28, 32 (2010); see 
also Peter K. Yu, Anticircumvention and Anti-anticircumvention, 84 DENV. U. L. REV. 13, 
17 (2006) (“[M]ore [copyright protection] is not always better, and small can be 
beautiful.”). 
 281. Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2012) (limiting the rights 
of attribution and integrity to a narrowly defined set of works of visual art). 
 282. See Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Copyright and the Moral Right:  Is an American 
Marriage Possible?, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1, 17–33 (1985) (discussing the non-copyright 
alternatives U.S. courts relied upon before the enactment of the Visual Artists Rights 
Act of 1990 to protect a creator’s moral rights, such as “unfair competition, breach of 
contract, defamation, and invasion of privacy”); see also Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, 
Information as Speech, Information as Goods:  Some Thoughts on Marketplaces and the Bill of 
Rights, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 665, 665 (1992) (“A common device for privatizing 
speech is copyright; privatization can similarly be achieved using § 43(a) of the 
Lanham Act and such common law doctrines as trade secrets, rights of privacy and 
publicity, and unfair trade practices.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 283. See Berne Convention, supra note 39, art. 6bis (providing the rights of 
attribution and integrity). 
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different if the inquiry were not about what intellectual property rights 
had been offered but what rights—of whatever kind—had been 
offered to protect intellectual property investments.  To answer this 
reframed question, one would have to consider protection from both 
inside and outside the intellectual property system. 
On the investor’s side, it is therefore important to consider both 
additive and subtractive adjustments.  Additive adjustments are those 
adjustments that will enhance the overall protection of intellectual 
property investments.  A case in point is the protection offered by a 
food and drug administration.  When such an administration links 
the registration of pharmaceutical products to their patent status—a 
common requirement in TRIPS-plus bilateral, regional, and 
plurilateral trade agreements284—the overall protection provided by 
the host state to pharmaceutical investments will be stronger than the 
protection of pharmaceutical patents alone.  This additional 
protection was indeed why commentators and civil society 
organizations have been highly critical of the demands for this type of 
linkage in TRIPS-plus trade agreements.285 
By contrast, subtractive adjustments are those adjustments that will 
undermine the overall protections given to intellectual property 
investments.  Typical examples are safeguards provided outside the 
intellectual property system, such as those exogenous limits discussed 
in the previous Section.286  A case in point is a process withholding 
patent protection from a pharmaceutical product until after health 
and medical experts have assessed its contribution to innovation and 
                                                     
 284. See, e.g., Australia–United States Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Austl., art. 
17.10.4, May 18, 2004, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/aus 
tralian-fta/final-text; Central America–Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement 
art. 15.10.2, May 28, 2004, http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-
agreements/cafta-dr-dominican-republic-central-america-fta/final-text; Singapore–
United States Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Sing., art. 16.8.4, May 6, 2003, 
https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/singapore-fta/final-text. 
 285. As Carlos Correa observed, 
The patent-registration linkage ignores that patents are private rights, as 
stated in the Preamble of the TRIPS Agreement, and that, whether a given 
product infringes or not, a patent is a legal matter entirely separate from the 
technical issues concerning safety and efficacy of drugs.  Health authorities 
have no knowledge or experience whatsoever to assess the claims of a patent. 
Carlos M. Correa, Bilateralism in Intellectual Property:  Defeating the WTO System for Access 
to Medicines, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 79, 88–91 (2004).  Professor Correa further 
criticized the patent-registration linkage for “creat[ing] a presumption of validity of 
pharmaceutical product patents which health authorities are neither empowered nor 
have the capacity to challenge.”  Id. at 91. 
 286. See supra text accompanying notes 267–71. 
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health welfare, such as the prior consent mechanism (anuência prévia) 
instituted by the Brazilian National Health Surveillance Agency 
(ANVISA).287  Although commentators have extolled the agency’s 
effort in fostering coordination between patent offices and health 
and medical experts,288 there is no denying that this mechanism has 
also weakened the overall protection offered to intellectual property 
investments.  Indeed, by October 2010, the conflicts between ANVISA 
and the Brazilian industrial property agency289 had become so intense 
that the country’s attorney general (Advocacia Geral da Uniao) felt 
compelled to step in to curtail ANVISA’s role.290 
Just as it is important to evaluate the protection given to the 
investor, it is equally significant to examine the protection provided 
by the host state.  In regard to the latter, ISDS arbitrators should 
consider the inputs the state has provided to investors as part of its 
effort to protect intellectual property investments.  Such 
                                                     
 287. See Peter Drahos, “Trust Me”:  Patent Offices in Developing Countries, 34 AM. J.L. 
& MED. 151, 169–70 (2008) (discussing ANVISA’s prior consent mechanism). 
 288. For example, Peter Drahos declared, 
The Brazilian model is worth close study by other developing countries.  It is 
a preventive strategy that avoids the high costs of attempting to remove 
patents that have been granted.  It is also an integrative regulatory strategy.  
It links patentability criteria in the area of pharmaceuticals to the goal of 
welfare-enhancing innovation in the health sector.  One of the real concerns 
with pharmaceutical patenting has been that patent offices are granting 
patents over essentially trivial steps in the innovation process.  The reasons 
for this are complex, having to do with the incentives facing patent offices, 
the narrow training of patent examiners, the fact that patent examiners are 
not researchers, and that they are not integrated into communities of public 
health experts that know about what constitutes real innovation in a given 
field.  From the perspective of the patent social contract, the grant of patents 
over trivial or obvious steps in the pharmaceutical innovation process 
constitutes a welfare loss to society.  Involving public health experts in the 
process of patent administration is one way of helping to ensure that the 
patent social contract functions as it should in the health sector. 
Id. at 169–70 (footnotes omitted); see also Peter K. Yu, Access to Medicines, BRICS Alliances, 
and Collective Action, 34 AM. J.L. & MED. 345, 378 (2008) (suggesting that the ANIVSA 
model could be used to facilitate greater cooperation between intellectual property 
offices in the South and health and medical experts and related NGOs in the North). 
 289. For discussions of this conflict, see generally Kenneth C. Shadlen, The Political 
Contradictions of Incremental Innovation:  Lessons from Pharmaceutical Patent Examination 
in Brazil, 39 POL. & SOC’Y 143 (2011); Kenneth C. Shadlen, The Rise and Fall of “Prior 
Consent” in Brazil, 3 WIPO J. 103 (2011). 
 290. See Felipe Carvalho, Brazil and the Defence of Public Health:  Do as I Say, Not as I 
Do, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Feb. 17, 2011, 3:30 PM), http://www.ip-
watch.org/weblog/2011/02/17/brazil-and-the-defence-of-public-health-do-as-i-say-
not-as-i-do (reporting the October 2010 decision of the Advocacia Geral da Uniao that 
undermined ANVISA’s prior consent mechanism). 
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consideration is especially important in inquiries concerning the 
country’s overall minimum standard of treatment. 
As far as intellectual property investments are concerned, host 
states contribute to their overall protections through inputs within 
and outside the system.  Those inputs that are within the system 
include the establishment of registration, examination, and 
enforcement infrastructures.  Those outside the system include 
concessions offered to compensate for weaker intellectual property 
protections, such as free lands, tax breaks, exemption from export 
custom duties, and preferential treatment on foreign exchange.291 
To be sure, the existence of concessional benefits outside the 
intellectual property system does not reduce the host state’s 
obligation under an international investment agreement.  
Nevertheless, ISDS arbitrators should take those benefits into account 
if they are to obtain a more complete picture of what attracts foreign 
intellectual property rights holders to invest in the first place.  After 
all, if intellectual property rights were as strong as the claimants 
expected them to be, offsetting contributions would not have been 
needed in the first place.292 
3. International investment agreements and other multilateral obligations 
The final set of conceptual improvements concerns the 
interrelationship between an international trade or investment 
agreement containing ISDS, such as the TPP Agreement, and the 
host state’s other, and often preexisting, multilateral obligations.  
These obligations include those under the TRIPS Agreement, the 
                                                     
 291. See sources cited supra note 127. 
 292. For example, many transnational corporations outsource their operations to 
China because of location advantages unrelated to intellectual property protection.  
See Maskus, Role of Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 57, at 128–29 (noting that, if 
strong intellectual property protection and enforcement attracted foreign investors, 
“recent FDI flows to developing economies would have gone largely to sub-Saharan 
Africa and Eastern Europe . . . [rather than] China, Brazil, and other high-growth, 
large-market developing economies with weak IPRs” (footnotes omitted)); see also 
CATHERINE SUN, CHINA INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY FOR FOREIGN BUSINESS 4–5 (2004) 
(noting that many major Western companies, such as Coca-Cola, Kodak, Motorola, 
and Procter & Gamble, have enjoyed substantial profits for years despite the 
country’s serious piracy and counterfeiting problems and that improvements in 
intellectual property protection will merely “increas[e the] already acceptable profit 
ratios,” rather than providing profitability in the first place); Yu, From Pirates to 
Partners II, supra note 88, at 983 (“[F]or those companies that have successfully 
adapted to the local market environment, rampant piracy and counterfeiting 
problems, though annoying, did not affect their ability to make profits.”). 
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Convention on Biological Diversity,293 the Nagoya Protocol on Access 
to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits 
Arising from Their Utilization,294 the World Health Organization 
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control,295 and international and 
regional human rights treaties.296 
When efforts are needed to fill in the gap, ISDS arbitrators may 
want to look at the developments in not only the host state and the 
investor’s home state but also third states.  National laws can indeed 
provide useful guideposts.  In their book, Graeme Dinwoodie and 
Rochelle Dreyfuss called for the recognition of an international 
intellectual property acquis297—which they defined as “a set of basic 
principles that form the background norms animating the intellectual 
property system.”298  Aiming to clarify the normative underpinnings of 
intellectual property law and policy, this acquis would draw from not 
only international intellectual property treaties but also “national . . . 
intellectual property law along with associated jurisprudence and 
scholarship.”299  As Professors Dinwoodie and Dreyfuss explained, 
[This acquis] would crystallize the international commitment to 
intellectual property protection.  It would include both express and 
latent components of the international regime, put access-
regarding guarantees on a par with proprietary interests, and 
enshrine the fundamental importance of national autonomy and 
national treatment.  Although it is unlikely that the intellectual 
property system will ever be centrally administered in the manner 
of a true federal system, the acquis would facilitate a neofederalist 
                                                     
 293. Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 79. 
 294. Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable 
Sharing of Benefits Arising from Their Utilization, Oct. 29, 2010, http://www.cbd.int 
/abs/doc/protocol/nagoya-protocol-en.pdf. 
 295. World Health Organization Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, 
May 21, 2003, 2302 U.N.T.S 166. 
 296. For discussions of the interplay between investment law and human rights, 
see generally MOUYAL, supra note 76, at 140–57; Pierre-Marie Dupuy & Jorge E. 
Viñuales, Human Rights and Investment Disciplines:  Integration in Progress, in 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 30, at 1739; Bruno Simma & 
Theodore Kill, Harmonizing Investment Protection and International Human Rights:  First 
Steps Towards a Methodology, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW, supra note 76, at 678; 
Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, The Impact of Human Rights on International Investment Law 
and Investor-State Arbitration, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW, supra note 76, at 877. 
 297. See GRAEME B. DINWOODIE & ROCHELLE C. DREYFUSS, A NEOFEDERALIST VISION 
OF TRIPS:  THE RESILIENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 
175–203 (2012). 
 298. Id. at 176. 
 299. Id. at 177. 
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vision because it would coordinate international lawmaking while 
giving due regard to the role of nation-states in that process.300 
To a large extent, the approach proposed in this Section is not that 
different from what the TPP negotiators have already developed in 
the investment chapter.  For instance, Article 9.8.5 states that the 
provision on expropriation and compensation 
shall not apply to the issuance of compulsory licences granted in 
relation to intellectual property rights in accordance with the 
TRIPS Agreement, or to the revocation, limitation or creation of 
intellectual property rights, to the extent that the issuance, 
revocation, limitation or creation is consistent with Chapter 18 
(Intellectual Property) and the TRIPS Agreement.301 
Article 9.3.1 further states that “[i]n the event of any inconsistency 
between this Chapter and another Chapter of this Agreement, the 
other Chapter shall prevail to the extent of the inconsistency.”302  
Thus, if inconsistencies arise between the TPP investment and 
intellectual property chapters, the latter shall prevail to the extent of 
those inconsistencies. 
Notwithstanding these similarities, the approach proposed in this 
Section will take a holistic perspective.  It will take into account the 
many obligations the host state has already assumed under other 
multilateral agreements.303  To make explicit the host state’s duty to 
interpret international agreements in good faith (pacta sunt servanda),304 
TPP partners should consider writing into the ISDS arbitrators’ code of 
conduct a requirement that arbitrators consider a host state’s broad 
                                                     
 300. Id. at 203. 
 301. TPP Agreement, supra note 6, art. 9.8.5. 
 302. Id. art. 9.3.1. 
 303. See Miles, supra note 109, at 296 (“There is . . . a need for greater engagement 
with principles from other areas of international law.  Although international investment 
agreements do not exist in a vacuum, the logical consequences of this appreciation are 
not often embraced in arbitral awards or investment treaty negotiation.  If they were, we 
would already have seen the development of more socially and environmentally 
responsible norms of international investment law—and more emphasis on protecting 
the host state’s right to regulate in the public interest.”); Okediji, Is Intellectual Property 
“Investment”?, supra note 25, at 1129 (noting that “an interpretation of NAFTA’s 
provisions must take place in the broader context of this network of treaties”). 
 304. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 26, May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331 (“Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be 
performed by them in good faith.”); Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law 
§ 321 (1987) (“Every international agreement in force is binding upon the parties to 
it and must be performed by them in good faith.”). 
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multilateral commitments.  Such consideration can draw on the 
principles of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.305 
B. Institutional Improvements 
Section IV.A identifies three sets of conceptual improvements that 
are either directly or substantially related to intellectual property 
investments.  This Section turns to their institutional counterparts 
that can help strengthen ISDS in regard to all forms of investments, 
including those in the intellectual property field.  This Section 
discusses three institutional improvements in turn. 
1. Advisory Center on Investor-State Disputes 
The first institutional improvement concerns the need for an 
Advisory Center on Investor-State Disputes (“ACISD”),306 similar to 
the Advisory Centre on WTO Law (“ACWL”).  Based in Geneva, the 
latter provides to the developing and least developed country 
members of the WTO “free advice and training on all aspects of WTO 
law, as well as assistance in WTO dispute settlement proceedings.”307  
As the Centre explained in its guide, 
Over the past 20 years, WTO law has become increasingly complex.  
While most developed countries have “in-house” legal expertise 
that enable[s] them to understand WTO law and to participate 
fully in the WTO legal system, most developing countries and LDCs 
[least developed countries] do not.  Thus, the ACWL was created 
                                                     
 305. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.  
For detailed discussions of the use of the Vienna Convention in TRIPS disputes, see 
generally Susy Frankel, WTO Application of “the Customary Rules of Interpretation of Public 
International Law” to Intellectual Property, 46 VA. J. INT’L L. 365, 384–90 (2006); Daya 
Shanker, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the Dispute Settlement System of the 
WTO and the Doha Declaration on the TRIPs Agreement, 36 J. WORLD TRADE 721, 723–36 
(2002). 
 306. Other commentators have advanced similar proposals.  As Anna Joubin-Bret 
recounted, 
The idea to establish an international centre to provide advice and defence 
services for states in international investment disputes is not new.  It has 
been proposed and discussed by several Latin American states following the 
example of the successful Advisory Centre on WTO Law (ACWL) established 
to provide advice and defence services to states in [WTO] disputes. 
JOUBIN-BRET, supra note 72, at 1; see also id. (calling for the establishment of an 
International Advisory Centre for Investment Disputes to provide assistance in 
defending investor-state disputes). 
 307. ADVISORY CENTRE ON WTO LAW, THE SERVICES OF THE ACWL 2 (n.d.), 
http://www.acwl.ch/download/ql/Services_of_the_ACWL.pdf. 
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to provide these countries with this legal capacity and to help them 
to understand fully their rights and obligations under WTO law. 
 At present, 74 countries—roughly half of the membership of the 
WTO—are entitled to the services of the ACWL.  Since its 
establishment in 2001, the ACWL has provided these countries with 
over 1800 legal opinions free of charge, has conducted twelve 
annual training courses for Geneva-based delegates, and has 
trained 23 lawyers as part of its Secondment Programme for 
Government lawyers.  In addition, it has assisted developing 
countries and LDCs in 44 WTO dispute settlement proceedings at 
modest fees.  Thus, the ACWL has become an organisation that 
pools the collective experience of developing countries and LDCs 
in WTO legal matters and makes that expertise available to each of 
those countries.308 
In the past two decades, ACWL has provided assistance to a large 
number of developing countries, including Bangladesh, Brazil, Chad, 
Chinese Taipei, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Nicaragua, Pakistan, 
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam.309 
Within the TPP, the establishment of an ACISD would be critically 
important, considering the Agreement’s failure to offer special and 
differential treatment to poor TPP partners,310 despite what 
policymakers and commentators have long advocated.311  After all, TPP 
partners are of varying sizes and economic strengths.  While the United 
States and Japan had GDP per capita of $55,836.79 and $32,477.22 in 
2015, respectively, the World Bank estimated that the comparable 
figures for Peru and Vietnam were only $6027.13 and $2111.14, 
                                                     
 308. Id. 
 309. WTO Disputes:  Assistance in WTO Dispute Settlement Proceedings Since July 2001, 
ADVISORY CENTRE ON WTO LAW, http://www.acwl.ch/wto-disputes (last visited Feb. 5, 2017). 
 310. The TPP Agreement does offer transition periods to select partners.  Its 
intellectual property chapter, for example, offers transition periods to six of the 
twelve TPP partners—namely, Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, 
Peru, and Vietnam.  See TPP Agreement, supra note 6, art. 18.83.4. 
 311. As Lim Chin Leng, Deborah Elms, and Patrick Low observed, 
One of the unusual elements of the TPP is the fact that the members of the 
TPP represent a range of economic development, from the world’s largest 
economy to a lower middle income economy.  While members have been 
clear that the TPP will not have any sort of “two-speed” or explicit special 
and differential . . . treatment for developing country members, it is true that 
the final Agreement will need to have some provisions to account for the 
developmental aspects of some members. 
C.L. Lim et al., What Is “High-Quality, Twenty-First Century” Anyway?, in TRANS-PACIFIC 
PARTNERSHIP, supra note 167, at 3, 12. 
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respectively.312  As a result, Peru and Vietnam are unlikely to have the 
same financial flexibility to handle investor-state disputes as the United 
States and Japan.  These two poorer countries are also unlikely to have 
the same legal capacity to achieve success through ISDS.313 
2. Small-claims procedure 
The second institutional improvement concerns the need for a 
small-claims procedure within the ISDS mechanism.  This proposal 
builds on the proposal Håkan Nordström and Gregory Shaffer 
advanced a few years ago on the development of such a procedure 
within the WTO.314  That earlier proposal sought to enable developing 
countries to make greater use of the WTO dispute settlement process.  
It further called for the provision of legal aid “by offering Members 
                                                     
 312. GDP per Capita (Current US$), WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/indica 
tor/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD (last visited Feb. 5, 2017). 
 313. As Kyla Tienhaara noted, 
[W]hile hiring outside counsel can be advantageous, it may not always be a 
feasible option for developing countries.  Large law firms often have long-
term relationships with multinational corporations and such relationships 
may prevent a firm from representing a developing country in an investor-
State dispute.  If a law firm is available, the next question becomes whether a 
developing country can afford its services.  [Eric] Gottwald notes that the 
hourly rates for lawyers in elite firms can range from US$400 to US$600.  
When a team of lawyers is retained for arbitral proceedings that are drawn 
out over a period of several years, the result can be a colossal legal bill. 
Tienhaara, supra note 132, at 612 (citing Eric Gottwald, Leveling the Playing Field:  Is It 
Time for a Legal Assistance Center for Developing Nations in Investment Treaty Arbitration?, 
22 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 237 (2007)); see also Dreyfuss & Frankel, supra note 26, at 600 
(“[The provision of] defense attorneys . . . would be particularly helpful for IP, 
because their availability could correct the current imbalance between developed 
and undeveloped countries in dispute resolution.  Because most of the disputes are 
among the developed countries that can afford to be involved in these cases, the 
range of flexibilities considered are limited to those necessary to win.”); Franck, 
Development and Outcomes, supra note 106, at 484 (“A legal assistance center for 
developing countries could provide strategic advice to enhance the quality of 
arbitration and eliminate disparities in outcome related to development status.”). 
 314. See Håkan Nordström & Gregory Shaffer, Access to Justice in the WTO:  A Case 
for a Small-Claims Procedure?, in DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE WTO LEGAL SYSTEM 191 
(Chantal Thomas & Joel P. Trachtman eds., 2009) (building the case for a small 
claims procedure within the WTO); see also Bernard M. Hoekman & Petros C. 
Mavroidis, WTO Dispute Settlement, Transparency and Surveillance, 23 WORLD ECON. 527, 
536 (2000) (“Many cases that involve developing countries will generally pertain to 
relatively small trade volumes.  Another way of recognising resource constraints is to 
consider adopting ‘light’ dispute settlement procedures for ‘small’ cases brought by 
developing countries (e.g., where the exports constitute less than one per cent of 
apparent consumption in the importing market).”). 
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legal counsel funded out of the regular WTO budget or a designated 
legal aid fund.”315  As Professors Nordström and Shaffer explained, 
What is insignificant for some Member states is highly significant to 
others.  A million dollars in foregone export revenue may not matter 
much for the European Union or the United States; it would only be 
a few seconds worth of exports.  For small developing countries like 
Burundi, Gambia, and Guinea-Bissau, on the other hand, $1 million 
corresponds to about 1.45 percent of annual exports, or put in 
relationship to national income, between 0.17 and 0.42 percent of 
gross domestic product . . . .  Forgone export revenue of this 
magnitude would not be a small order for them. 
 What is “small” is thus a relative concept.  Yet the WTO Dispute 
Settlement . . . system does not take into account the inherent 
variation in exports across the WTO’s membership.  A case worth 
$1 million is treated in the very same way (at least formally) as a 
case worth $1 billion.  The timetable is the same, the submission 
requirements are the same, the standard of proof is the same, the 
appeal procedures are the same; everything is the same unless the 
parties opt for the alternative resolution mechanisms offered by the 
[Dispute Settlement Understanding] . . . .316 
Professors Nordström and Shaffer’s proposal for developing a 
small-claims procedure within the WTO could be used to improve the 
ISDS process in the TPP or other international trade or investment 
agreements.  As noted earlier, the high costs of ISDS arbitrations will 
not only be immensely burdensome on host states in the developing 
world, but it will also virtually guarantee that most developing country 
businesses will be unable to afford ISDS arbitrations—other than to 
file, or threaten to file, ISDS complaints, perhaps.  To avoid this 
grossly unfair arrangement and the one-sided benefits that the ISDS 
mechanism presently provides, establishing a small-claims procedure 
within this mechanism will be quite urgent. 
3. Appellate mechanism 
The final institutional improvement concerns the need for an 
appellate mechanism.  As Cynthia Ho observed in regard to the 
problems raised by a lack of such a mechanism in ISDS proceedings, 
A major complaint is that the system results in inconsistent 
decisions because there is no binding precedent, tribunals interpret 
provisions broadly, and there is no appeal system.  Although 
tribunals often rely on prior decisions and awards, and counsel for 
                                                     
 315. Nordström & Shaffer, supra note 314, at 195. 
 316. Id. at 193. 
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parties regularly cite prior decisions, the lack of hierarchy among 
tribunals as compared to traditional court systems, as well as the lack 
of an appellate system, may result in unpredictability.317 
Moreover, some commentators suggested that an appellate 
mechanism could provide some important benefits to investors, 
considering that they “historically have lost more often than they 
have won in investor-State arbitration.”318  Nevertheless, only time will 
tell whether the appellate mechanism, once established, will be eager 
to overturn ISDS decisions as these commentators have surmised. 
At the time of the TPP negotiations, the participating countries 
already anticipated the future need of an appellate mechanism.  
Given the language built into the TPP Agreement, the discussion of 
this mechanism is inevitably different from the discussion of the first 
two improvements, which the Agreement neither covers nor 
anticipates.  Article 9.23.11 of the TPP Agreement explicitly declares, 
In the event that an appellate mechanism for reviewing awards 
rendered by investor-State dispute settlement tribunals is 
developed in the future under other institutional arrangements, 
the Parties shall consider whether awards rendered under Article 
9.29 (Awards) should be subject to that appellate mechanism.  The 
Parties shall strive to ensure that any such appellate mechanism 
they consider adopting provides for transparency of proceedings 
similar to the transparency provisions established in Article 9.24 
(Transparency of Arbitral Proceedings).319 
The conditional language in this provision suggests that the TPP 
negotiators did not oppose the introduction of an appellate 
mechanism.  Instead, they might have merely failed to reach a 
consensus within the limited negotiation time on how this 
mechanism was to be set up or whether the mechanism was needed 
in the first place.320  The proverbial door therefore remains open. 
The choice of language in the TPP Agreement regarding the possible 
future development of an appellate mechanism is consistent with the 
                                                     
 317. Ho, supra note 22, at 234. 
 318. Barton Legum, Appellate Mechanisms for Investment Arbitration:  Worth a Second 
Look for the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Proposed EU-U.S. FTA?, in RESHAPING THE 
ISDS SYSTEM, supra note 75, at 437, 441. 
 319. TPP Agreement, supra note 6, art. 9.23.11 (emphasis added). 
 320. Compare Hans von der Burchard, EU Faces Tough Sell on TTIP Compromise, 
POLITICO (Feb. 10, 2016), http://www.politico.eu/article/eu-faces-tough-sell-on-ttip-
compromise-malmstroem-froman (reporting that USTR Michael Froman 
“question[ed] the need for the appeal tribunal”), with 19 U.S.C. § 3802(b)(3)(G)(iv) 
(2012) (including among the U.S. principal negotiating objectives regarding foreign 
investment the “provi[sion] for an appellate body or similar mechanism to provide 
coherence to the interpretations of investment provisions in trade agreements”). 
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ongoing negotiation of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (T-TIP), a pact that has been widely considered to be the 
TPP’s trans-Atlantic counterpart.321  During the negotiations, the 
European Commission advanced a proposal for the establishment of an 
investment court system, which includes an Appeal Tribunal that 
consists of two members each from the European Union, the United 
States, and third countries.322  It remains to be seen whether the United 
States will be receptive to this proposal, or even whether the Trump 
administration will continue the T-TIP negotiations. 
To a large extent, the proposal for developing an appellate 
mechanism in the TPP Agreement is similar to the proposals that 
commentators have thus far advanced, which range from the creation 
of an ISDS court to the development of an appellate mechanism 
similar to the WTO Appellate Body.323  Such an appellate mechanism 
                                                     
 321. E.g., Hans Kundnani, TTIP Must Die So That the West Can Live, FOREIGN POL’Y 
(May 13, 2016), http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/05/13/ttip-tpp-eu-trade-obama-asia; 
David Lawder, EU Trade Chief:  U.S. Campaign Rhetoric Won’t Stop TTIP Trade Talks, 
REUTERS (Mar. 10, 2016, 12:52 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-trade-
europe-usa-idUSKCN0WC0GU. 
 322. See EUROPEAN UNION’S PROPOSAL FOR INVESTMENT PROTECTION AND 
RESOLUTION OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES § 3, art. 10.2 (2015), http://trade.ec.europa.eu 
/doclib/docs/2015/november/tradoc_153955.pdf; see also Stephan W. Schill, The 
European Commission’s Proposal of an “Investment Court System” for TTIP:  Stepping Stone or 
Stumbling Block for Multilateralizing International Investment Law?, ASIL INSIGHTS (Apr. 
22, 2016), https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/20/issue/9/european-commissions-
proposal-investment-court-system-ttip-stepping (discussing the European Commission’s 
proposal). 
 323. See Dreyfuss & Frankel, supra note 26, at 601 (supporting “the creation of a 
central appellate body for investment disputes to address both consistency and 
substantive issues, on the theory that it would have the same appreciation for IP 
rationales as [Robert] Howse suggests the Appellate Body would have for public-
regarding principles”); Ho, supra note 22, at 235 (“To combat these shortcomings 
there have been many proposals to reform the current system for investor-state 
disputes.  Many have suggested some type of appellate body to address the problem 
of inconsistent as well as expansive interpretations of identical provisions.  
Alternatively, some suggest replacing private arbiters with an international 
investment court to promote impartiality and independence.”); Ieva Kalnina & 
Domenico Di Pietro, The Scope of ICSID Review:  Remarks on Selected Problematic Issues of 
ICSID Decisions, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW, supra note 76, at 221, 245–46 
(discussing the potential creation of an ICSID Appeals Body); Okediji, Is Intellectual 
Property “Investment”?, supra note 25, at 1137 (calling for the provision of “a form of 
appellate review for investor-state disputes involving intellectual property, such as the 
type that exists in the WTO system or in national law”); Asif H. Qureshi, An Appellate 
System in International Investment Arbitration?, in OXFORD HANDBOOK, supra note 77, at 
1154 (discussing the expediency and feasibility of having an appellate system in 
international investment arbitration); Reinisch, supra note 76, at 910–11 (discussing 
the need for an appellate mechanism in investment arbitration).  For a collection of 
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will be particularly attractive if policymakers, commentators, and civil 
society organizations remain concerned about the “development 
bias”324 of ISDS arbitrators.  As Susan Franck reasoned, 
If outcome is linked to the development status of the presiding 
arbitrator and there is disparate pressure to favor the developed 
world, having standing judges with secure tenures may enhance 
integrity and independence.  In order to eliminate pressure to join 
a club or secure repeat appointments, a standing body could 
provide judicial oversight and create an environment that favors 
rule of law adjudication.  Moreover, such an institution could foster 
the judicialization of international economic law and provide a 
backstop to create certainty about contested legal issues, thereby 
increasing the integrity of the dispute resolution system.325 
Given the wide range of proposals that experts have provided, 
many models now exist to improve the TPP ISDS mechanism.  One 
model worth considering is the inclusion of some previous WTO 
panelists or Appellate Body members in the appellate mechanism.326  
Such a cross-institutional setup will not only enhance the 
mechanism’s quality but will further promote coherence327 and cross-
fertilization328 between the ISDS process and the WTO dispute 
                                                     
articles on the development of an appellate mechanism within ISDS, see generally 
RESHAPING THE ISDS SYSTEM, supra note 75, at 403–505. 
 324. Franck, Development and Outcomes, supra note 106, at 451. 
 325. Id. at 484. 
 326. Other commentators have similar suggestions.  See, e.g., Theodore R. Posner 
& Marguerite C. Walter, The Abiding Role of State-State Engagement in the Resolution of 
Investor-State Disputes, in RESHAPING THE ISDS SYSTEM, supra note 75, at 381, 389–91 
(discussing the use of state-to-state dispute settlement to support ISDS); Andreas R. 
Ziegler, Investment Law in Conflict with WTO Law?, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 
HANDBOOK, supra note 30, at 1784, 1800 (“[I]t may be useful to encourage arbitrators 
and the members of judicial bodies of multilateral organizations like the WTO and 
ICSID to refer to each other’s case law and engage in a judicial debate.  This could 
avoid the scenario where each system operates in clinical isolation and would 
certainly be beneficial for the development of an inter-institutional debate on special 
issues affecting global trade and investment flows.”). 
 327. See Appellate Body Report, United States—Standards for Reformulated and 
Conventional Gasoline, WTO Doc. WT/DS2/AB/R, at 17 (Apr. 29, 1996) (declaring 
that “the General Agreement [on Tariffs and Trade] is not to be read in clinical isolation 
from public international law”); RESOURCE BOOK ON TRIPS AND DEVELOPMENT, supra 
note 125, at 130 (noting that, in United States—Import Prohibition on Certain Shrimp and 
Shrimp Products, the Appellate Body “moved firmly away from the notion of the WTO 
as a ‘self-contained’ legal regime”); Ho, supra note 22, at 247 (“[I]f investor-state 
disputes could challenge TRIPS-consistent decisions, there is a risk of decisions 
inconsistent with the built-in dispute resolution process of TRIPS.”). 
 328. See SUBEDI, supra note 34, at 158 (“Foreign investment law is . . . influenced by 
cross-fertilisation from other areas of public international law, especially those 
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settlement process.  Such coherence and cross-fertilization will ensure 
the healthy development of the international intellectual property 
regime.329  They will also be particularly important in light of the 
increasing use of parallel proceedings to challenge intellectual 
property and intellectual property-related regulations in developing 
countries,330 such as those via the WTO and ISDS.331  Indeed, in 
intellectual property-related investor-state disputes, ISDS arbitrators 
will increasingly have to address questions concerning the extent of 
protection and limitation as provided in the TRIPS Agreement. 
Thus far, some commentators have already called for the exclusion 
of intellectual property investments in ISDS.332  Although 
international investment agreements generally define investment 
broadly to cover all forms of investments, it is not unusual to exclude 
certain unique forms of investments from ISDS.  In the TPP 
Agreement, for example, Article 9.3.3 states specifically that the 
investment chapter “shall not apply to measures adopted or 
maintained by a Party to the extent that they are covered by Chapter 
11 (Financial Services).”333  If a carve-out can be created for financial 
                                                     
relating to human rights and environmental protection, as well as certain 
fundamental principles of international economic law such as the principle of 
economic self-determination of states, the right to develop, and the permanent 
sovereignty of states over their natural resources.”). 
 329. See Peter K. Yu, International Enclosure, the Regime Complex, and Intellectual 
Property Schizophrenia, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1, 18 (noting the growing “focus on the 
coherence of intellectual property policies, in addition to the maintenance of 
balance and flexibility in those policies”). 
 330. See Kalderimis, supra note 198, at 58 (discussing the various cases in which the 
“the same dispute has triggered both WTO and arbitration procedures”). 
 331. See discussion supra notes 13–17 (providing an example of parallel 
proceedings relating to efforts to challenge the plain-packaging regulations for 
tobacco products in Australia); see also Katia Yannaca-Small, Parallel Proceedings, in 
OXFORD HANDBOOK, supra note 77, at 1008 (discussing parallel proceedings in 
investment arbitration). 
 332. See, e.g., Baker & Geddes, supra note 151, at 58 (proposing “to rewrite the 
[TPP] Investment Chapter to explicitly exclude IPRs and to clarify that IPRs are not 
even indirectly protected by the definition of ‘investment’”); Ho, supra note 22, at 
255 (“Intellectual property should be excluded from investor-state arbitration 
because providing enhanced protection of IP does not satisfy traditional justifications 
for investment arbitrations.”); Flynn, supra note 211 (“Tobacco should be carved out 
of free trade agreements.  But so should all other claims of ‘indirect’ expropriation 
of expected profits of a company through health and safety regulations, including 
the regulation of intellectual property.  At minimum, the treating of the IP chapter 
differently than all other substantive chapters (which remain subject only to state to 
state adjudication) needs to be fixed.”). 
 333. TPP Agreement, supra note 6, art. 9.3.3. 
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services—and, upon election, tobacco control measures334—a similar 
carve-out can certainly be created for intellectual property rights, at 
least when there is enough political will. 
Notwithstanding the possibility of creating such a carve-out, it is 
worth remembering that ISDS is attractive to private investors 
because it provides finality.335  The more steps there are in a 
process—appellate or otherwise—the longer it will take for a dispute 
to be finally resolved.  Ultimately, whether an appellate mechanism 
should be introduced will depend on how efficiency and expedition 
are to be balanced against fairness and legitimacy.  Given the high 
stakes involved in ISDS arbitrations and the arbitrations’ controversial 
nature and continuous opposition, having an appellate mechanism 
built into the ISDS process to ensure greater fairness and legitimacy is 
eminently sensible. 
V. SILVER LININGS 
The previous Part proposed a wide variety of conceptual and 
institutional improvements to address the weaknesses of ISDS.  Although 
these improvements were created with the TPP Agreement in mind, the 
analysis is equally applicable to the T-TIP Agreement or other 
international trade or investment agreements containing ISDS.  In fact, 
the application to the latter set of agreements is particularly attractive 
considering that those agreements have not yet been finalized and the 
ISDS mechanism they contain can be further improved. 
One question that has not yet been asked in this Article is how bad the 
TPP ISDS mechanism will be if it is introduced without the improvements 
                                                     
 334. See id. art. 29.5 (providing a carve-out for tobacco control measures).  See 
generally Matthew Rimmer, Plain Packaging for the Pacific Rim—Tobacco Control and the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership, in TRADE LIBERALISATION AND INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION:  
A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT 75 (Tania Voon ed., 
2014) (discussing tobacco control measures in relation to the TPP negotiations). 
 335. See Chester Brown & Kate Miles, Introduction:  Evolution in Investment Treaty 
Law and Arbitration, in EVOLUTION IN INVESTMENT TREATY, supra note 127, at 3, 11 
(“[I]nvestment arbitration has, until recently, been characterised by an approach 
traditionally seen in international commercial arbitration, being that of a simple 
desire for a quick and inexpensive decision to resolve the dispute.”); Kalnina & Di 
Pietro, supra note 323, at 245–46 (“The main disadvantages [of the creation of the 
ICSID Appeals Body] include jeopardy of the principle of finality, which has always 
been considered among the main advantages of arbitration over judicial 
settlement . . . .”); Jaemin Lee, Introduction of an Appellate Review Mechanism for 
International Investment Disputes:  Expected Benefits and Remaining Tasks, in RESHAPING 
THE ISDS SYSTEM, supra note 75, at 474, 493 (“[T]he benefit of arbitration lies in the 
promptness of the proceedings; this should not be undermined for the sake of 
having an appellate system.”). 
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proposed in this Article.  More positively, given the weaknesses already 
documented in Parts II and III, can there be any silver linings for this 
mechanism?  This Part seeks to answer this particular question, with a 
focus on developing countries—countries that the current version of the 
TPP ISDS mechanism will harm the most. 
That ISDS has so many weaknesses and flaws certainly has made it 
difficult to locate silver linings.  Nevertheless, as Part III points out, 
the TPP investment chapter did introduce some substantive and 
procedural safeguards to help improve ISDS.336  Even if this improved 
mechanism remains problematic for host states in the developing 
world, the TPP upgrades will provide at least some benefits.  This Part 
discusses in turn four sets of benefits. 
A. Baseline for Minimum ISDS Safeguards 
The first set of benefits concerns the minimum safeguards in the 
ISDS process.  Just as the TPP investment chapter has ratcheted up 
the standards of intellectual property protection and enforcement by 
allowing private investors to use ISDS to resolve international 
intellectual property disputes,337 this chapter has also raised the 
baseline expectations for substantive and procedural safeguards in 
the ISDS process. 
Thus, if developing countries remain concerned about the 
demands for ISDS in new international trade or investment 
agreements, they should use the safeguards in the TPP investment 
chapter as the negotiation floor.  In doing so, they will be able to 
demand safeguards that go beyond what the TPP Agreement 
provides.  They will also be able to use the TPP investment chapter as 
a benchmark for the minimum safeguards that should be included in 
any international trade or investment agreement containing ISDS.  
Given the developing countries’ difficulty in coming up with 
safeguards in a vacuum, the existence of the TPP safeguards and the 
related textual language is particularly useful. 
B. Protection of Developing Country Investments 
The second set of benefits pertains to the protection of intellectual 
property investments from developing countries.  ISDS is likely to be 
useful for not only the intellectual property rights now enshrined in 
the TPP Agreement or the TRIPS Agreement but also other types of 
intellectual property rights that may be recognized in the future.  As 
                                                     
 336. See discussion supra Part III. 
 337. See supra text accompanying notes 139–55. 
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long as businesses in developing countries hold these rights, ISDS will 
benefit them. 
Contrary to what many have believed,338 ISDS does not discriminate 
between the intellectual property investments of developed countries 
and those of developing countries.  ISDS harms the latter group of 
countries so significantly because this group does not obtain the same 
range of benefits from the intellectual property system as its 
developed counterpart.339  ISDS merely perpetuates—and, at times, 
amplifies—the inequitable intellectual property system enshrined in 
the TRIPS Agreement and TRIPS-plus bilateral, regional, and 
plurilateral trade agreements.340 
Interestingly, and somewhat counterintuitively, enforcement—
including enforcement through ISDS—is an area where developed 
and developing countries can reach some common ground.341  At the 
moment, developing countries hesitate to support stronger 
enforcement because they see limited benefits from such 
enforcement.  Their view, however, may change in the future if the 
intellectual property system starts offering stronger protection to the 
developing countries’ intellectual property interests.  Possible 
benefits to these countries include greater protection of genetic 
resources, traditional knowledge, and traditional cultural 
expressions, as well as the expansion of geographical indications to 
cover such food products as Basmati rice and Darjeeling tea.342 
                                                     
 338. E.g., Rick Rowden, 9 Ways TPP Is Bad for Developing Countries, FOREIGN POL’Y 
(July 7, 2015, 12:58 PM), http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/07/07/9-ways-the-tpp-is-
bad-for-developing-countries. 
 339. See Biadgleng, supra note 53, at 1 (“[T]he industries in developing countries 
that do not have significant assets allocated in different jurisdictions do not gain a 
comparable advantage from these agreements.”). 
 340. See supra text accompanying notes 139–55. 
 341. See Peter K. Yu, Cultural Relics, Intellectual Property, and Intangible Heritage, 81 
TEMP. L. REV. 433, 453 (2008) [hereinafter Yu, Cultural Relics] (“[B]ecause of the 
importance of enforcement in [the areas of online and offline piracy], enforcement 
issues may provide a promising opportunity for both developed and less-developed 
countries to cooperate.”); Peter K. Yu, Enforcement:  A Neglected Child in the Intellectual 
Property Family, in THE INTERNET AND THE EMERGING IMPORTANCE OF NEW FORMS OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 279, 299 (Susy Frankel & Daniel Gervais eds., 2016) 
(“[E]nforcement is actually one area in which developed and developing countries 
can team up with each other.”). 
 342. Cf. KEITH E. MASKUS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 
239 (2000) (noting the developing countries’ demand for greater protection of 
geographical indications relating to “food products that could be protected to their 
advantage, such as Basmati rice and Darjeeling tea”). 
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In the ISDS context, the protection of traditional knowledge will 
present some inevitable challenges considering that such protection 
is generally introduced to address biopiracy.343  Instead of protecting 
foreign investors against uncompensated expropriation by the host 
state—a primary goal of ISDS—traditional knowledge protection 
shields the host state’s indigenous population from the expropriation 
of indigenous materials by foreign investors.  Nevertheless, if 
traditional knowledge can be protected (and commodified) as 
intellectual property rights and if businesses holding those rights can 
have foreign investments, ISDS will allow these businesses to sue host 
states in the developed world the same way it allows transnational 
corporations to sue host states in the developing world. 
To be sure, the above scenario is only possible when businesses 
holding traditional knowledge can make foreign investments in 
developed countries and when such knowledge is protected as an 
intellectual property right.  Nevertheless, even if this scenario fails to 
materialize, ISDS does not favor the intellectual property rights of 
developed countries at the expense of their developing country 
counterparts.  Indeed, other than privileging resourceful countries, 
ISDS has been fairly neutral to disputing parties. 
C. Reduced Volume of WTO Disputes 
The third set of benefits relates to the reduced use of the WTO 
dispute settlement process.  Commentators have noted how 
transnational corporations have successfully worked with developed 
country governments to push for intellectual property reforms344 as well 
as successful WTO panel decisions.345  However, enough evidence has 
also shown that governments do not always meet the specific demands of 
domestic industries346 due partly to the overall trade picture and partly 
to other political and non-political considerations.347 
                                                     
 343. For discussions of biopiracy, see generally sources cited in Yu, Cultural Relics, 
supra note 341, at 481 n.266. 
 344. See Paul C.B. Liu, U.S. Industry’s Influence on Intellectual Property Negotiations and 
Special 301 Actions, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 87, 87 (1994) (discussing the operation 
of the Section 301 process and how it relates to U.S. trade negotiations). 
 345. See GREGORY C. SHAFFER, DEFENDING INTERESTS:  PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS 
IN WTO LITIGATION (2003) (discussing the partnerships between developed country 
governments and transnational corporations in WTO litigation). 
 346. See Dreyfuss & Frankel, supra note 26, at 572 (“In the WTO, states decide 
whether to bring a dispute to the [Dispute Settlement Body].  They may decline to 
pursue a perceived injury for political or policy reasons.”); Yu, From Pirates to Partners 
II, supra note 88, at 923–26 (noting that the USTR initially took a “wait-and-see” 
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In the trade arena, the complex decision-making process required 
can be illustrated by China’s creative response to the USTR’s 
relentless push for greater intellectual property reforms in the mid-
1990s.348  Although the USTR’s strong-arm tactics since the late 1980s 
had resulted in the negotiation of four bilateral instruments in 1989, 
1992, 1995, and 1996,349 China slowly improved its ability to respond 
to U.S. pressure.  In the run-up to the last negotiation in spring 1996, 
Chinese Premier Li Peng went to France to sign a $1.5 billion order 
for thirty short-haul Airbus planes.350 
On the surface, this purchase was irrelevant to the United States’ 
intellectual property demands.  In reality, however, the Airbus order 
completely changed the cross-industry dynamics within the USTR.  
Even though the U.S. intellectual property industries claimed that 
trade sanctions were badly needed to protect against a potential $2 
billion loss in intellectual property-based goods and services,351 the 
USTR was confronted with Boeing’s immediate loss of $1.5 billion worth 
of contracts to its European archrival (assuming that China would have 
purchased those planes from Boeing).352  One can only imagine how 
difficult it was for the USTR to explain to Boeing executives (and 
                                                     
approach and refused to file a WTO complaint against China despite repeated 
complaints and demands from the business community). 
 347. See Dreyfuss & Frankel, supra note 26, at 573 (“[I]nvestment arbitration is 
initiated by the investor right holders.  Geopolitical considerations and social welfare 
are not necessarily relevant to their decisions to demand arbitration, settle disputes, 
or make particular assertions.”). 
 348. See Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners:  Protecting Intellectual Property in China in 
the Twenty-first Century, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 131, 140–51 (2000) [hereinafter Yu, From 
Pirates to Partners I] (recounting the USTR’s aggressive effort toward China in the late 
1980s and early 1990s). 
 349. See Memorandum of Understanding Between the People’s Republic of China 
and the United States on the Protection of Intellectual Property, May 19, 1989, 
China-U.S., reprinted in PRC Agrees to Push for Copyright Law That Will Protect Computer 
Software, WORLD INTELL. PROP. REP., July 1989, at 151; Memorandum of 
Understanding on the Protection of Intellectual Property, Jan. 17, 1992, China-U.S., 
T.I.A.S. No. 12036 (1995); Agreement Regarding Intellectual Property Rights, Feb. 
26, 1995, China-U.S., 34 I.L.M. 881 (1995); China Implementation of the 1995 
Intellectual Property Rights Agreement, June 17, 1996, China-U.S., 
http://tcc.export.gov/trade_agreements/all_trade_agreements/exp_005361.asp 
(last visited Feb. 5, 2017). 
 350. Yu, From Pirates to Partners I, supra note 348, at 168. 
 351. The potential loss in the intellectual property area is likely to be much lower 
than the industry’s reported figures, which tend to overstate the ability or interest of 
the local people to purchase protected foreign products at stated retail prices.  See id. 
at 175–76; WILLIAM P. ALFORD, TO STEAL A BOOK IS AN ELEGANT OFFENSE:  
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN CHINESE CIVILIZATION 129 n.13 (1995). 
 352. Yu, From Pirates to Partners I, supra note 348, at 168. 
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shareholders) why their company had to suffer to help reduce the loss 
experienced by the U.S. entertainment and software industries. 
Obviously, in situations where the USTR hesitates to act on the 
industries’ behalf, ISDS will benefit those industries by allowing them 
to file complaints without governmental participation.  Nevertheless, 
their growing ability to file independent complaints without 
government assistance or intervention may eventually backfire on 
them by discouraging the government from filing WTO complaints 
on their behalves in the first place.  After all, governments do not 
want to incur political capital if they can avoid it.  Incurring such 
capital will become less worthwhile if private industries can obtain 
compensation themselves through ISDS. 
Thus, in an unexpected way, ISDS may actually reduce the total 
volume of WTO disputes targeting developing countries.  That some 
WTO disputes have been converted to ISDS disputes does not, in and 
of itself, become a benefit.  Nevertheless, there are serious benefits to 
avoiding WTO disputes with developed country governments, such as 
the European Union or the United States.  Being sued by Philip Morris 
is just not the same as being sued by the U.S. government, not to 
mention that states have historically won about sixty percent of those 
ISDS cases involving the final resolution of the underlying disputes.353 
D. Benefits to Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises 
The last set of benefits involves small and medium-sized enterprises 
(“SMEs”).  Although the analysis of SMEs is highly important 
considering that many businesses in developing countries are SMEs, 
this analysis can go either way, and the benefits are somewhat unclear. 
Commentators have widely debated the benefits of ISDS to SMEs.  As 
the USTR declared in its fact sheet, “ISDS can be of particular benefit to 
[SMEs], which often lack the resources or expertise to navigate foreign 
legal systems and seek redress for injury at the hands of a foreign 
government.  Indeed, SMEs and individuals have accounted for about 
half of all cases brought under international arbitration.”354  Similarly, 
the Center for Strategic and International Studies stated in its report, 
                                                     
 353. See Franck, Development and Outcomes, supra note 106, at 447 (“[G]overnments 
(57.7%) were more likely than investors (38.5%) to win cases and have no damages 
awarded for alleged treaty breaches.”); Franck, Using Investor-State Mediation Rules, 
supra note 116, at 79 (“[T]he 144 publicly available awards (up to January 2012) 
where arbitrators ended up resolving a treaty dispute included 57 investor wins 
(where investors were awarded some form of damages) and 87 State wins (where 
States suffered US$0 in a liability finding).”). 
 354. ISDS Fact Sheet, supra note 36. 
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“[i]n the 105 disputes filed at ICSID by American investors, two-thirds of 
the participants in the arbitrations were individuals or SMEs [defined as 
business entities with fewer than 500 employees].”355  Despite these 
numbers, the high arbitration costs have led one to wonder what type of 
SME these statistics actually cover.  Were the covered SMEs mostly from 
developed countries?  Developed and emerging countries?  Or 
developed, emerging, and developing countries? 
Although ISDS may benefit SMEs in developed countries as well as 
those in China, India, and other large developing countries, it is very 
likely that the high arbitration costs will put SMEs in smaller 
developing countries at a significant disadvantage356 or even prevent 
them from filing ISDS complaints against their host states in the first 
place.  Thus, it remains to be seen how beneficial ISDS will be to 
businesses in developing countries. 
CONCLUSION 
Although developing country policymakers, academic and policy 
commentators, and civil society organizations continue to strongly oppose 
the use of investment law in the intellectual property arena, it seems 
inevitable that such law will be used to resolve international intellectual 
property disputes.  After all, many industries and their supportive 
governments have already viewed intellectual property protection through 
an investment lens.  Thus, it will be only a matter of time before the 
investment-related aspects of intellectual property rights are emphasized 
to the same extent as the trade-related aspects of these rights. 
Nevertheless, implementing the type of ISDS mechanism provided 
by the TPP Agreement is not a foregone conclusion.  Even with the 
various substantive and procedural safeguards that the TPP 
Agreement has instituted to improve ISDS, the mechanism remains 
flawed.  This Article therefore proposes both conceptual and 
institutional improvements to address these flaws. 
Some readers will undoubtedly be more optimistic about the 
developing countries’ prospects for resisting the use of ISDS in the 
intellectual property field.  If they are right, the harm that ISDS 
generates will not materialize—or will, at least, be significantly 
                                                     
 355. MILLER & HICKS, supra note 31, at 10. 
 356. Gus Van Harten & Pavel Malysheuski, Who Has Benefited Financially from 
Investment Treaty Arbitration?  An Evaluation of the Size and Wealth of Claimants 12 
(Osgoode Hall Law School Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 
14, 2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2713876 (“ISDS appears to have created among 
smaller and unknown investors a small number of lucky winners and a much larger 
number of apparent losers.”). 
YU.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/13/2017  6:42 PM 
910 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:829 
curtailed.  Regardless, it will be important to start thinking more 
deeply about the investment-related aspects of intellectual property 
rights.  After all, policymakers, commentators, and civil society 
organizations are unlikely to propose solutions to improve ISDS if 
they just focus on how to keep ISDS outside the intellectual property 
field.  By the time they realize that the mechanism cannot be kept 
outside the field, it will just be too late to start studying the 
investment-related aspects of intellectual property rights. 
The arrival of the TRIPS Agreement and the application of trade 
rules to the intellectual property field have woken up many 
commentators and civil society organizations.357  The TPP Agreement 
and other TRIPS-plus trade or investment agreements containing 
ISDS are likely to do the same.  Thus, it is high time we started 
preparing for the growing use of investment law in the intellectual 
property field.  Greater preparation and engagement in this area will 
help us improve ISDS while enhancing our understanding of this 
highly controversial mechanism.  For those who want to keep ISDS 
outside the intellectual property field, a deepened understanding will 
also strengthen our ability to resist the use of investment law in the 
intellectual property field. 
                                                     
 357. See SELL, supra note 47, at 181 (“When I asked some public-regarding 
copyright activists ‘where they had been’ during TRIPS, they told me they had been 
‘sleeping’ but that because of TRIPS they had ‘woken up.’”); Ellen ’t Hoen, The Revised 
Drug Strategy:  Access to Essential Medicines, Intellectual Property, and the World Health 
Organization, in ACCESS TO KNOWLEDGE IN THE AGE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 127, 
131 (Gaëlle Krikorian & Amy Kapczynski eds., 2010) (stating that it was at the 
International Conference on National Medicinal Drug Policies in Sydney in 1995 
that “for the first time public-health advocates raised the concern that the 
globalization of new international trade rules and the harmonization of regulatory 
requirements would restrict countries’ ability to implement drug policies that would 
ensure access to medicine for all”); Keith E. Maskus, The WIPO Development Agenda:  A 
Cautionary Note, in THE DEVELOPMENT AGENDA:  GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 163, 164 (Neil Weinstock Netanel ed., 2008) (“Policymakers, 
non-governmental organizations, the media, and even many legal scholars have 
awakened to the fact that IP regulations have rather fundamental implications for 
the processes of economic development.”). 
